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Abstract
The term service network (SN) denotes a network of software services in
which complex software applications are provided to customers by aggregating
multiple elementary services. These networks are based on the service-oriented
computing (SOC) paradigm, which defines the fundamental technical concepts
for software services over electronic networks, e.g., Web services and, most re-
cently, Cloud services. For the provision of software services to customers,
software service providers (SPs) have to allocate their scarce computational re-
sources (i.e., hardware and software) of a certain quality to customer requests.
The SOC paradigm facilitates interoperability over organizational boundaries
by representing business relationships on the software system level. Composite
software services aggregate multiple software services into software applications.
This aggregation is denoted as service composition. The loose coupling of ser-
vices leads to SNs as dynamic entities with changing interdependencies between
services.
For composite software services, these dependencies exist across SN tiers;
they result from the procurement of services, which are themselves utilized
to produce additional services, and constitute a major problem for resource
allocation in SNs. If these dependencies are not considered, the fulfillment
of agreements may become unaccomplishable (overcommitment). Hence, the
consideration of service dependencies is crucial for the allocation of service
providers’ resources to fulfill customer requests in SNs.
However, existing resource allocation methods, which could consider these
dependencies – such as combinatorial auctions with a central auctioneer for the
whole SN – are not applicable, since there are no central coordinating entities
in SNs. The application of an allocation mechanism that does not consider
these dependencies might negatively affect the actual service delivery; results
are penalty payments as well as a damage to the reputation of the providers.
This research is conducted in accordance to the design science paradigm
in information system research. It is a problem-solving paradigm, which tar-
gets the construction and evaluation of IT artifacts. The objectives of this
research are to develop and evaluate an allocation protocol, which can consider
multi-tier service dependencies without the existence of central coordinating
entities. Therefore, an interaction protocol engineering (IPE) perspective is
applied to solve the problem of multi-tier dependencies in resource allocation.
This approach provides a procedure model for designing interaction protocols
ABSTRACT IV
for multiagent systems, and is closely related to the well-established area of
communication protocol engineering.
Automated resource allocation in SNs is analyzed in this research by repre-
senting the actors as autonomous software agents in the software system. The
actors delegate their objectives to their software agents, which conduct the ne-
gotiations for service provision on their behalf. Thus, these agents communicate
concerning the resource allocation; in this process, the sequence of communi-
cation interactions is crucial to the problem addressed. Interaction protocols
define a structured exchange of defined messages between agents; they facilitate
agent conversations.
When multiple agents have to reach agreements by negotiation and bar-
gaining, such as in case with allocating scarce resources, game theory provides
means to formalize and analyze the most rational choice of actions for the in-
teracting agents. Based on a formal framework for resource allocation in SNs,
this research first performs a game-theoretic problem analysis; it is concerned
with the existence, as well as the complexity of computing optimal allocations.
In addition, Nash equilibria are analyzed for optimal allocations. Second, a dis-
tributed, auction-based allocation protocol, which prevents overcommitments
and guarantees socially optimal allocations for single customer requests under
certain assumptions, is proposed. Therefore, a game-theoretic model and an
operationizable specification of the protocol are presented. Third, it is formally
verified that the protocol enables multi-tier resource allocation and avoids over-
commitments by proofs for the game-theoretic model and by model checking
for the interaction protocol specification; using the model checker Spin, safety
properties like the absence of deadlock are as well formally verified as the proto-
col enabling multi-tier resource allocation. Fourth, the efficacy and the benefits
of the proposed protocol are demonstrated by multiagent simulation for con-
current customers. The experimental evaluation provides evidence of the pro-
tocol’s efficiency compared to the socially optimal allocation as a centralized
benchmark in different settings, e.g., network topologies and different bidding
policies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Resource allocation in service networks
The term service network (SN) denotes a network of software services in which
complex software applications are provided to customers by aggregating multi-
ple elementary services. These networks are based on the service-oriented com-
puting (SOC) paradigm, which provides the fundamental technical concepts
for software services over electronic networks, e.g., Web services and, most re-
cently, Cloud services (Blau, van Dinther, Conte, Xu & Weinhardt 2009, Arm-
brust, Fox, Griffith, Joseph, Katz, Konwinski, Lee, Patterson, Rabkin, Stoica
& Zaharia 2010). Studies suggest that Cloud-based SNs are gaining widespread
acceptance and may provide economic benefits for businesses as well as entire
economies (e.g., (Alford & Morton 2009, Hogan & Mohamed 2010, Vehlow &
Golkowsky 2011, Alcatel-Lucent 2012)).
SOC enables the loose coupling of software services to provide composite
software application services to customers. The main objective of the SOC
paradigm is to facilitate interoperability over organizational boundaries, repre-
senting real-world business relationships on the software system level. Compos-
ite software services aggregate multiple software services into software applica-
tions. This aggregation is denoted as service composition. The loose coupling
of services leads to SNs as dynamic entities with changing interdependencies
between services (Papazoglou, Traverso, Dustdar & Leymann 2008).
The provision of software services in SNs requires non-consumable resources
(hardware and software) that are limited and possessed by service providers
(SPs). The SPs’ resources contribute to the production of service applica-
tions in SNs by means of service provision and composition. For the supply
of software services to customers, software SPs have to allocate their scarce
computational resources of a certain quality to customer requests, i.e., re-
1
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serve respective resources for software services on the contracted service level.
In return, SPs receive monetary compensations for providing services to cus-
tomers. Supply and demand for services are assigned by an allocation mecha-
nism (Rasmusen 1989, Binmore 1992). Thus, the allocation mechanism of SPs’
resources to fulfill customer requests is of major importance for SNs.
SNs can be regarded as a special kind of digital supply chains with a
network structure, in which nodes constitute the software systems of actors
– SPs and customers – and edges constitute formal representations of busi-
ness relationships for software services. This research analyzes automated re-
source allocation in SNs by representing the actors as autonomous software
agents (Wooldridge & Jennings 1995, Jennings 2000, Russell & Norvig 2003)
in the software system. The actors delegate their objectives to their software
agents, which conduct the negotiations for service provision on their behalf
(Huhns, Singh, Burstein, Decker, Durfee, Finin, Gasser, Goradia, Jennings,
Kiran Lakkaraju Nakashima, Van Dyke Parunak, Rosenschein, Ruvinsky, Suk-
thankar, Swarup, Sycara, Tambe, Wagner & Zavafa 2005). The representation
of real-world business relationships requires formal contractual agreements. Ex-
plicit formal statements of the obligations and guarantees regarding software
services in a business relationship are referred to as service level agreements
(SLAs) (Verma 1999). A SLA defines a software service as part of a contract be-
tween a SP and a service customer in a SN. SOC-related SLA approaches aim at
providing an abstraction of the service while facilitating measurement and mon-
itoring of service properties agreed upon (Czajkowski, Foster & Kesselman 2004,
pp. 264–265). Thus, agreements between software agents are represented by
SLA specifications. Figure 1.1 shows a use case diagram for automated resource
allocation in SNs in accordance to the actors’ delegated objectives.
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Figure 1.1: Resource allocation in service networks use case diagram.
For composite software services, service dependencies exist across SN tiers;
they result from the procurement of services, which are themselves utilized to
produce additional services, and constitute a major problem for resource allo-
cation in SNs. The individual requirements of the service customer determine
the requirements of agreements that have to be established in upstream SN
tiers. This results in networks of agreements with service dependencies. If
these dependencies are not considered, the fulfillment of agreements may be-
come unaccomplishable (overcommitment). The application of an allocation
mechanism that does not respect these dependencies might negatively affect
the actual service delivery; results are penalty payments as well as a damage to
the reputation of the providers. Hence, the consideration of service dependen-
cies is crucial for the allocation of service providers’ resources to fulfill customer
requests in SNs.
However, existing resource allocation methods, which could respect these
dependencies – such as combinatorial auctions with a central auctioneer for the
whole SN – are not applicable, since there are no central coordinating entities in
SNs. In addition, finding optimal allocations is often computationally infeasible
in this setting (Bo & Lesser 2010). Thus, the objectives of this research are to
develop and evaluate an allocation protocol which is able to consider multi-tier
service dependencies without the existence of central coordinating entities.
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Example As an illustrative example, a scenario with two customer agents is
shown in figure 1.2. The service requested by the customer agents are data
mining services in the same time frame, which are provided by SP agents over
the network (software as a service, SaaS). The customer agents’ requests include
definitions of the services and respective parameters (required capacities in
this example). The SP agents have to subcontract parts of the service to,
respectively procure appropriate sub-services from, their suppliers in the next
tier. In this example, both data mining SP agents require a specialized analysis
service for their data mining service software. In addition, one of the data
mining services along with the analysis service require data storage services.
storage SP agent
input
Ø
output
10GB
analysis SP agent
input
10GB
output
10MB/s
data mining SP agent2
input
7MB/s
output
2MB/s
customer agent1
input
1MB/s
output
Ø
customer agent2
input
2MB/s
output
Ø
data mining SP agent1
input1
10GB
output
1MB/sinput2
6MB/s
XOR
XOR
Figure 1.2: Service network example.
The multi-tier resource allocation has to ensure that agreements will either
be established with the customer agents and with respective supplier agents in
all tiers required or no agreements will be established at all. If a binding agree-
ment between a SP agent and a customer agent is established before binding
procurement agreements with the SP agents in the next tier are established, the
SP agents may be unable to fulfill the agreements with the customer agents.
In this example, it is assumed that the storage SP agent can either provide
its service to the analysis SP agent or data mining SP agent1, since the required
capacity of the latter two exceeds the available capacity of the storage SP agent
(10GB + 10GB > 10GB). Similarly, both data mining SP agent1 and data
mining SP agent2 require the specialized analysis service. However, the analysis
SP agent has insufficient capacity to serve both agents (6MB/s + 7MB/s >
10MB/s).
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In this example scenario, just two possible allocations are feasible. Figure
1.3 shows the two feasible allocations of the example scenario in black, while
unallocated services are depicted in gray.
storage SP agent
input
Ø
output
10GB
analysis SP agent
input
10GB
output
10MB/s
data mining SP agent2
input
7MB/s
output
2MB/s
customer agent1
input
1MB/s
output
Ø
customer agent2
input
2MB/s
output
Ø
data mining SP agent1
input1
10GB
output
1MB/sinput2
6MB/s
storage SP agent
input
Ø
output
10GB
analysis SP agent
input
10GB
output
10MB/s
data mining SP agent2
input
7MB/s
output
2MB/s
customer agent1
input
1MB/s
output
Ø
customer agent2
input
2MB/s
output
Ø
data mining SP agent1
input1
10GB
output
1MB/sinput2
6MB/s
(i)
(ii)
Figure 1.3: Feasible allocations example.
The allocation mechanism has to ensure that
1. data mining SP agent2 does not establish an agreement with customers
agent2 if it cannot procure the analysis service (figure 1.3, (i)),
2. data mining SP agent1 does not establish an agreement with customers
agent1 if it cannot procure both the analysis and storage services (figure
1.3, (ii)), and
3. the data mining SP agents must not purchase services from their upstream
provider agents if the purchased services cannot be used for production
by the data mining SP agents.
1.2 Research approach
Resource allocation is a well-established field in multiagent research (Chevaleyre,
Dunne, Endriss, Lang, Lemaitre, Maudet, Padget, Phelps, Rodriguez-aguilar &
Sousa 2006). Each actor in a SN (service providers and customers) is repre-
sented by an autonomous software agent (Huhns et al. 2005). These agents
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communicate concerning the resource allocation in SNs. The sequence of com-
munication interactions is crucial to the problem addressed, as stated in sec-
tion 1.1. Interaction protocols define a structured exchange of defined messages
between agents; they facilitate agent conversations (Huhns & Stephens 1999,
Wooldridge 2009).
This research studies multi-tier dependencies in resource allocation from
an interaction protocol engineering (IPE) perspective (Huget & Koning 2003).
IPE is concerned with designing interaction protocols for multiagent systems,
and is closely related to communication protocol engineering (Holzmann 1991).
Although there are conceptual differences between the assumptions for commu-
nicating processes in distributed systems and communicating agents, especially
regarding the level of abstraction (Jennings & Wooldridge 2000), prior research
in multiagent systems suggests that methods and tools from the communication
protocol area are also useful for technical aspects of developing and validating
agent interaction protocols (Walton 2007, Giordano, Martelli & Schwind 2007);
basic requirements apply for both communication and interaction protocols
(e.g., absence of deadlock and unreachable states).
The IPE approach comprises five phases. In the analysis phase (1), this
research studies resource allocation with regard to dependencies between differ-
ent SN tiers and formally analyzes these dependencies. When multiple agents
have to reach agreements by negotiation and bargaining, such as in case with
allocating scarce resources, game theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944,
Rasmusen 1989, Binmore 1992) provides means to formalize and analyze the
most rational choice of actions for the interacting agents (Rosenschein 1985,
Rosenschein & Zlotkin 1994, Kraus 1997, Parsons & Wooldridge 2002). Based
on a formal framework for resource allocation in SNs, this research performs a
game-theoretic problem analysis; it is concerned with the existence, as well as
the complexity of computing optimal allocations. In addition, Nash equilibria
(Nash 1950) are investigated for optimal allocations.
In the formal description phase (2), the protocol is constructed and for-
mally specified. In this thesis, a distributed, auction-based allocation protocol,
which prevents overcommitments and guarantees socially optimal allocations
for single customer requests under certain assumptions, is proposed. A game-
theoretic specification of the protocol is provided, based on the formal frame-
work. In addition, a specification is presented in UML sequence diagrams. The
model checker (Clarke, Grumberg & Peled 1999) Spin (Holzmann 1997) accepts
protocol specifications in the verification language Promela (a Process Meta
Language) (Holzmann 1991). Towards a formal description of the protocol in
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Promela, finite state machines (FSMs) are constructed for the participants.
Thus, states are assigned to the participants for every (alternative) interaction
on the basis of the UML sequence diagrams.
The fulfillment of the requirements by the formal descriptions is evidenced
in the verification phase (3). This research proves that the proposed protocol
prevents overcommitments and guarantees socially optimal allocations for single
customer requests under the assumption, that resources are non-substitutable
between SPs, based on the game-theoretic model. Further, the model checker
Spin is applied to verify certain formal properties of the protocol description in
Promela. These include safety (e.g., absence of deadlock) as well as liveness
properties of the protocol, expressed in linear temporal logic (LTL). Thus, it is
verified that the protocol allows multi-tier resource allocation.
The implementation phase (4) comprises the construction of an executable
protocol. The proposed protocol is implemented as a reusable capability for
the Jadex BDI agent system (Pokahr, Braubach & Lamersdorf 2005). The sim-
ulation experiments are executed using this implementation, along with Jadex
BDI agents representing the actors in a dedicated simulation system.
Finally, the conformance test phase (5) validates the conformance of the
implemented protocol with the properties defined in the analysis phase (Huget
& Koning 2003). The efficacy and the benefits of the proposed protocol are
demonstrated through multiagent simulation (Kluegl 2001) of different Cloud
computing scenarios. In the simulation experiments, the efficiency of the pro-
tocol is compared to the optimal allocation as a centralized benchmark in dif-
ferent settings (e.g., network topologies or number of customer and SP agents)
for three different SP bidding policies. Further, the experiments are executed
with and without substitutable resources. SP agents can decide if they use
own resources or procure sub-services from SP agents in the next tier in case
of substitutable resources. Table 1.1 summarizes the methods applied.
Table 1.1: Methods used.
# IPE phase methods used
1 analysis game theory
2 formal description game theory, UML, FSMs, Promela (LTL)
3 verification proofs, model checking (Spin)
4 implementation Jadex (java)
5 conformance test multiagent simulation
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1.3 Epistemological position
This research is conducted in accordance to the design science paradigm in
information systems research proposed by Hevner, March, Park & Ram (2004).
Research in the information systems discipline is mainly characterized by two
paradigms: The behavioral-science approach – based on natural science research
principles – aims at developing and justifying theories that explain or predict
organizational and human behavior, regarding the utilization of information
systems. In contrast, the design science paradigm – based on engineering and
the sciences of the artificial (Simon 1996) – is a problem-solving paradigm. It
targets the construction and evaluation of IT artifacts, enabling organizations
to address information-related tasks (Hevner et al. 2004).
Hevner et al. (2004) propose seven guidelines for effective information sys-
tem research; these are shown in table 1.2 and discussed with regard to this
work in the following.
Table 1.2: Design-science research guidelines.
(Hevner et al. 2004, p. 83)
guideline description
guideline 1:
design as an
artifact
Design-science research must produce a viable artifact
in the form of a construct, a model, a method, or an
instantiation.
guideline 2:
problem
relevance
The objective of design-science research is to develop
technology-based solutions to important and relevant
business problems.
guideline 3:
design
evaluation
The utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artifact
must be rigorously demonstrated via well-executed eval-
uation methods.
guideline 4:
research
contributions
Effective design-science research must provide clear and
verifiable contributions in the areas of the design arti-
fact, design foundations, and/or design methodologies.
guideline 5:
research rigor
Design-science research relies upon the application of
rigorous methods in both the construction and evalua-
tion of the design artifact.
guideline 6:
design as a
search process
The search for an effective artifact requires utilizing
available means to reach desired ends while satisfying
laws in the problem environment.
guideline 7:
communication
of research
Design-science research must be presented effectively
both to technology-oriented as well as management-
oriented audiences.
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Guideline 1: design as an artifact Design-science research in information
systems results in purposeful IT artifacts addressing important organizational
problems. IT artifacts are defined as constructs (vocabulary and symbols),
models (abstractions and representations), methods (algorithms and practices),
and instantiations (implemented and prototype systems) (Hevner et al. 2004,
p. 77). In this thesis, a distributed resource allocation protocol is constructed
as a method artifact. Further, an implementation of this protocol is presented
as an instantiation artifact.
Guideline 2: problem relevance This thesis addresses multi-tier service
dependencies in resource allocation, i.e., distributed resource allocation without
the existence of central coordinating entities. The problem consists of contrac-
tual dependencies along the complete SN. If these dependencies are not con-
sidered, the fulfillment of agreements may be unaccomplishable, due to missing
agreements with other actors; however, these agreements are required for the
fulfillment (avoiding overcommitment). The application of an allocation mech-
anism that does not respect these dependencies might negatively affect the
actual service delivery; results are penalty payments as well as a damage to the
reputation of the providers.
Guideline 3: design evaluation The evaluation within the design science
framework has to demonstrate the utility, quality, and efficacy of the con-
structed artifact by means of appropriate methods (Hevner et al. 2004, pp.
85–87). This research verifies the formal specification of the proposed protocol
(i) by proofs and (ii) by model checking regarding safety (e.g., absence of dead-
lock), as well as liveness properties. The model checker Spin (Holzmann 1997)
is applied to verify that the protocol specification is sound and allows multi-tier
resource allocation. This work evaluates the protocol implementation experi-
mentally by multiagent-based simulation (Kluegl 2001), motivated by real-world
application scenarios from the Cloud-computing domain.
Guideline 4: research contributions The developed artifact has to be
innovative and provide a clear contribution; i.e., it has to be novel in terms of
solving a previously unsolved problem or it has to solve a known problem in
a more effective or efficient manner (Hevner et al. 2004). The contributions of
this thesis are a formal framework and the specification and implementation
of a novel interaction protocol for multi-tier resource allocation for composite
service provision over multiple SN tiers. In contrast to current work, it avoids
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overcommitments by service providers and does not require central entities for
coordination.
Guideline 5: research rigor Research rigor refers to the application of
rigorous methods for the construction and evaluation of design artifacts and
addresses the way design-science research is conducted. Research rigor requires
the effective use of the knowledge base, i.e., theoretical foundations and re-
search methodologies (Hevner et al. 2004, p. 87–88). This work’s theoretical
foundations include an economic and a technical part. The economic part
comprises game theory and service auctions in SNs. The technical part cov-
ers foundations of multiagent systems, service-oriented information systems,
and SLAs. To solve the problem of multi-tier resource allocation, an interac-
tion protocol engineering perspective (Huget & Koning 2003) is applied. This
approach is closely related to the well-established area of communication pro-
tocol engineering (Holzmann 1991). For the verification of required protocol
properties, formal methods from game theory (i.e., proofs) and communication
protocol engineering (model checking) are applied. The simulation method used
is multi-agent simulation (Kluegl 2001), which constitutes a mature method for
the evaluation of interaction protocol implementations.
Guideline 6: design as a search process The design process can be re-
garded as a search process for an effective solution to a problem. Problem
solving can be defined as utilizing available means to reach desired ends while
satisfying laws existing in the environment (Simon 1996). Means qualify the set
of actions and resources available to construct a solution; ends describe goals
and constraints on the solution; and laws denote uncontrollable forces in the
environment. However, it may not be possible to formulate appropriately and
pose mathematically all relevant means, ends, or laws of an information system
design problem to apply standard operations research techniques to determine
an optimal solution. Assuming it is possible to do so, the size and complexity
of the solution space will often render the problem computationally infeasible.
For these problems, the search processes consist of determination of satisfac-
tory (i.e., satisficing (Simon 1996)) solutions, without explicitly specifying all
possible solutions (Hevner et al. 2004, p. 88–90). Regarding the formal speci-
fication of the protocol, this thesis formally verifies that the protocol is sound
and allows multi-tier resource allocation. The simulation-based evaluation of
the protocol implementation shows that the proposed solution is satisfactory
with regard to the requirements addressed.
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Guideline 7: communication of research Results of design-science re-
search must be presented to technology- and management-oriented audiences
in order to extend the research community’s knowledge base and to make the
artifact’s benefits available to practitioners (Hevner et al. 2004, p. 90). A pre-
liminary version of the protocol specification and a preliminary evaluation have
been described and demonstrated to management-oriented audiences within the
scope of the EU ICT project BREIN (Laria 2009, Jones 2010). The underly-
ing software architecture of the system used for the simulation-based evalua-
tion of the protocol implementation has been presented in (Karaenke, Micsik
& Kirn 2009). The approach for quality of service (QoS) parameter aggre-
gation has been published in (Karaenke & Leukel 2010, Karaenke, Leukel &
Sugumaran 2013). A multi-tier contract net protocol specification for logistics
service chains has been proposed in (Karaenke & Kirn 2010a). The general-
ization of this preliminary protocol to SNs and a formal verification by model
checking have been partly described in (Karaenke & Kirn 2010b).
1.4 Outline
This thesis is structured in five chapters. It starts with an overview of multia-
gent systems and service networks, continues with a requirements analysis and
related work, before presenting the proposed protocol along with its verification
and validation.
Chapter 1: Introduction This chapter outlines the motivation and problem
addressed in this thesis, its research approach and contributions, and discusses
the epistemological position of this research.
Chapter 2: State of the art This chapter gives an overview of the fun-
damentals and basic concepts of multiagent systems, game theory in multia-
gent systems, service networks, and service-oriented computing. In addition, it
provides a game-theoretic problem analysis based on a formal model for SNs,
presents a specification of the requirements, and discusses related work.
Chapter 3: Design This chapter presents the protocol specification math-
ematically based on the game-theoretic model, in UML sequence diagrams,
and in a Promela model. Different bidding policies for service providers are
formally analyzed. Further, the protocol implementation and the simulation
system are presented.
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Chapter 4: Evaluation This chapter evaluates the proposed protocol. First,
the protocol specification is evaluated based on the formal, game-theoretic
model. Second, safety and liveness properties of the Promela model are veri-
fied by means of the model checker Spin. Third, the results of the multiagent
simulation, which evaluates the protocol implementation, are presented and
discussed.
Chapter 5: Conclusions This chapter summarizes the results, draws major
conclusions, outlines implications and limitations of the proposed protocol, and
gives an outlook on future research.
Chapter 2
State of the art
This chapter provides the definitions of key concepts and underlying assump-
tions from multiagent systems, game theory in multiagent systems, and service
networks. Based on a formal model for SNs, it uses game theory to derive a set
of requirements that must be fulfilled to solve the problem addressed. Then it
reviews relevant allocation approaches from the extant literature and assesses
if and in how far they meet these requirements.
2.1 Definitions and assumptions
2.1.1 Autonomous agents & multiagent systems
This section introduces fundamental concepts from the distributed artificial
intelligence (DAI) area. DAI can be divided into two primary research ar-
eas: distributed problem solving (DPS) and multiagent systems (MAS). DPS
research addresses the division of problem solving processes among a set of en-
tities, which can cooperate in dividing and sharing knowledge about problems
and in developing solutions. Thus, DPS problems require a global perspective,
even for understanding and stating the problem. In contrast, MAS research
focuses on coordination of a number of intelligent agents to resolve conflicts
between actions or to take advantage of the actions of other agents (Bond &
Gasser 1988).
In the remainder of this section, concepts for a single computational entity,
an agent, are presented. This discussion focuses on concepts from the MAS
research area and agency in artificial intelligence (AI) in general. The literature
analysis includes a definition of the term ‘agent’ – with focus on agency in the
MAS research area – as well as discussions of different properties and types
of architecture for agents. Further, systems with multiple interacting agents,
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which form multiagent systems, and implications of agent properties for these
systems, are presented and analyzed. This includes agent communication and
coordination concepts in MAS.
2.1.1.1 Autonomous agent
Although the definition of the term ‘agent’ has been subject of comprehensive
scientific discussions in AI since the 1980s, there is no generally accepted defini-
tion and the debate is ongoing; not only for agency in AI in general, but also for
agency in MAS research in particular. This results from the fact that different
attributes of agency are of varying importance in distinct application domains.
For example, it may be desirable that agents learn (i.e., adopt their behavior)
in some domains, while this is undesired in others (Wooldridge 2009). Franklin
& Graesser (1997) discuss various different notions of agency, present a set of
essential characteristics, and propose a taxonomy of autonomous agents.
This work provides a definition of intelligent, autonomous software agents –
hereafter referred to as agents – from the MAS research area, based on related
literature; it also discusses and analyzes properties as well as characteristics of
agents in the remainder of this section.
Though there is a number of different definitions of the term ‘agent’ (e.g.,
(Ferber 1999)), the understanding of agency in this research is based on the
weak notion of agency by Wooldridge & Jennings (1995), which constitutes the
most commonly accepted definition. Wooldridge & Jennings (1995) also discuss
a stronger notion of agency, considering human-like concepts like mentalistic
notions (e.g., knowledge and obligations) or emotions (Wooldridge & Jennings
1995, p. 117). However, the stronger notion of agency is beyond the scope of
this work.
Definition 2.1.1 (agent). An agent ai ∈ A is an encapsulated software
system with social ability that is situated in an environment, and that is
capable of autonomous action which is expected to maximize the agent’s
delegated objective function (Wooldridge & Jennings 1995, Jennings 2000,
Russell & Norvig 2003).
This definition and the understanding of agency in this work is based on the
assumptions that (i) agents are encapsulated software systems; (ii) agents are
situated in an environment; (iii) agents are autonomous from their environment
and have delegated objective functions; (iv) agents are rational; (v) agents are
capable of deliberation, reactive, and proactive behavior; (vi) agents have social
ability; and (vii) agents can potentially improve their performance through
learning. The following sections discuss these assumptions in detail.
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Although agent mobility (i.e., mobile agents) is an important research field,
it is beyond the scope of this research. That is, agent mobility is explicitly
excluded. Moreover, this research assumes persistence of agents and the ability
to conclude binding agreements (Rosenschein 1985, p. 30) as discussed further
in section 2.1.1.2.
2.1.1.1.1 Encapsulated software system Agents are encapsulated soft-
ware systems, i.e.,
• agents are identifiable entities with well-defined boundaries (Jennings
2000, p. 280) ⇔ (∀ai, aj ∈ A : ai 6= aj ⇔ i 6= j);
• autonomous agents are a concept of computer science, namely the agent-
based computing software paradigm (Wooldridge 1997, Jennings 2000).
Encapsulation of complex data types in software modules provides an ab-
straction to hide (i) details of operations (procedural abstraction) and (ii) value
representations (data abstraction). In addition, encapsulation is a protection
mechanism to isolate changes in one software module from the remainder of
the software system (Gannon, Hamlet & Mills 1987, p. 820). Encapsulation
also plays an important role in the object-oriented software paradigm. Here, a
class is separated into interface and implementation. This facilitates a separa-
tion of concerns, where the implementation details are hidden and the interface
provides an abstract description of the class behavior (Booch 1993, pp. 46–47).
For agents, encapsulation also denotes an abstraction role that hides details
of the realization. Therefore, an agent is an identifiability software system
(e.g., module or class) with well-defined boundaries (Jennings 2000, p. 280). In
definition 2.1.1, the identifiability is provided by the index i.
The concept of agency discussed in this work is fundamentally a concept of
computer science, i.e., it considers the agent-based computing software paradigm
(Wooldridge 1997, Jennings & Wooldridge 2000). Therefore, philosophical, so-
cial, and economical discussions of agency, which are beyond the capabilities of
the Von Neumann architecture, are out of the scope of this research.
However, this work does utilize concepts from economic theory for agents,
though the underlying assumptions are analyzed with regard to the applicability
to software systems. For example, the set of possible actions of an agent is
limited by, among others, the computational model and more specifically by
the realization of an agent in software. That is, it cannot be assumed that an
agent is capable of any imaginable action as is might be assumed in philosophical
or social sciences (e.g., in principle, an agent cannot be assumed to have the
capabilities to ‘walk away’ or terminate itself).
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Further, in agent-based computing, several metaphors from other research
disciplines such as social sciences are used (e.g., the ‘social ability’ of agents
(Wooldridge & Jennings 1995, p. 116)). Hereby, it is essential to not over-
interpret the implications the migrated concepts have for software systems. For
example, ‘social ability’ is a metaphor which denotes the ability to coordinate
joint and conflicting goals and actions with other agents required for, e.g., coop-
erative problem solving or negotiation (Wooldridge 1997, Castelfranchi 1998).
However, it cannot be assumed that a ‘society’ of these communicating soft-
ware components has the same properties as a human society. The same is true
for autonomy and other properties of software agents. The interpretation of
these properties for software systems are thus analyzed in the remainder of this
section.
2.1.1.1.2 Situated in environment Agents are situated in an environ-
ment, i.e.,
• agents can perceive their environment through sensors ⇔ there is a per-
ception function per i such that the environment Ωi ⊆ Ω is part of the
domain of per i for all agents ai ∈ A ⇔ ∃per i : Dper i → CDper i∀ai ∈ A :
Ωi ⊆ Dper i ;
• agents can execute actions in their environment through effectors⇔ there
is an action function act i such that the set of possible actions Σi is part of
the co-domain of act i for all agents ai ∈ A⇔ ∃act i : Dacti → CDacti∀ai ∈
A : Σi ⊆ CDacti (Jennings 2000, Russell & Norvig 2003).
The embeddedness of the agent in its environment, i.e., being situated in
the environment, is defined by an agent’s ability to perceive the state of its
environment through sensors and act on that environment through effectors
(Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 32).
The concept of an agent’s embodiment in its environment – which is adopted
in the understanding of the term ‘agent’ in this work – is shown in figure 2.1.
Agents generate actions to influence their environment (possibly including other
agents) and receive feedback and other percepts through their sensors.
Agent environments can be further specified by general properties suggested
by Russell & Norvig (2003) as follows. They can be fully or partially observable.
Full observability denotes that an agent can perceive the complete state of
the environment at any point in time through its sensors. An environment
is effectively fully observable if an agent can perceive all relevant information
for the choice of action. Relevance depends on the agent’s delegated objective
function.
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Figure 2.1: Agent and environment.
(after (Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 33) and (Wooldridge 2009, p. 22))
The environment can be deterministic or stochastic. In deterministic envi-
ronments, agent actions have guaranteed effects, i.e., the resulting state of the
environment is solely dependent on the current state and the agent’s actions. In
stochastic environments, there is uncertainty about the state that results from
the agent’s actions. If the environment is deterministic except for other agents’
actions, it is denoted as strategic.
An agent’s environment is qualified as episodic if the next episode does not
depend on actions taken in the current episode. That is, the environment is
divided into atomic episodes, which are independent of each other. In sequential
environments, the current agents’ decisions can affect all future decisions.
If the environment does not change while an agent is deliberating, it is
denoted as static for this agent. If it can change during agent deliberation, it
is denoted as dynamic. In dynamic environments, agents continuously have to
decide what to do – in case they are still deliberating, they may also decide to
do nothing.
The distinction of discrete and continuous environments can be applied to
(i) the state of the environment, (ii) the way time is handled, and (iii) to the
perceptions and actions of agents. An environment is state-discrete if it has a
finite number of states, time-discrete if it has a finite set of points in time, and
perception-/action-discrete if it has a finite set of perceptions/actions; i.e., the
discreteness depends on the finiteness of the corresponding set of states, points
in time, perceptions, and actions.
In addition, single-agent and multiagent environments can be distinguished
– by the number of agents situated in the environment (Russell & Norvig 2003,
pp. 40–44). However, this distinction is out of scope of this section, since it
focuses on agents’ relationships with their environments, independent of the
number of agents situated in this environment. Multiagent environments are
discussed in detail in section 2.1.1.2.
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The agents’ environments considered in this work are assumed to be par-
tially observable, strategic (stochastic), sequential, dynamic, state-continuous,
time-discrete, perception-/action-continuous, and multiagent.
Definition 2.1.2 (agent environment). Let ai ∈ A be an agent and Ω be
the world state. ai’s environment Ωi ⊆ Ω consists of anything an agent can
perceive through its sensors, denoted by function per i, and act on through its
effectors, denoted by function act i (Jennings 2000, Russell & Norvig 2003).
2.1.1.1.3 Autonomy and delegation Agents are autonomous from their
environment and have delegated objective functions, i.e., agents have
• delegated objective functions OF i ⇔ ∃OF i∀ai ∈ A;
• beliefs BELi, constituting the agents’ interpretation of the perceptions
received ⇔ ∃BELi∀ai ∈ A;
• states of parameters of their environment with positive influence on the
objective functions, referred to as goals GOALi ⇔ ∃GOALi∀ai ∈ A;
• perception functions per i that interpret the perceptions received in ac-
cordance to the delegated objective function ⇔ ∃per i : Ωi × OF i →
BELi∀ai ∈ A;
• goal functions goal i that infer the goals in accordance to the beliefs, del-
egated objective function, and existing goals ⇔ ∃goal i : BELi × OF i ×
GOALi → GOALi∀ai ∈ A;
• action functions act i that infer the actions in accordance to the goals,
delegated objective function, and planned actions ⇔ ∃act i : GOALi ×
OF i × Σi → Σi∀ai ∈ A; and
• control threads CTi which manage the internal execution of inference
processes ⇔ ∃CTi∀ai ∈ A.
The mentioned sets and functions cannot be directly influenced by the envi-
ronment (including other agents) – this constitutes the autonomy (Wooldridge
& Jennings 1995, Castelfranchi 1995, Luck & d’Inverno 1995, Jennings 2000,
Russell & Norvig 2003, Wooldridge 2009).
Wooldridge (2009) identifies autonomy as a commonly accepted property of
agents in MAS; it is a key characteristic that distinguishes agents from objects
(Wooldridge 1997). Wooldridge & Jennings (1995) characterize agents’ auton-
omy as follows: agents have control over their internal state and their behavior
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(i.e., actions) without direct external interaction. However, the authors do not
provide a comprehensive discussion of the autonomy concept for agents, but
refer to Castelfranchi (1995).
Castelfranchi (1995) analyzes the fundamentals of agent autonomy and pro-
poses different autonomy dimensions. He characterizes autonomy as an intrin-
sically relational concept, i.e., the autonomy of an entity is defined in relation
to another entity. For autonomous agents, two main relations are identified:
autonomy from the environment (physical context) and autonomy from other
agents (social context). However, autonomy does not imply ‘autism’, i.e., al-
though the environment (including other agents) cannot directly influence the
behavior and internal state of agents, it does not mean that agents are to-
tally unrelated and unconcerned about the environment. The behavior can
be indirectly influenced by external stimuli, though it cannot be determined
or imposed by them, i.e., agent behavior is not determined by a set of rigid
and deterministic reflexes to external stimuli. The autonomy of an agent from
stimuli it percepts through its sensors is referred to as cognitive autonomy.
Further, Castelfranchi (1995) distinguishes executive autonomy and goal au-
tonomy. Executive autonomy is relative to the actions (‘means’) an agent per-
forms, while goal autonomy is related to the goals (‘ends’) an agent tries to
achieve. That is, executive autonomy refers to the autonomy how an agent
tries to reach its goals, and goal autonomy refers to the autonomy what it tries
to achieve.
In addition to not being directly influenceable by the environment, agent
goals can only be influenced through agent beliefs (i.e., double indirect influ-
ence). Therefore, an agent’s control over its beliefs constitutes an additional
filter for the influences of the environment on the agent’s goals (Castelfranchi
1995).
Luck & d’Inverno (1995) formally define autonomy of an agent by the ex-
istence of a ‘motivation’ of an agent. By motivation, the authors refer to
non-derivable top-level goals, guarded by internal inaccessible rules. That is,
autonomous agents evaluate their possible behavior not only regarding their
environment, but also regarding non-derived, static top-level goals (Luck &
d’Inverno 1995). Jennings (2000) and Wooldridge (2009) denote this ‘motiva-
tion’ by ‘design objectives’ (Jennings 2000, p. 280) and ‘delegated objectives’
(Wooldridge 2009, p. 21) respectively. Russell & Norvig (2003) characterize the
‘motivation’ of an agent in AI as an intended maximization of its performance
measure (Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 35–36). In this work, the ‘motivation’
of an agent is denoted as an agent’s delegated objective function, i.e., it is a
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delegated objective which is measurable and constitutes the criterion of success
of the agent’s actions in accordance to the delegated objectives.
Jennings (2000) states that autonomy implies that agents have a dedicated,
persistent thread of control (Jennings 2000, p. 283).
Based on the literature analysis, the perception and action functions from
definition 2.1.2 can be substantiated. Let ai ∈ A be an agent, OF i ai’s del-
egated objective function, BELi ai’s beliefs, GOALi ai’s (operational) goals,
Σi ai’s set of possible actions and Ωi ai’s environment. Then, function per i :
Ωi×OF i → BELi interprets the perceptions received in accordance to the del-
egated objective function (i.e., relevance of perceptions). This interpretation
and filtering function for perceptions realizes the cognitive autonomy, as the
agent is autonomous in interpretation of the perceptions in accordance to its
delegated objective function.
goal i : BELi ×OF i ×GOALi → GOALi infers agent ai’s operational (sub-)
goals in accordance to the beliefs, delegated objective function, and existing
goals. Thus, this function implements the goal autonomy of agent ai.
act i : GOALi × OF i × Σi → Σi infers agent ai’s actions in accordance
to the goals, delegated objective function, and planned actions. Therefore, this
function realizes the executive autonomy of agent ai. However, the set of actions
Σi is necessarily limited due to (i) the computational model of ai and (ii) the
delegated objective function; i.e., it cannot be assumed that an agent is capable
of any imaginable action.
Finally, to be autonomous in the elaborated sense, an agent ai needs control
of its internal execution thread, i.e., a control thread CTi which manages the
internal execution of inference processes (e.g., execution order). In this work,
the control of this thread in combination with conceptual control of the infer-
ence processes is denoted as control autonomy. Figure 2.2 shows an agent, its
environment, and the different forms of autonomy elaborated in this section.
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Figure 2.2: Agent, environment, and different forms of autonomy.
2.1.1.1.4 Rationality Agents are rational, i.e.,
• agents choose the actions that are expected to maximize the value of their
delegated objective function (max(σi,1,...,σi,n)∈Σi(E(OFi))), though the ra-
tionality is limited by computational resources, and therewith referred
to as bounded rationality or bounded optimality (Russell & Subramanian
1995, Russell & Norvig 2003).
Towards a definition of intelligence of agents, Russell & Norvig (2003) dis-
cuss the concept of rational agents – agents that do the right things. Moreover,
they identify rationality as a central concept for AI. With regard to agents,
rationality depends on performance measures, an agent’s knowledge about the
environment, an agent’s possible actions, and an agent’s perceptions received.
Thereby, performance measures define the criterion of success of an agent’s
actions, regarding the environment and perceptions received. Thus, rational
agents are maximizing their expected performance measures for any possible
combination of perceptions received (Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 35–36).
The agency concept in this work adopts the rationality for autonomous
agents. An autonomous agent ai is optimizing the expected value of its dele-
gated objective function OFi by taking this function into account for inference
of beliefs from perceptions, goals from beliefs, and actions from goals.
However, perfect rationality – acting in a way to maximize the expected
utility in every instant – is a concept from theory which is in general unreal-
istic in practice; given that computational resources of agents are limited, the
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calculations for choosing appropriate actions is too time-consuming in most en-
vironments. The notion of rationality for an agent that eventually returns the
perfectly rational choice, potentially too late to be of any value, is referred to
as calculative rationality ; i.e., a calculative rational agent will eventually return
what would have been the optimal choice. The notion of calculative rational-
ity is mostly applied when designing logical or decision-theoretic agents. Here
the calculations of the optimal choice are not considered, but the optimality of
actions is focused on.
Similarly, perfect rationality is neglected for humans by Simon (1957) in his
principle of bounded rationality, as the capacity of the human mind is small
as compared to the size of real-world problems requiring objectively rational
behavior for their solution. This also applies for reasonable approximations of
this objective rationality (Simon 1957, p. 198). Simon characterizes bounded
rationality by deliberation just until an ‘acceptable’ (i.e., satisficing) solution is
found (Simon 1982). However, the acceptance criterion is not formally defined,
and satisficing is one of several alternatives to deal with bounded resources
(Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 972–973).
In AI, the constrained rationality of agents, limited by computational re-
sources, is denoted as bounded optimality. A bounded optimal agent acts as
satisfactorily as possible with the computational resources available. Bounded
optimality specifies optimal programs, not optimal actions, since agent actions
are generated by programs (Russell & Subramanian 1995).
2.1.1.1.5 Deliberation, reactivity, and proactiveness Agents are ca-
pable of deliberation, reactive, and proactive behavior, i.e.,
• deliberation denotes the ability of agents to determine which state of the
world Ωi is desirable to be achieved, i.e., infer the goals GOALi for agent
ai;
• reactivity denotes the ability of agents to perceive the environment and
adopt their beliefs, goals, and actions to changes in it;
• proactiveness denotes the ability of agents to determine actions and sub-
goals to achieve current agent goals without external triggers (Wooldridge
& Jennings 1995, Wooldridge 1997).
The decision processes of agents which actions to perform in order to meet
its delegated objectives (i.e., maximize the expected value of their delegated
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objective functions) depend on the agents’ architectures, that is, software ar-
chitectures for decision-making systems embedded in environments (Wooldridge
2009). Thus, abstract agent architectures are briefly discussed in the following.
On an abstract architecture level, purely reactive agents and agents with
state can be distinguished. Purely reactive agents, also referred to as simple
reflex agents (Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 46–48), decide what to do without a
consideration of the complete perception sequence, i.e., they react to the latest
perception only.
Agents with state have internal data structures in which they can track
the percepts received. This information can be utilized for decision making
(Wooldridge 2009, pp. 36–38). Russell & Norvig (2003) denote reactive agents
with state as model-based reflex agents. These agents use an internal state to
track changes in the environment which are not evident in the current percept
(Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 44–56). However, since purely reactive agents
do not meet this work’s definition, the agents considered in this research are
explicitly not purely reactive.
In contrast to reactive agents, deliberative (i.e., deductive reasoning) agents
are built on the symbolic AI paradigm – the classical approach of building AI
systems. Thus, these agents have an explicitly represented, symbolic model of
the world (i.e., of the environment and the desired behavior). Decisions are
made, based on this model, via reasoning mechanisms. If the symbolic models
constitute logical formulae, the reasoning corresponds to logical deduction or
theorem proving (Wooldridge 2009, pp. 45–50).
Practical reasoning must be distinguished from logical reasoning and is di-
rected towards determining which actions to perform; it consists of two distinct
activities. First, it has to be determined which state of the world Ωi is desir-
able to be achieved, i.e., infer the goals GOALi for agent ai. This process is
referred to as deliberation. Second, it has to be determined how this state can
be achieved by performing appropriate actions, i.e., infer the actions σi ∈ Σi
for agent ai. This is referred to as means-end reasoning (Wooldridge 2009, pp.
65 ff.).
Reactive and deliberative agent architectures are not mutually exclusive.
Hybrid architectures exist which combine reactive and deliberative behavior in
a single architecture, integrating subsystems to deal with reactive and proac-
tive behavior (Wooldridge & Jennings 1995, pp. 134–138). There is a class of
architectures where these subsystems are organized in layers; at least one for
reactive and proactive behavior each. The interacting layers are characterized
by an either horizontal or vertical control and information flow. In a horizon-
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tal layering, each layer is able to receive perceptions and produce effects (i.e.,
suggestions of which actions to perform) independent of other layers. In con-
trast, a vertical layering results in the processing of inputs and the production
of outputs by at most one layer (Wooldridge 2009, pp. 92 ff.).
This work does not assume a specific organization of the agents’ architec-
tures subsystems in layers, though the agents considered in this thesis have a
hybrid architecture; i.e., they are capable of both reactive and proactive behav-
ior – discussed in detail in the following.
Wooldridge & Jennings (1995, p. 116) characterize reactivity of agents as
having the ability to perceive the environment and respond in a timely fashion
to changes in it. They define proactiveness of agents as being able to act without
external triggers on their own initiative (i.e., goal-driven).
Wooldridge (1997) describes proactiveness as being able to plan how to
achieve goals without external triggers, and, if necessary, to generate subsidiary
goals. In relation to the plans of achieving goals and active goals themselves,
reactivity constitutes the ability to not blindly executing plans or pursue goals.
In contrast, in the event of circumstances in the environment which conflict with
preconditions or invariants of active plans or goals, an agent should react to the
changed situation accordingly in time for the response to be useful (Wooldridge
1997, pp. 27–28).
The capability to determine actions and sub-goals to achieve current agent
goals is realized in function goali∀ai ∈ A. This goal inference is internally trig-
gered by the control thread of an agent. It is done independently of actual
changes in the environment – internal events (e.g., timers) can also initiate the
goal reasoning process. The reactivity as described by Wooldridge (1997) is
implemented by the feedback loop between actions, perceptions, beliefs, goals,
and updated actions. The timeliness of responses is out of scope of this work’s
model, since (i) it is domain dependent and (ii) timely responses to any change
in the environment for any imaginable application domain, objective function,
and set of goal is an assumption that is obviously both impossible to guaran-
tee and to be proven. This is also acknowledged in Wooldridge’s example for
reacting in sufficiently short time, and in general by stating that this is rather
a vision of agents than a hard requirement (Wooldridge 1997, p. 28). However,
rationality implies that an agent will only perform actions if they are expected
to increase the value of the delegated objective function. If actions are expected
to be performed too late to have positive effects on OFi, agent ai will not con-
sider these actions (acti will not return them); if the actions have already been
planned, the agent will not perform these actions, but react to the changed
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expected impact and dismiss the actions.
2.1.1.1.6 Social ability Agents have social ability, i.e.,
• agents have the capability of interacting with other agents via agent
communication languages (Genesereth & Ketchpel 1994, Wooldridge &
Jennings 1995);
• agent interactions are conceptualized on the knowledge level (Newell 1982),
i.e., they are conceived in semantic terms;
• agents have the ability to make run-time decisions about interactions
(Jennings 2000); and
• agents are able to coordinate joint and conflicting goals and actions with
other agents required for, e.g., cooperative problem solving or negotiation
(Wooldridge 1997, Castelfranchi 1998).
According to Wooldridge & Jennings (1995), agents have ‘social ability’: the
capability of interacting with other agents via agent communication languages
(Genesereth & Ketchpel 1994). Although the term ‘social’ is common in agent-
based computing to describe the ability of agents to communicate with others
(e.g., (Wooldridge & Jennings 1995, Wooldridge 1997, Jennings 2000)), it can
lead to misinterpretations of how ‘social’ agents are in comparison to human
societies. In addition, the term is defined differently in related literature. For
example, in the definition by Wooldridge & Jennings (1995), the capability
to interact with other agents (i.e., to communicate) is sufficient for the social
ability property. In contrast, Castelfranchi (1998) states that agents cannot be
considered ‘social’ just because they communicate. Agents are social because
they interfere with, depend on, and influence each other when they act in a
common environment (Castelfranchi 1998, p. 159). This includes coordination
of joint and conflicting goals and actions, i.e., cooperative pursuing of goals
and resolution of conflicts. Similarly, Wooldridge (1997) states further that
agents should have the ability to engage in ‘social activities’ with other agents
in order to achieve their goals. That is, to perform interactions with other
agents required for, e.g., cooperative problem solving or negotiation.
As Jennings (2000) points out, agent interactions are conceptualized on
the knowledge level (Newell 1982); they are conceived in semantic terms (e.g.,
which goals, when, by whom) in contrast to method invocations and function
calls which take place on a purely syntactic level. Further, since agents operate
in environments that they can only partly control and observe, agents need the
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ability to make run-time decisions about interactions in contrast to hard-wired
interactions in, for example, object-oriented programming.
Therefore, in this work, this capability of communicating with other agents
is denoted as the ability to interact with other agents in terms of asynchronous
communication. Contrarily, the understanding of social ability of agents goes
beyond communication. An agent is assumed to have social ability if and only
if (i) it is capable to interact (i.e., communicate) with other agents via agent
communication languages, (ii) interactions are conceptualized on the knowledge
level, (iii) decisions about interactions are made at run time, and (iv) joint and
conflicting goals and actions can be coordinated with other agents (Newell 1982,
Wooldridge & Jennings 1995, Wooldridge 1997, Castelfranchi 1998, Jennings
2000).
2.1.1.1.7 Agent learning Agents can potentially improve their perfor-
mance through learning, i.e.,
• learning agents can improve their expected performance for future actions
in accordance to the delegated objective function OF i by using percepts
received as experience in their reasoning cycle from perceptions to actions
(Mitchell 1997, Russell & Norvig 2003).
Learning of software systems, also referred to as machine learning, denotes
improving the system’s performance, indicated by a performance measure, with
experience (Mitchell 1997). For software agents, learning denotes the capability
of improving the agents’ abilities to act in the future by experience; by using
percepts received, learning agents can improve the expected performance in
accordance to the delegated objective function OF i. Thus, the reasoning cycle
from perceptions over beliefs and goals to actions is adapted to maximize the
expected performance. However, different forms of learning from the simple
memorization of experience to the creation of scientific theories exist (Russell
& Norvig 2003).
In this thesis, learning beyond memorization of perceptions by means of
their interpretation to beliefs is not considered in detail. Nevertheless, strategic
behavior of agents to gain individual performance is analyzed, based on the
game-theoretic framework.
2.1.1.2 Multiagent system
In section 2.1.1.1.2, properties of agent environments have been discussed from
a single-agent perspective. Properties only relevant for environments with mul-
tiple agents – multiagent environments – are discussed in this section. Such
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an environment is the basis for a multiagent system (MAS). The autonomous
agents situated in this environment constitute a multiagent system. Thus, a
MAS is a collection of autonomous agents, interacting through a communication
infrastructure, representing different interests of stakeholders (Wooldridge 2009,
p. 5).
According to Huhns & Stephens (1999), these environments may be open
or closed and may or may not contain more than one agent. However, the
authors identify these environments to be typically open and to contain a num-
ber of autonomous distributed agents. Similarly, it is assumed in this research
that multiagent environments are open and potentially contain multiple agents.
Further, the multiagent environment provides communication means to enable
interactions (Huhns & Stephens 1999, p. 81–82).
Openness of the multiagent environment is defined as having multiple loci of
control (Jennings 2000, p. 280). In open MAS, agents can in principle join and
leave at any time and are owned by various stakeholders with different objectives
(Huynh, Jennings & Shadbolt 2006, p. 120). That is, openness is character-
ized by the absence of a single controlling organization and no central designer
(Huhns & Stephens 1999, p. 82), by software representing interests of a diverse
range of stakeholders, and by constant change (Gasser 1991, Hewitt 1991).
Openness requires autonomy and delegated objectives for agents in MAS: To
represent the interests of their owner, agents have to receive respective ob-
jectives. To follow those different interests, agents must be autonomous from
other agents. Openness does not necessarily imply that agents cannot conclude
binding agreements on behalf of their owners. For example, in open real-world
electronic marketplaces, participants can freely join and leave the platform.
Concluded agreements are nevertheless valid and binding beyond platform par-
ticipation. This research assumes that agents can conclude binding agreements
as in cooperative game theory (Rasmusen 1989, Binmore 1992). Agent mobility,
however, is out of scope of this research.
Definition 2.1.3 (multiagent system). A multiagent system (MAS) is an
open system of multiple agents that are situated in a shared environment
that enables agent communication (Huhns & Stephens 1999, Jennings 2000,
Wooldridge 2009).
The agents in a MAS may have compatible goals (i.e., there’s a single global
goal) or individual conflicting objectives. The agents are required to interact
with one another to manage the dependencies that result from the shared en-
vironment. Thus, the key problem in MAS is the coordination of agents in a
shared environment (Bond & Gasser 1988, Jennings 1993). Multiagent coordi-
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nation is discussed in section 2.1.1.2.2.
The understanding of multiagent systems in this work is based on the fol-
lowing assumptions.
• MAS are assumed to be open, i.e., there are multiple loci of control
(Jennings 2000, p. 280). Openness is characterized by concurrent, asyn-
chronous software systems with decentralized control, representing inter-
ests of a diverse range of stakeholders (Bond & Gasser 1988, Gasser 1991,
Hewitt 1991).
• The agents in a MAS can conclude binding agreements (Rosenschein 1985,
p. 30), i.e., as in cooperative game theory (Rasmusen 1989, Binmore
1992). However, due to the agents’ autonomy, they are able to break
these agreements, though agents not fulfilling binding agreements may
have to pay a penalty fee.
• MAS and the agents in MAS are assumed to be persistent, i.e., start
and termination of MAS and agents are not considered. That is, the set
of agents of the MAS remains constant over the time relevant for the
investigations of this research. Agents joining and leaving the MAS at
run time are not considered.
• The mobility of agents is explicitly not considered, i.e., agents moving
from one execution environment (e.g., machine) to another.
2.1.1.2.1 Multiagent communication Intelligent agents often operate in
MAS to be able to work together productively in interconnected computer net-
works. Agent communication enables the agents to coordinate their actions in
order to reach goals of their own or their multiagent organization more effec-
tively or efficiently. The multiagent environment has to provide the computa-
tional infrastructure to enable multiagent interactions. Further, protocols are
required for communication and interactions of agents.
Communication protocols enable agents to communicate and to interpret
the messages exchanged. Therefore, communication protocols define the meth-
ods of interconnections as well as the syntax and semantics of the messages
transferred. Whereas the syntax refers to the actual message content, the se-
mantics also depend on the message type. In general, messages can either be
assertions or queries. However, most agent communication languages consider
more specific message types, based on the speech act theory (Singh 1993). To
understand the semantics of a message, i.e., what the symbols denote, a shared
ontology is required.
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Interaction protocols define a structured exchange of defined messages be-
tween agents, i.e., interaction protocols facilitate agent conversations (Huhns &
Stephens 1999, Wooldridge 2009).
Definition 2.1.4 (communication channel). A communication channel
CCij is a directed link between two agents – CCij = (ai, aj) ∈ CC – which allows
messages to be send from agent ai to aj (Wooldridge, Jennings & Kinny 2000).
Communication channels do not define when or what messages are sent be-
tween agents, but indicate that a message path exists, i.e., messages can be
send. The set of all communication channels of an agent defines its acquain-
tances. That is, all other agents of a MAS an agent is able to send messages to
(Wooldridge et al. 2000).
Definition 2.1.5 (agent acquaintances). An agent’s acquaintances ACQ i
consist of the set of agents to which the agent has communication channels
to, i.e., ACQ i = {aj : (ai, aj) ∈ CC} (Wooldridge et al. 2000).
2.1.1.2.2 Multiagent coordination There is a large body of research con-
cerning coordination, as the scope of coordination research is both fuzzy and
wide. Consequently, an interdisciplinary study of coordination research leads to
a generic definition of coordination: “Coordination is managing dependencies
between activities” (Malone & Crowston 1994, p. 90).
In DAI, coordination is regarded as a system property which facilitates ac-
tions of multiple agents in a shared environment, e.g., by providing means for
livelock and deadlock avoidance. Nevertheless, there is no generally accepted
definition or taxonomy of coordination in DAI. Huhns & Stephens (1999, p. 83)
state that among self-interested agents, coordination is performed by negotia-
tion, while non-antagonistic agents are coordinated by cooperation.
However, the term ‘cooperation’ is also often used in a broader sense, refer-
ring to distributed systems which have to interact to carry out their assigned
tasks, i.e., cooperation in its broader sense includes interactions of both benev-
olent and competitive agents (Wooldridge 2009, p. 151). In this research, co-
operation is regarded as coordination of non-antagonistic (benevolent) agents,
though coordination of antagonists does neither imply cooperation nor negotia-
tion, as it can also be performed by, e.g., legal proceedings (Bond & Gasser 1988,
p. 19).
Definition 2.1.6 (multiagent coordination). Multiagent coordination is
managing dependencies between agent actions in a multiagent system
(Malone & Crowston 1994, Huhns & Stephens 1999).
CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART 30
2.1.2 Multiagent resource allocation
Resource allocation is a well-established field in multiagent research (Chevaleyre
et al. 2006). This section introduces basic concepts of multiagent research allo-
cation (MARA), i.e., game-theoretic concepts utilized for analyzing and design-
ing resource allocation mechanisms in MAS and the relationship of intelligent
agents as entities (i.e., players) acting in these systems along with coordination
concepts.
Decision theory (Raiffa 1968) and game theory (Rasmusen 1989, Binmore
1992) are closely related, and both have received adoption by multiagent re-
searchers for studying allocation problems. Decision theory addresses the max-
imization of the expected utility of decision makers under uncertainty. Game
theory concentrates on multiagent encounter, i.e., interactions of agents, utility
maximizing strategies in multiagent interactions, as well as the design of pro-
tocols or mechanisms to affect the behavior of rational, interacting agents to
lead to desired outcomes of agent interactions (Parsons & Wooldridge 2002).
Decision theory is also regarded as the theory of games against nature. Both
disciplines have strong relations to the work of von Neumann & Morgenstern
(1944) and share elementary concepts, e.g., individual preferences described by
utility.
Game theory is applied to multiagent systems in which multiple agents have
to reach agreements by negotiation and bargaining (Rosenschein & Zlotkin 1994,
Kraus 1997). In these systems, game theory provides means to analyze and
develop protocols (i.e., the ‘rules of encounter’ (Rosenschein & Zlotkin 1994))
for the negotiation interactions. A protocol can be regarded as a function which
defines valid actions by the participants based on the negotiation history. In
this context, mechanism design – also referred to as ‘reverse game theory’ –
denotes the design of protocols so that any negotiation outcome has desirable
properties (Parsons & Wooldridge 2002).
Definition 2.1.7 (multiagent resource allocation). Let A be a set of agents
and R be a set of resources, where Rj ⊆ R denotes the set of resources of agent
aj ∈ R. The distribution of rj ∈ Rj to ai ∈ A∀ai, aj ∈ A, i.e., the allocation of
rj to ai ⇔ x(rij) = 1, that is influenced by the agents, is denoted as multiagent
resource allocation (MARA) (Chevaleyre et al. 2006).
To apply game theory to the analysis and design of MARA, the assump-
tions of the applied concepts and methods from MAS and game theory have
to be compatible. In addition, particular assumptions are made, regarding the
application of MARA in software service networks (e.g., regarding the type of
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resources). Therefore, this work makes the following assumptions for MARA.
Agents in MAS are (i) rational and any rational agent possesses a (explicit
or implicit) utility function whose expected value the agent is trying to max-
imize (Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 51); (ii) agents in MAS can conclude bind-
ing agreements (Rosenschein 1985, p. 30), i.e., as in cooperative game theory
(Rasmusen 1989, Binmore 1992); (iii) agents’ resources required for the pro-
duction of services are regarded as being discrete, indivisible, non-shareable,
and static throughout the allocation process in single-unit and multi-unit set-
tings, depending on the substitutionality of resources for service production
(Chevaleyre et al. 2006, pp. 10–12); and (iv) the utilitarian social welfare is
utilized as a metric for allocative efficiency, since it is well suited to assess
the system performance in terms of the maximal average profit of negotiating
agents in electronic commerce transactions (Chevaleyre et al. 2006, p. 16). The
following sections discuss these assumptions in detail.
2.1.2.1 Agents, games, and strategies
In applications of game theory in multiagent research, the agents are the play-
ers in games. An agent’s (i.e., a player’s) type abstracts from goals, beliefs,
objective function, and control thread and determines the preference structure
of the agent. An agent’s strategy denotes the plan of actions of this agent for
the game (e.g., an agent’s bid in an auction). A strategy profile describes the
set of all agents’ strategies. The agents are assumed to be rational, i.e., agents
chose the strategy that maximizes their (expected) utility, using their available
information.
Definition 2.1.8 (agent type). Let ai ∈ A be an agent, θi denotes ai’s type
which determines ai’s preference structure.
Definition 2.1.9 (strategy). Let ai ∈ A be an agent, σi(θi) ∈ Σi denotes ai’s
strategy, i.e., ai’s plan of actions for the game, where Σi ⊆ Σ denotes the set
of all available strategies for agent ai.
Definition 2.1.10 (strategy profile). Let A = {a1, · · · , an} be the set of
agents. The vector of all agents’ strategies σ(θ) = (σ1(θ1), . . . , σn(θn)) is de-
noted as the strategy profile of the agents.
A game is denoted as being strategic if the strategy of at least one agent
has an impact on the strategy of at least one other agent. In contrast, strategic
independence is present if the agents’ decisions are independent of one another.
Game theory is applied to analyze strategic games (Rasmusen 1989, Binmore
1992).
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2.1.2.2 Types of resource
The nature of the resources themselves is a central property of resource alloca-
tion problems. While some resource properties directly refer to the resources,
others constitute characteristics of the allocation process. Resources can be
either continuous (e.g., liquids) or discrete (e.g., bottles). While continuous re-
sources are typically infinitely divisible as a matter of principle, the allocation
process may restrict the allocation to certain quantities, i.e., the continuous re-
source is discretized. Thus, the allocation mechanism greatly influences whether
a resource is divisible or indivisible.
Besides resource characteristics, the allocation mechanism may also influ-
ence if a resource is shareable or non-shareable; shareable resources can be al-
located to multiple agents at the same time. Further, resources can be consum-
able (e.g., fuel) and perishable (e.g., food). Non-consumable, non-perishable re-
sources, which do not change during the allocation process, are denoted as static
resources. Finally, single-unit or multi-unit resources can be distinguished. In
a multi-unit setting, a set of resources exists for which a common identifier
exists, i.e., single items of this set cannot be distinguished (e.g., multiple bot-
tles with the same content). In a single-unit setting, each of the resources to
be allocated can be identified using a unique identifier. Thus, any multi-unit
allocation problem can be transformed into a single-unit allocation problem
(Chevaleyre et al. 2006).
In this research, resources required for the production of services (i.e., hard-
ware and software) are regarded as being discrete and indivisible, since it is
assumed that computational resources are not practically infinitely divisible,
but are discretized for their allocation in SNs. Resources are non-shareable in
this setting, since the services produced using the allocated resources require
these resources as a whole. That is, while a CPU or memory can be shared
by multiple services in principle, the computing units allocated already consti-
tute arbitrary small portions of the physical resources and are thus assumed
not to be used simultaneously for the production of multiple services. The re-
sources in this research are assumed to be static, since their characteristics do
not change during the allocation process. Finally, this work considers multi-
unit resources if the resources are subsitutable between service providers, since
the single discretized computational units are non-distinguishable. In contrast,
if the resources are non-substitutable between service providers, the allocation
procedure is to be considered single-unit.
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2.1.2.3 Utility and preference representation
Agents in MAS are rational and any rational agent possesses a (explicit or
implicit) utility function whose expected value the agent is trying to maximize
(Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 51).
The individual satisfaction of different alternatives is expressed by agents’
preferences. In the context of resource allocation, these preferences refer to
the satisfaction of alternative allocations, i.e., the sets of possible allocations
of resources to an agent. An agent’s preferences over a set of alternatives is
denoted as the agent’s preference structure.
Preference structures can be represented by means of different mathematical
models; four types of preference structures can be distinguished: (i) cardinal,
(ii) ordinal, (iii) binary, and (iv) fuzzy preference structures. Cardinal prefer-
ence structures can be quantitative (i.e., numerical values are assigned to each
alternative) or qualitative (i.e., elements from an ordered scale are assigned to
each alternative). The assignment of values or elements to an alternative is
done by means of an agent’s utility function (Wooldridge 2009, pp. 223–226).
According to Russell & Norvig (2003), any rational agent possesses a (ex-
plicit or implicit) utility function whose expected value the agent is trying to
maximize (Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 51), i.e., utility functions are a prerequisite
for rationality of agents.
Since quantitative cardinal preference structure is most relevant for mul-
tiagent resource allocation, this work focuses on this structure. Quantitative
preferences allow for both an inter-agent comparison of utility as well as for an
expression of preference intensity. Thus, differences between two utility degrees
can be calculated, e.g., for monetary compensations. Formally, utility can be
defined as follows. Let
• A = {a1, · · · , an} be the set of agents,
• Ω = {ω1, · · · , ωm} be the set of world states, and
• U = {u1, · · · , un} be the set of utility functions of the agents.
The world state denote any ‘outcome’ that the agents have preferences over.
Then, agent ai ∈ A’s utility function can be defined as
ui : Ω→ CDui ∀ui ∈ U .
The co-domain CDui is typically a set of quantitative (numerical) values
(e.g., [0, 1], N, Q, R, etc.), though it can also be a set of totally ordered
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qualitative values (e.g., literals such as “good” and “very good”) (Chevaleyre
et al. 2006, Wooldridge 2009).
Let ω, ω′ ∈ Ω. A utility function defines a preference ordering i with
ω i ω′ ⇔ ui(ω) ≥ ui(ω′).
That is, agent ai prefers state ω at least as much as state ω
′. For strict
preference this yields
ω i ω′ ⇔ ui(ω) > ui(ω′),
i.e., agent ai strictly prefers state ω over ω
′ (Wooldridge 2009).
Definition 2.1.11 (utility function). Let A be the set of agents, Ω be the
set of world states, and U be the set of utility functions of the agents. ui :
Ω → CDui ∀ui ∈ U denotes the utility function of the agents that defines the
preference ordering of world states for every agent.
In MARA, the set of world states Ω typically denotes the allocation of
resources to agents. Let
R = {r1, · · · , rm}
be the set of resources. A resource allocation setting is represented by the triple
〈A,R,U〉. An agent’s utility function associates a value to every resource subset
(or bundle of resources), i.e.,
ui :P(R)→ CDui ∀ui ∈ U ,
where P(R) denotes the powerset of R and thus Ω = P(R). Then, an
allocation of resources is a mapping from A to P(R). This simple definition
over resource bundles assumes that the values that agents assign to resources are
independent of the allocation of other resources to agents. This is also denoted
as being free of allocation externalities (Chevaleyre et al. 2006, p. 13). In this
research, however, this assumption is too strict for the allocation of resources
for service production, respectively services provided to agents in SNs. Thus,
these assumptions will be relaxed in the remainder of the work.
2.1.2.3.1 Dominant strategies A dominant strategy is the best response
of an agent to all available strategies of the other agents.
Definition 2.1.12 (dominant strategy). Let ai ∈ A be an agent and σi(θi)
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ai’s strategy. σi(θi) is a dominant strategy if and only if
ui(σ1(θ1), . . . , σi(θi), . . . , σn(θn)) ≥ ui(σ1(θ1), . . . , σi(θ′i), . . . , σn(θn))
∀θ = (θ1, · · · , θn) ∈ Θ.
That is, independent of the other agents’ strategies, a dominant strategy will
maximize the utility of the agent playing this strategy. In most games, however,
there is no dominant strategy (Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos & Vazirani 2007,
Wooldridge 2009).
2.1.2.3.2 Social choice A social choice function aggregates the preferences
of all agents into a social choice, i.e., a world state (or outcome).
Definition 2.1.13 (social choice). A social choice function f : Σ→ Ω selects
an outcome ω ∈ Ω from the strategy profile σ(θ) = (σ1(θ1), . . . , σn(θn)) with
(θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ Θ.
That is, the social choice function (also denoted as social choice rule) selects
a feasible world state for each possible combination of preferences and other
characteristics (Dasgupta, Hammond & Maskin 1979).
2.1.2.3.3 Pareto optimality A game’s outcome, selected by the social
choice function f , is pareto optimal (also referred to as pareto efficient) if there
is no other outcome that would improve one agent’s utility without decreasing
the utility of at least one other agent.
Definition 2.1.14 (pareto optimality). An outcome of the social choice
function f(σ(θ)) = ω is pareto optimal if and only if
∀ω′ /∈ f(σ(θ)), θ ∈ Θ, ui(ω′) > ui(ω)⇒ ∃aj ∈ A : uj(ω′) < uj(ω).
That is, no agent can gain utility without another agent losing utility.
2.1.2.3.4 Nash equilibrium A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium (NE)
if no agent has an incentive to deviate from its strategy, given that the other
participating agents do not deviate (Nash 1950, Rasmusen 1989, Binmore 1992).
Definition 2.1.15 (Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile σ(θ) = (σ1(θ1, . . . ,
σn(θn)) with (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ Θ is a NE if and only if
ui(σ1(θ1), . . . , σi(θi), . . . , σn(θn)) ≥ ui(σ1(θ1), . . . , σi(θ′i), . . . , σn(θn))
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∀ui ∈ U , ∀θ′i 6= θi.
That is, a set of strategies is a NE if and only if they are the best response
to each other. This type of NE is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. However,
not every game has a pure strategy NE, and some games have more than one
pure strategy NE (Wooldridge 2009, pp. 230–233).
2.1.2.4 Social welfare
The social welfare denotes a preference aggregation over all participating agents,
i.e., a social welfare function produces the social preferences of the agent society,
taking the individual agents’ preferences (Wooldridge 2009, p. 254). It allows
for comparison of different mechanisms by comparing their respective outcomes
(Sandholm 1999, p. 202). Different notions of social welfare have been studied
in social choice theory and welfare economics (Sen 1970, Moulin 1988, Arrow,
Sen & Suzumura 2002).
For quantitative preference structures, the term utilitarian social welfare
denotes the sum of all agents’ utility for a given alternative, i.e., the utilitarian
social welfare for world state ω ∈ Ω, swu(ω), is defined as
swu(ω) =
∑
ai∈A
ui(ω).
To give another example, the egalitarian social welfare sweg is given by the
least utility, i.e., sweg(ω) = minai∈A ui(ω). Thus, sweg is defined by the utility
of the agent that is ‘worst off’. It is appropriate when a minimum amount of a
large number of agents has to be satisfied. In other words, it provides a certain
level of fairness.
Further notions of social welfare exist in literature which are suitable for
different objective functions. The Nash product is given by the product of
the individual utilities (swnp(ω) =
∏
ai∈A ui(ω)). It constitutes a compromise
between utilitarian and egalitarian social welfare as it favors both increases
in the sum of all agents’ utility and inequality-reducing redistributions. The
elitist social welfare is given by the largest utility – swel(ω) = maxai∈A ui(ω).
It can be useful in applications where a single agent is required to achieve its
goals (Chevaleyre et al. 2006, pp. 17–19). Further details along with further
notions of social welfare can be found in the research area of welfare economics
(Sen 1970, Moulin 1988, Arrow et al. 2002). In this research, the utilitarian
social welfare is utilized as it is well suited to assess the system performance in
terms of the maximal average profit of negotiating agents in electronic commerce
transactions. This definition of social welfare is most commonly used in the
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multiagent systems research area (Chevaleyre et al. 2006, p. 16). Thus, this
research sets sw := swu.
Definition 2.1.16 (social welfare). Let A be the set of agents, Ω be the
set of world states, and U be the set of utility functions of the agents. The
social welfare swu(ω) =
∑
ai∈A ui(ω) denotes a preference aggregation over all
participating agents.
2.1.2.5 Allocation procedures
Allocation procedures can either be distributed or centralized. In centralized
allocation mechanisms such as combinatorial auctions (Cramton, Shoham &
Steinberg 2006), the allocation is determined by a central entity. In contrast,
the allocation result of distributed mechanisms emerges from multiple, local
allocation steps. In multiagent resource allocation, the following three issues
are of major importance (Chevaleyre et al. 2006, p. 19):
• Protocols address ontological as well as communication issues. That is,
protocols define which deals are possible and which messages agents have
to exchange in order to establish an agreement.
• Strategies have to be designed to allow agents to maximize their (ex-
pected) utility for a given protocol. Strategies are also closely related to
protocols; protocols should incentivize agents to adopt a certain behavior
(mechanism design).
• Algorithms comprise both the computational problem of winner determi-
nation (e.g., in auctions) as well as computing the best response to certain
messages in a protocol (i.e., proposal messages). These algorithms are also
closely related to the respective protocols and strategies, as finding op-
timal allocations in service networks is often computationally infeasible
(Bo & Lesser 2010).
For the design of an allocation mechanism, the protocol constitutes the first
building block. For the protocol to be developed, the most fundamental design
decision comprises the distribution of the allocation mechanism, i.e., whether
a centralized or distributed design is adopted. The corresponding agent strate-
gies are most commonly analyzed based on game theory. The convergence
property of an allocation framework corresponds to the question if for mutually
beneficially deals, the allocation converges to an optimal allocation; this opti-
mality can constitute the maximal utilitarian social welfare or pareto optimality
(Endriss, Maudet, Sadri & Toni 2003, Chevaleyre et al. 2006).
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2.1.2.5.1 Allocation mechanism An allocation mechanism defines the
strategies available to each agent (i.e., the strategy space) and the function
to determine the outcome of the game, based on the strategy profile (Parkes
2001, Nisan et al. 2007).
Definition 2.1.17 (allocation mechanism). A mechanism M = (Σ1, . . . ,
Σn,m(·)) defines the sets of possible strategies Σi ⊆ Σ∀ ai ∈ A and an outcome
function m : Σ→ Ω that maps strategy profiles to outcomes (Parkes 2001, Nisan
et al. 2007).
It is impossible to design a mechanism that is allocatively efficient, budget
balanced, and incentive compatible, at least in settings with quasi-linear prefer-
ences (Green & Laffont 1977, Walker 1980, Myerson & Satterthwaite 1983, Hur-
wicz & Walker 1990).
2.1.2.5.2 Allocative efficiency An allocation mechanism is denoted as
being allocatively efficient if it maximizes the social welfare for all strategy
profiles.
Definition 2.1.18 (allocative efficiency). The allocation of mechanismM =
(Σ1, . . . ,Σn,m(·)) with m(σ(θ)) = ω is allocatively efficient if and only if
sw(m(σ(θˆ))) = sw(ω) ≥ sw(ω′)∀σ(θˆ) ∈ (Σ1, . . . ,Σn), ω′ ∈ Ω,
where θˆ denotes the types reported by the agents to the mechanism. These
types do not necessarily represent the true types (Parkes 2001, Nisan et al.
2007).
2.1.2.5.3 Incentive compatibility In an incentive compatible, also de-
noted as strategy-proof or truthful, mechanism it is rational for the agents to
report their true types (preferences), i.e., it is not rational for the agents to ‘lie’
about their preferences.
Definition 2.1.19 (incentive compatibility). Let θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) be the
true agent types and let θˆi be the type reported by agent ai ∈ A. A mechanism
M is incentive compatible if and only if
ui(m(θi, θ−i)) ≥ ui(m(θˆi, θ−i))∀ θˆi ∈ Θi, ai ∈ A.
2.1.2.5.4 Individual rationality A mechanism is (ex-post) individually
rational if participating agents always receive non-negative utility, i.e., no agent
is worse-off by participating.
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Definition 2.1.20 (individual rationality). Let ui(m(θˆi, θˆ−i)) denote ai’s
utility if agent ai ∈ A participates, u¯i(m(θˆi, θˆ−i)) the utility if ai does not
participate. A mechanism M is individually rational if and only if
ui(m(θˆi, θˆ−i)) ≥ u¯i(m(θˆi, θˆ−i))∀ ai ∈ A.
However, ex-post individual rationality always requires that concrete out-
comes of participating agents produce non-negative utility. Therefore, the con-
cept of ex-ante individual rationality is introduced that refers to expected util-
ities.
Definition 2.1.21 (ex-ante individual rationality). Let E(ui(m(θˆi, θˆ−i)))
denote ai’s expected utility if agent ai ∈ A participates, E(u¯i(m(θˆi, θˆ−i)))
denote the expected utility if ai does not participate. A mechanism M is ex-
ante individually rational if and only if
E(ui(m(θˆi, θˆ−i))) ≥ E(u¯i(m(θˆi, θˆ−i)))∀ ai ∈ A.
It is important to note that for ex-ante individual rationality, distributional
information about the other agents’ preferences θ−i has to be known (Parkes
2001, Nisan et al. 2007).
2.1.2.5.5 Budget balance For quasi-linear preferences of the agents, the
outcome function m(·) of mechanism M can be decomposed into an allocation
function x(θˆ) ∈ Ω and a payment function pi(θˆ) that determines the payments
made or received by the agents.
Definition 2.1.22 (budget balance). Let M be a mechanism and m(θˆ) =
(x(θˆ), p1(θˆ), . . . , pn(θˆ)). M is budget balanced if and only if
∑
ai∈A
pi(θˆ) = 0.
That is, there are no net money transfers into or out of the allocation system
(Parkes 2001, Nisan et al. 2007).
Definition 2.1.23 (weak budget balance). LetM be a mechanism and m(θˆ)
= (x(θˆ), p1(θˆ), . . . , pn(θˆ)). M is weakly budget balanced if and only if
∑
ai∈A
pi(θˆ) ≥ 0.
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Thus, for weak budget balance, there can be net payments by the agents to
the mechanism, but not vice versa (Parkes 2001, Nisan et al. 2007).
2.1.2.5.6 Allocation complexity The complexity of an allocation frame-
work comprises (i) the computational complexity as well as (ii) the commu-
nication complexity. Computational complexity theory is concerned with the
question how many computational resources are required to solve a given prob-
lem. Therefore, it provides a classification of problems of different complexity
(Garey & Johnson 1979, Papadimitriou 1994).
Communication complexity is concerned with (i) the number of required
agreements (or deals) to arrive at an optimal allocation outcome, (ii) the num-
ber of dialogue moves required to establish an agreement, (iii) the expressiveness
of the communication language required, and (iv) the complexity of individual
agent’s reasoning tasks deciding on dialogue moves (Endriss & Maudet 2005,
p. 96). The complexity of agents’ reasoning for a given allocation mecha-
nism strongly influences the computational complexity, since this reasoning is
required to arrive at an allocation outcome.
2.1.3 Services & service networks
This section introduces fundamental concepts of services, especially electronic
and software services, and respective service parameters. In addition, networks
of electronic services in service-oriented architectures are described. Finally,
service level agreements – formal statements of the obligations and guarantees
in a business relationship regarding services – are discussed.
2.1.3.1 Service
The concepts of business services has been studied in research literature over
the last decades, however, no commonly accepted definition exists (Hill 1977,
Hill 1999, Gadrey 2000). This work is concerned with electronic services –
services provided over electronic networks (Rust & Kannan 2002). Moreover,
the ‘service’ concept of this research is limited to software services (Booth,
Haas, McCabe, Newcomer, Champion, Ferris & Orchard 2004, Papazoglou et al.
2008).
Definition 2.1.24 (service). A service sij ∈ S is a software activity performed
by a service provider aj ∈ ASP over electronic networks for a customer ai ∈ A,
based on an agreement x(sij), with well-defined service properties (Hill 1977,
Hill 1999, Gadrey 2000, Rust & Kannan 2002, Booth et al. 2004, Papazoglou
et al. 2008).
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The definition of services is based on the assumptions that (i) services
are software activities by service providers for customers over electronic net-
works (Hill 1977, Hill 1999, Gadrey 2000, Christensen, Curbera, Meredith &
Weerawarana 2001, Rust & Kannan 2002); (ii) services have well-defined in-
puts, outputs, preconditions, and effects (Booth et al. 2004, Martin, Burstein,
Hobbs, Lassila, McDermott, McIlraith, Narayanan, Paolucci, Parsia, Payne,
Sirin, Srinivasan & Sycara 2004); (iii) services provide reuse and interoperabil-
ity of software, potentially under distributed ownership and control (Papazoglou
2003); and (iv) services are provided based on explicit formal statements of obli-
gations and guarantees, regarding certain service properties (Verma 1999). The
following sections discuss these assumptions in detail.
2.1.3.1.1 Goods, services, and tangibility Tangibility has traditionally
defined the distinction between goods and services: goods are tangible (mate-
rial) and services are intangible (immaterial). However, intangible goods such
as information goods exist in practice and differ from services. Thus, a distinc-
tion of tangibles, intangibles, and services is evident. The differences of goods
and services are especially notable in the production output. Good production
outputs are entities of economic value and ownership of goods can be estab-
lished as well as traded. Further, goods can be consumed independently of the
time and location of their production. These characteristics of goods are also
inherent in intangible goods (e.g., information and software) (Hill 1999). In
contrast, services cannot be produced without the agreement and participation
of the service customer and service production outputs do not constitute en-
tities that exist independently of service provider and customer, i.e., services
are not separable from the service customer (Hill 1977). A detailed analysis of
the roles of customers in service production can be found in (Bitner, Faranda,
Hubbert & Zeithaml 1997). However, the integration of the customer in value
creation cannot be applied as a criterion to differentiate goods and services.
Recent production strategies for goods consider an integration of the customer
early in the production process to facilitate advanced flexibility in addressing
individual customer requirements, i.e., mass customization (Piller, Moeslein &
Stotko 2004).
There is also criticism regarding this characterization of service production
outputs. Gadrey (2000) states that outputs of activities are material if the
activities transform the state of reality and if this transformation is observable.
Consequently, all service activities have observable material outputs (Gadrey
2000, p. 372). In addition, the identity of entities, which is inherent in Hill’s
analysis, is firmly rooted in social conventions. In other conventions it could
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be considered that trading and altering (e.g., repairing) activities on an entity
change its identity (Gadrey 2000, pp. 379–380).
Since no generally accepted definition of the service concept exists, especially
across different research and application areas, this section characterizes the
service concept based on commonly accepted attributes. Despite the differences,
Hill (1977, 1999) and Gadrey (2000) determine common characteristics of the
service concept:
A service is an activity that is performed by a service provider for a service
consumer (customer) based on an agreement, results in a change of condition
of an entity, and has an output that is not separable from the altered entity
(Hill 1977, Hill 1999, Gadrey 2000).
The discussion shows that the service concept differs from the concepts of
tangible and intangible goods in several attributes. For example, services are
no entities and thus cannot be stocked (Hill 1999, p. 441). Consequently, the
production of services significantly differs from the production of goods. In
addition, electronic and software services can be further characterized, which is
presented in the following sections.
2.1.3.1.2 Electronic, software, and Web services This research as-
sumes services to be software activities by service providers for customers via
electronic networks (Hill 1977, Hill 1999, Gadrey 2000, Christensen et al. 2001,
Rust & Kannan 2002). These services have well-defined inputs, outputs, pre-
conditions, and effects (Booth et al. 2004, Martin et al. 2004).
Information and communication technologies and the internet have signif-
icant impact on the service economy. There is an emerging paradigm shift
from the electronic commerce with physical goods to electronic services (Rust
& Kannan 2003). This paradigm defines electronic services as services provided
over electronic networks (Rust & Kannan 2002). In contrast to the general
service concept, electronic services show specific characteristics. Since these
services are provided over networks, the consumption of the services is virtu-
ally independent of the location of their production and their activities cannot
directly change conditions of physical entities. Although most findings apply to
the general service concept, this work focuses on a subset of electronic services,
namely software services, in the following. That is, the services provided by
SPs over networks constitute remote execution of software, with well-defined
inputs, outputs, preconditions, and effects (Martin et al. 2004) – Web services.
The concept of a Web service (WS) generally refers to functionality pro-
vided as a software service which is accessible over the Web in a standardized
manner. The concept is independent of concrete realizations and provides a con-
CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART 43
cretization of objectives such as reuse and interoperability in distributed appli-
cations. It reduces heterogeneity by standardization, i.e., it provides platform-
independent means for distributed interoperability.
There is a significant number of commonly accepted standards around WSs
provided by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), commonly referred to
as WS-*. The W3C defines WSs as software systems which support machine-
to-machine interactions over networks. A W3C WS’s interface is described in
machine-readable form, specifically WSDL (Christensen et al. 2001). Interac-
tions with WSs are performed using SOAP messages (Gudgin, Hadley, Mendel-
sohn, Moreau, Nielsen, Karmarkar & Lafon 2007), HTTP, XML serialization,
and other WS-* standards (Booth et al. 2004).
2.1.3.1.3 Service-oriented computing and service-oriented architec-
ture Services are assumed to provide reuse and interoperability of software,
potentially under distributed ownership and control (Papazoglou 2003).
Service-oriented computing (SOC) is a paradigm that utilizes software ser-
vices as building blocks for applications. It is regarded as a derivative of object
and component orientation for distributed computing. The service-oriented
architecture (SOA), which aims at reuse and interoperability of software ser-
vices, is itself a building block of SOC. However, in existing literature, the term
SOA is often used synonymously with SOC. This research regards SOA as the
architectural basis of SOC (Papazoglou 2003).
SOA facilitates the utilization and organization of capabilities, potentially
under distributed ownership and control; it has gained significant relevance for
software development in the last decade. SOA-based technology provides means
for SOC developments. The OASIS Reference Model for Service-Oriented Ar-
chitecture (MacKenzie, Laskey, McCabe, Brown & Metz 2006) defines basic
SOA principles and vocabulary for a common understanding of SOA. Key con-
cepts of the SOA reference model include visability, realized by means of service
descriptions, interaction, mediated by message exchange, and effects, denoting
real-world changes as a result of capability utilizations. Further, SOA provides
an abstraction for service utilization, i.e., realization details (e.g., implementa-
tion, deployment, etc.) are hidden from the service customer. The abstracted
concepts are independent of concrete specifications and technologies used for
their realization. Although SOA is most commonly implemented using Web
services, it is technology-independent and can be implemented by other means
and technologies (MacKenzie et al. 2006).
Grid computing has emerged in the mid 1990s from conventional distributed
computing with a focus on large-scale resource sharing. Grid computing and re-
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lated technologies have since then changed from distributed high performance
computing (HPC) to a standards-base, flexible coordinated resource sharing
over organizational boundaries (Foster, Kesselman & Tuecke 2001). The Open
Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) (Foster, Kishimoto, Savva, Berry, Djaoui,
Grimshaw, Horn, Maciel, Siebenlist, Subramaniam, Treadwell & Reich 2006)
provides a high-level framework for service-oriented grid architecture, mostly
based on Web service standards. The building blocks are means for homoge-
neous access to heterogeneous distributed resources in the grid fabric, as well as
a SOA providing higher-level functionality. This functionality of the OGSA is
outlined in the specification’s capability descriptions. Execution Management
Services (EMS) constitute the most relevant OGSA capability for resource allo-
cation and scheduling. They include: (i) service containers which encapsulate
running entities; (ii) Job Managers (JMs) which are high-level services, encap-
sulating execution of sets of jobs; and selection services which consist of (iii)
execution planning services (EPS), (iv) candidate set generators (CSGs), and
(v) reservation services. Information services make metadata of resources avail-
able. Data services provide management, access to and update capabilities for
data resources. In addition, they are concerned with transfers of data between
resources.
During the last years, Cloud computing has emerged, operationalizing many
of Grid computing’s promises while differing in detail. For example, access
to existing Cloud computing services is mostly based on WS standards (i.e.,
WS-*), though the actual functionality commonly does not adhere to any stan-
dard. There is a large variety of definitions for the term Cloud computing
and the current hype is turning it to a widely used term referring to almost
any service related to outsourced hosting and computing resources (Vaquero,
Rodero-Merino, Caceres & Lindner 2009, p. 50). Vaquero et al. (2009) analyze
more than 20 definitions for Cloud computing to arrive at a comprehensive but
general definition:
“Clouds are a large pool of easily usable and accessible virtual-
ized resources (such as hardware, development platforms and/or
services). These resources can be dynamically reconfigured to ad-
just to a variable load (scale), allowing also for an optimum resource
utilization. This pool of resources is typically exploited by a pay-
per-use model in which guarantees are offered by the Infrastructure
Provider by means of customized SLAs.” (Vaquero et al. 2009, p.
51)
Thus, scalability, pay-per-use utility model and virtualization constitute the
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essential features to arrive at a minimal definition.
Besides the basic definition, there exist different levels of abstractions to
group certain services in Cloud computing. The infrastructure as a service
(IaaS) paradigm describes the resource-near provision of virtualized comput-
ing resources over a network, i.e., IaaS provides remote access to virtualized
computing infrastructure. This infrastructure can be utilized by other SPs to
provide their services in the Cloud ecosystem.
In contrast, platform as a service (PaaS) refers to a higher abstraction layer
in which software platforms are provided to customers instead of virtualized
hardware resources. The software as a service (SaaS) paradigm constitutes an
approach where applications directly run on remote servers instead of being
executed locally on the client computer (Vaquero et al. 2009).
2.1.3.1.4 Service properties Service properties are commonly categorized
in functional and non-functional properties. Functional properties describe
what a service does and non-functional properties describe how a services does
it (O’Sullivan, Edmond & ter Hofstede 2002). However, the distinction of
functional and non-functional service properties is often ambiguous and dif-
fers across application domains. This section provides an overview of relevant
concepts and references with a focus on non-functional properties of electronic
services.
Functional properties describe what a service does, i.e., capabilities of a
service (Oaks, ter Hofstede & Edmond 2003). This includes (i) actions that
a service performs, (ii) valid inputs of a service, (iii) conditions of a service’s
operations in term of preconditions and postconditions, as well as (iv) outputs
that a service produces (also referred to as effects of a service). Functional
service properties are defined in syntactic or semantic service specifications
and are fundamental to discover and select appropriate services. However, a
service description is only complete if non-functional properties are considered
(O’Sullivan et al. 2002, p. 118). For example, a service may provide the required
functionality while it cannot fulfill timely constraints of service provision, i.e.,
insufficient availability or execution time.
Non-functional service properties can be regarded as descriptions of limi-
tations of the functionality of a service in terms of how a service provides a
capability (O’Sullivan et al. 2002). Non-functional properties describe qual-
itative and financial characteristics of a service (Menasce 2004). Qualitative
service characteristics, referred to as quality of service (QoS) properties, orig-
inate from the telecommunication and network domains, though extensive re-
search work has been conducted in the service domain in the last decade (e.g.,
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(O’Sullivan et al. 2002, Cardoso, Sheth, Miller, Arnold & Kochut 2004, Jaeger,
Rojec-Goldmann & Mu¨hl 2004, Jaeger & Ladner 2006)). The QoS profile of a
service is described as a set of quantifiable, measurable service parameters that
refer to qualitative characteristics. These parameters are commonly denoted as
QoS parameters. In this context, the term service level refers to QoS parameter
values. Financial characteristics include cost of usage as well as rewards and
penalties if defined service levels are met or missed. Further details on service
level, reward, and penalty definitions as part of an agreement between service
provider and customer are given in the following.
2.1.3.1.5 Service level agreement Services are assumed to be provided
based on explicit formal statements of obligations and guarantees, regarding
certain service properties (Verma 1999).
An explicit formal statement of the obligations and guarantees regarding
services in a business relationship is referred to as a service level agreement
(SLA) (Verma 1999). Thus, a SLA provides the operational definition of a
service as part of a contract between a service provider and a service customer
in a SN. In real-world SNs, contractual agreements exist along the flows of
services. For individual service requests, agreements have to be established.
These agreements depend either directly or indirectly on other agreements along
the SN (e.g., for procurement or outsourcing). SOA-related SLA approaches
aim at providing an abstraction of the service while facilitating measurement
and monitoring of service properties agreed upon (Czajkowski et al. 2004, pp.
264–265).
Current technical SLA approaches (e.g., WS-Agreement (Andrieux, Cza-
jkowski, Dan, Keahey, Ludwig, Nakata, Pruyne, Rofrano, Tuecke & Xu 2007))
are limited to independent bipartite (1:1) relationships. Thus, current SLA
management is not capable to represent the full complexity of SLAs existing in
real-world service industries. The reason is that it originates from high perfor-
mance computing (HPC), which concerns purely technical attributes of limited
expressiveness which can be directly forwarded and broken-down to the lower
level stages in a 1:1 manner. Multi-tier real-world business relationships can be
mapped to sets of technical SLAs. The problem is, however, that current SLA
approaches do not consider the dependencies between subsets of SLAs in SNs
which are essential for individualization; i.e., there is a mismatch between the
technical representation of SLAs in SOA and the required coverage of real-world
business agreements, for which dependencies exist (e.g., hierarchical).
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2.1.3.2 Service network
In this research, networks of software services in which composite services are
offered by service providers (SPs), are denoted as service networks (SNs). The
provision of these software services in SNs requires non-consumable resources
(i.e., hardware and software) that are limited and possessed by SPs. The SPs’
resources contribute to the production of service applications in SNs by means
of service provision and composition. SNs are characterized by requiring mul-
tiple SPs’ resources for the provision of composite services to customers. For
the supply of software services to customers, software SPs have to allocate
their scarce computational resources of a certain quality to customer requests,
i.e., reserve respective resources for software services on the contracted service
level. In return, SPs receive monetary compensations for providing services to
customers.
The SPs’ resources’ contribution is carried out by production; i.e., the com-
bination of production (input) factors and their transformation to services (out-
put factors). Service flows are directed and primarily carried out from upstream
agents down to the customer agent, which does itself not show primary value
flows to other agents (Kirn 2008). The number of service providers can be
different on each tier. Figure 2.3 shows a generic SN model: nodes represent
agents, edges represent potential provision of services.
customersserviceproviders
a0a2a4an-1
an a3 a1a5
Figure 2.3: Generic service network model.
Definition 2.1.25 (service network). A service network (SN) is a network
of software services in which composite services sij ∈ S are offered by service
providers aj ∈ ASP to customers ai ∈ AC based on agreements x(sij), where
composite services sij aggregate multiple software services {sjk : sjk ∈ S, ak ∈
ASP} into software application services (Papazoglou et al. 2008, Blau et al.
2009).
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The definition of SNs is based on the assumptions that (i) in SNs, com-
posite software services aggregate multiple software services into software ap-
plication services (service composition) based on workflows (McIlraith, Son &
Zeng 2001, Papazoglou et al. 2008); (ii) service parameter aggregations for com-
posite services depend on parameter types, as well as workflow patterns (van
der Aalst, ter Hofstede, Kiepuszewski & Barros 2003, Jaeger et al. 2004, Jaeger
& Ladner 2006, Karaenke et al. 2013); and (iii) supply and demand in SNs are
allocated by service auctions (Smith 1989). The following sections discuss these
assumptions in detail.
2.1.3.2.1 Composite service In SNs, composite software services aggre-
gate multiple software services into software application services (service com-
position) based on workflows (McIlraith et al. 2001, Papazoglou et al. 2008).
Services are categorized in constituent (elementary, simple, atomic, prim-
itive) and composite (complex) services (McIlraith et al. 2001, Papazoglou
et al. 2008). Elementary services provide their functionality without requir-
ing other services as input factors (e.g., database or sensor services). In con-
trast, composite services rely on multiple (elementary or composite) further
services for their execution. Complex services often include functionality for
interactions or conversions between composed services and the customer, en-
abling customers to make decisions (McIlraith et al. 2001). For example, a
composite service can be a composition of elementary services for storage and
computational resources.
The composition of multiple services to provide a composite service to a
customer considers SNs as a solution space to fulfill the customer’s demand.
Composite services constitute collections of services that are governed under a
shared workflow (directed acyclic graph, DAG). Figure 2.4 shows an example
workflow, which contains six tasks (tk1 − tk6) and four gateways (represented
by diamond shapes).
tk1
tk2
tk4
tk3
tk5
tk6
ANDsplit ANDjoin
ORsplit ORjoin
Figure 2.4: Example workflow.
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To instantiate the workflow for different services, the tasks are separated
from actual services by means of a binding, which is part of the succeeding
definition. Let
• TK be a finite, non-empty set of tasks tk ∈ TK ;
• GW be a finite, non-empty set of gateways gw ∈ GW ;
• ARC be a set of arcs connecting tasks with tasks, tasks with gateways,
and gateways with gateways, thus ARC ⊆ (TK × TK ) ∪ (TK ×GW ) ∪
(GW ×GW );
• cwg ∈ CWG be a function which assigns a type to each gateway;
cwg : GW → {XORsplit, XORjoin, ANDsplit, ANDjoin, ORsplit,
ORjoin, DISCjoin, Loop};
• bng ∈ BNG be a binding function, which assigns a service s ∈ S to each
task, i.e., bng : TK → S.
Then a workflow can be defined as follows.
Definition 2.1.26 (workflow). A workflow wf ∈ WF is a directed acyclic
graph with WF = (TK ,GW ,ARC ,CWG).
Further, a composite service – the result of a service composition – can be
defined as follows.
Definition 2.1.27 (composite service). A composite service cs ∈ CW
is a tuple, cs = (wf , bng) ∈ CW = (WF ,BNG), of workflow wf ∈ WF and
binding function bng ∈ BNG.
The model is restricted to well-formed (structured) workflows, where W has
exactly one start and end node and is weakly connected. The correct usage of
the different gateway types, thus how to connect nodes by arcs, is given as
follows.
• Each task tk ∈ TK has exactly one input arc and one output arc, i.e.,
| • tk | = |tk • | = 1 ∀tk ∈ TK .
• Each gateway gw ∈ GW with cwg(gw) ∈ {XORsplit, ANDsplit, ORsplit}
has exactly one input arc and at least two output arcs, i.e., | • gw | = 1
and |gw • | ≥ 2.
• Each gateway gw ∈ GW with cwg(gw) ∈ {XORjoin,ANDjoin,ORjoin}
has at least two input arcs and exactly one output arc, i.e., | • gw | ≥ 2
and |gw • | = 1.
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• Each gateway gw ∈ GW with cwg(gw) = Loop has one input arc and
two output arcs, i.e., | • gw | = 1 and |gw • | = 2. Let arc1 = (n1, gw) be
the input arc, then one output arc arc2 connects back to node n1 with
arc2 = (gw , n1), and one output arc arc3 connects to another node with
arc3 = (gw , n2) and n1 6= n2.
This model is not bound to a particular workflow language such as the Busi-
ness Process Model and Notation (BPMN) (OMG 2011a) or the Web Services
Business Process Execution Language (WS-BPEL) (OASIS 2007), but conveys
common constructs of workflow languages (van der Aalst et al. 2003, Jaeger
et al. 2004, Jaeger & Ladner 2006, Karaenke et al. 2013).
2.1.3.2.2 Service parameter aggregation The service parameter aggre-
gations for composite services depend on parameter types, as well as workflow
patterns (van der Aalst et al. 2003, Jaeger et al. 2004, Jaeger & Ladner 2006,
Karaenke et al. 2013).
Composite WSs play an important role in SOC. They allow meeting in-
dividual service customer demand that cannot be fulfilled by a single service.
Business processes are realized by means of composing constituent services un-
der a shared workflow (Dustdar 2004). Therefore, composite services must be
configured so that they both meet the customer demand and preserve efficiency
on the service provider side. In the past years, a significant number of com-
position approaches has emerged. An essential subtask of service composition
is determining the QoS of composite services. This task is also called QoS
aggregation (Jaeger et al. 2004) – aggregation of non-functional properties.
The QoS of a composite WS provided in a SN depends on two determinants:
the QoS parameters and execution order of constituent services, defined in a
workflow. QoS parameters commonly do not adhere to any standards regarding
their number, naming, data types, and conceptualization. QoS aggregation has
been subject of much research in SOC (O’Sullivan et al. 2002).
The basic approach for QoS aggregation is standardization on the syntac-
tical level, i.e., providing standardized formats for representing parameters in
service descriptions and SLAs. Harmonization on the semantic level addresses
the problem of QoS parameter heterogeneity by defining a set of QoS param-
eters. In the Semantic Web services research field, QoS ontologies have been
proposed to specify the conceptualization of QoS parameters formally (e.g.,
(Dobson, Lock & Sommerville 2005, Mun˜oz Frutos, Kotsiopoulos, Vaquero &
Merino 2009)). These ontologies contain taxonomies of QoS parameters and
define attributes such as application domains and units of measurement. How-
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ever, beyond identifying similar parameters, these ontologies do not provide
information that could guide the QoS aggregation.
For QoS aggregation, one class of existing work proposes to state aggre-
gation functions explicitly (e.g. (ul Haq, Huqqani & Schikuta 2009)). The
drawback of this approach is that service providers need to determine the func-
tion for all potential parameters. Another class of approaches abstracts from
single parameters and identifies sets of several parameters for which aggregation
functions are provided, assuming that the parameter sets are extensible with-
out fundamentally altering the overall approach (e.g., (Zeng, Benatallah, Ngu,
Dumas, Kalagnanam & Chang 2004, Cardoso et al. 2004)). It is an important
insight to abstract from diverse and domain-specific QoS parameters and arrive
at parameter types with regard to their aggregation. QoS aggregation based on
graphs is proposed in (Cardoso et al. 2004) - the graph reduction works inversely
to operations that designers use when crafting a workflow. Jaeger et al. (2004)
ground QoS aggregation on workflow patterns (van der Aalst et al. 2003, Jaeger
et al. 2004, Jaeger & Ladner 2006), deriving so-called composition patterns and
respective aggregation functions. This research utilizes QoS parameter aggre-
gation based on composition patterns (Karaenke et al. 2013).
The composite QoS depends on two determinants: QoS parameters and
workflow. QoS parameters are diverse with regard to number, name, data
type, and conceptualization and they rarely adhere to any standard. Instead
of contributing to their harmonization, a classification with regard to their ag-
gregation exclusively is proposed. This classification is built upon the following
principle: If two parameters share the same aggregation function, then they be-
long to the same parameter type, regardless of other characteristics. Applying
this principle results in five parameter types:
• Type 1: Parameters that are always summed up along all determinis-
tic paths of the workflow (e.g., cost of service execution). For non-
deterministic paths, the aggregation depends on whether the lower or
upper bound is calculated.
• Type 2: Parameters for which the critical path is determined by the
maximal values in parallel executions (e.g., duration of execution time).
• Type 3: Parameters that denote a capacity (e.g., throughput).
• Type 4: Parameters that denote a probability (e.g., uptime probability).
• Type 5: Parameters for which the critical path is determined by the
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minimal values in parallel executions (e.g., key length of the services en-
cryption algorithm).
The second determinant workflow is analyzed by means of workflow patterns
(Jaeger et al. 2004); this analysis arrives at a set of composition patterns CP =
{Sequence, Loop, XORXOR, ANDAND, ANDDISC, OROR, ORDISC}.
For instance, the OROR pattern describes an ORsplit followed by ORjoin.
ANDDISC and ORDISC describe ANDsplit and ORsplit followed by a m-
out-of-n join (discriminator). The latter is used when an activity is triggered
after m out of n branches have been completed (e.g., to improve response time,
two databases are queried and the first result is processed, the second is ignored)
(van der Aalst et al. 2003). Both determinants span a matrix of cases, with
each cell giving the respective aggregation function. This research defines the
set of all aggregation functions as:
AF = {af cp,pt : cp ∈ CP ∧ pt ∈ PT s, af cp,pt : Rn → R}
PT s is the set of parameter types of service s ∈ S. n denotes the number
of parameters to be aggregated; the domain of af cp,pt consists of n-tuples with
QoS parameters of the constituent services. Since the aggregation function
depends on (cp, pt), there exist 5 · 7 = 35 aggregation functions.
Several pairs (cp, pt) share the same aggregation function. Thus, the num-
ber of functions can be reduced to only seven. This research defines generic
aggregation functions af ∈ AF as shown in table 2.1, with pv1, . . . , pvn de-
noting the parameter values of the services to be aggregated, and k for the
number of iterations in a Loop pattern. To each pair (cp, pt), this work as-
signs the respective aggregation function. Following (Jaeger et al. 2004), upper
and lower bound are distinguished (as shown in tables 2.2 and 2.3). This dis-
tinction is necessary to assess whether a particular parameter value meets the
guarantee defined in the SLA. Calculating expected or average parameter values
is only possible if the distribution of the non-deterministic control flows (i.e.,
XORXOR, ANDDISC, OROR, and ORDISC) is known (Jaeger et al. 2004);
however, this information is not available (Karaenke et al. 2013).
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Table 2.1: Generic aggregation functions.
aggregation function definition
af sum af sum(pv1, . . . , pvn) =
∑n
i=1 pvi
af product af product(pv1, . . . , pvn) =
∏n
i=1 pvi
af max af max (pv1, . . . , pvn) = max(pv1, . . . , pvn)
af min af min(pv1, . . . , pvn) = min(pv1, . . . , pvn)
af power af power (pv1, . . . , pvn) = (pv1, . . . , pvn)
k
af linear af linear (pv1, . . . , pvn) = k · (pv1, . . . , pvn)
af identity af identity(pv1, . . . , pvn) = (pv1, . . . , pvn)
Table 2.2: Aggregation functions for Sequence, Loop, and XORXOR compo-
sition patterns.
type bound Sequence Loop XORXOR
1
upper af sum af linear af max
lower af sum af linear af min
2
upper af sum af linear af max
lower af sum af linear af min
3
upper af min af identity af max
lower af min af identity af min
4
upper af product af power af max
lower af product af power af min
5
upper af min af identity af max
lower af min af identity af min
Table 2.3: Aggregation functions for ANDAND, ANDDISC, OROR, and
ORDISC composition patterns.
type bound ANDAND ANDDISC OROR ORDISC
1
upper af sum af sum af sum af sum
lower af sum af sum af min af min
2
upper af max af max af max af max
lower af max af min af min af min
3
upper af min af max af max af max
lower af min af min af min af min
4
upper af product af max af max af max
lower af product af product af product af product
5
upper af min af max af max af max
lower af min af min af min af min
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2.1.3.2.3 Service auction Different forms of auctions constitute specific
allocation mechanisms (e.g., English and Dutch auctions). Auctions are well-
suited when the costs of the traded products are private information to the
producing agents, i.e., the SP agents’ valuation for the services. In this thesis,
the SP agents’ valuations for services corresponds to the true cost of service pro-
ductions. Auction mechanisms can be designed, such that SP agents have an
incentive to reveal their true costs for services (Vickrey 1961). This is referred
to as incentive compatibility of a mechanism (section 2.1.2.5.3). In addition,
auction mechanisms are suitable for allocation and pricing if the traded prod-
uct has special or unusual characteristics (Smith 1989). The characteristics
of composite services in SNs are highly individual, depending on the specific
preferences of the requesting customer agent. Therefore, this research assumes
that supply and demand in SNs are allocated by service auctions, where cus-
tomer agents initiate the allocation by submitting service requests. This section
presents a formal, game-theoretic framework for service auctions in multi-tier
SNs, based on the definitions in this chapter. It is utilized for an analysis of the
problem addressed, as well as for the construction of the proposed protocol.
In this framework, SPs and customers are represented by autonomous soft-
ware agents (section 2.1.1.1). The actors delegate their objectives to their
software agents, which conduct the negotiations for service provision on their
behalf (Huhns et al. 2005). Thus, the edges in SNs represent the allocations of
services (i.e., provision of services) among SP and customer agents. SP agents
on different tiers contribute to the supply of service applications by means of
service provision and service composition. This contribution is carried out by
production; i.e., the combination of production (input) factors and their trans-
formation to services (output factors). The number of SPs can be different on
each tier. Since this research represents each actor in a SN by a software agent,
a SN is defined by service agreements between agents.
2.1.3.2.3.1 Agent From definition 2.1.1, the set of agents is defined as
A. This research further differentiates the agents in this set as follows. Let AC
denote the set of all customer agents, ASP the set of all service provider agents,
and A = AC ∪ ASP .
2.1.3.2.3.2 Service Let S be the set of all available services. sij ∈ S
denotes the service potentially provided from SP agent aj to agent ai (definition
2.1.24).
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2.1.3.2.3.3 Time This work considers an allocation process in discrete
time periods t ∈ T = {0, . . . , T}.
2.1.3.2.3.4 Offer Since customer agents initiate the interactions, Ot ⊆
O denotes the set of ‘offers’ to SP agents in t to provide a certain service (i.e.,
offers represent requests for quote/proposal), stating the maximal payment the
customer agents are willing to accept for service provision; otij ∈ O denotes the
offer from agent ai ∈ A to agent aj ∈ ASP for service sij in time period t ∈ T .
These offers are revealed to SP agents and do not necessarily represent the true
reserve prices of service customers.
2.1.3.2.3.5 Bid Bt ⊆ B is the set of bids the SP agents submit to cus-
tomer agents in t in response to offers they have received; btij ∈ B denotes the
bid from agent aj ∈ ASP to agent ai ∈ A for the provision of service sij in time
period t ∈ T .
2.1.3.2.3.6 Valuation Let vi : S → R denote the valuation function of
customer agent ai ∈ AC for the provision of services, i.e., vij := vi(sij) denotes
the valuation of customer agent ai ∈ AC for the provision of services sij ∈ S
by service provider agent aj ∈ ASP .
2.1.3.2.3.7 Cost Let cj : S → R denote the cost function of service
provider agent aj ∈ ASP for the provision of services, i.e., cij := cj(sij) denotes
the cost of SP agent aj ∈ ASP when using its own resources for providing sij
to agent ai ∈ A with cij > 0.
2.1.3.2.3.8 Capacity Let wj : S × Rj → R denote the capacity func-
tion of service provider agent aj ∈ ASP for the provision of services, i.e.,
wij := wj(sij) denotes the capacity requirements (i.e., resources from Rj) for
the provision of services sij ∈ S by service provider agent aj ∈ ASP . Further,
let Wj denote the total capacity of SP agent aj .
2.1.3.2.3.9 Allocation The binary functions xt ∈ X with xt : S →
{0, 1} denote whether the service sij ∈ S is allocated to the SP agent aj in
period t (xt(sij) = 1) or not (x
t(sij) = 0), i.e., whether a contract for service
sij has been established between customer and SP agent or not. St ⊆ S with
St = {sij : xt(sij) = 1} denotes the set of services contracted in period t ∈ T .
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2.1.3.2.3.10 Payment The function ψ : O × B → R determines the
payment from a customer agent ai ∈ A to a SP agent aj ∈ ASP with xt(sij) =
0⇔ ψtij := ψ(otij , btij) = 0 and xt(sij) = 1⇔ ψtij := ψ(otij , btij) > 0.
2.1.3.2.3.11 Service dependency ϕ : S → P(S) is a function that
returns the set of services that are required to provide a service sij along the
service network paths (including sij itself), where P(S) denotes the powerset
of the set S. That is, ϕ defines multi-tier service production dependencies.
Furthermore, this work defines the binary function zt : S → {0, 1}, which
returns 1 if and only if contracts have been established for all services which
are required to provide the service sij in period t, and 0 otherwise. Thus, z
t
defines if multi-tier dependencies along the SN paths have been considered in
the allocation in period t:
zt(sij) =
1 if ∀sk` ∈ ϕ(sij) : xt(sk`) = 1,0 otherwise. (2.1)
Obviously, zt(sij) ≤ xt(sij) ∀sij ∈ S, as sij ∈ ϕ(sij). In order to simplify
the following notion, this research sets ztij := z
t(sij), and x
t
ij := x
t(sij).
2.1.3.2.3.12 Penalty The function ρti : S → R denotes the penalty
payments received and paid by agent ai in period t if a SP agent fails to provide a
contracted service to ai or ai fails to provide a contracted service to a customer,
respectively.
With penalty factor γ ∈ R+, ρtj(sij) = (1 − ztij) γ ψij denotes the outgoing
penalty payment and ρtj(sjk) = (1 − ztjk) γ ψjk the incoming penalty payment
in case of overcommitment for the allocation in period t ∈ T for agent aj ∈ A.
Since customer agents only receive but never pay penalties themselves, it yields
ρtj(sij) = 0 ∀aj ∈ AC , t ∈ T .
2.1.3.2.3.13 Customer utility function The utility function of cus-
tomer agent ai ∈ AC is determined by ai’s valuation (vij) for services sij ∈ S
that are provided in t ∈ T (i.e., ztij = 1), less the payments ψtij for service
provision, plus penalty payments ρti(sij) for allocated services (i.e., x
t
ij = 1).
Thus, the utility function of customer ai ∈ AC is given by:
U ti (St) =
∑
aj∈ASP
ztij(vij − ψtij) + xtijρti(sij). (2.2)
Customer agents do not receive any penalty payments from their SP agents
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if these provide the service in accordance to the established contracts (i.e.,
ztij = 1⇔ ρti(sij) = 0). Contrarily, if a SP agent fails to provide its contracted
service (i.e., xtij = 1 and z
t
ij = 0), the SP agent has to pay a penalty fee to the
customer agent (i.e., ρti(sij) > 0). This state is denoted as overcommitment by
agent aj . Formally, x
t
ij = 1 ∧ ztij = 0⇔ ρti(sij) > 0.
2.1.3.2.3.14 Service provider utility function The utility function
of SP agent aj ∈ ASP is determined by the payments it receives for the provision
of services sij ∈ S (ψtij with ztij = 1), less the cost for allocated resources for
the provision of sij (cij with x
t
ij = 1) and penalties to be payed (ρ
t
j(sij)).
In addition, agent aj can act as a customer in the next tier. Consequently,
the utility function has to take into account payments (ψtjk) to SP agents ak ∈
ASP in the next tier for provided services sjk ∈ S and penalty payments received
(ρtj(sjk)).
Then the utility function of SP agents aj ∈ ASP is given by:
U tj (St) =
∑
ai∈A
ztijψ
t
ij − xtij(cij + ρtj(sij))
−
∑
ak∈ASP
(
ztjkψ
t
jk − xtjkρtj(sjk)
)
.
(2.3)
2.1.3.2.3.15 Utilitarian social welfare The social welfare is given by
the sum of (2.2) and (2.3) over all participating agents in A. Thus,
sw(St) =
∑
ai∈AC
U ti (St) +
∑
aj∈ASP
U tj (St)
=
∑
ai∈AC
∑
aj∈ASP
ztij(vij − ψtij) + xtij(1− ztij) γ ψtij
+
∑
aj∈ASP
∑
a`∈A
zt`jψ
t
`j − xt`j
(
c`j + (1− zt`j) γ ψt`j
)
−
∑
aj∈ASP
∑
ak∈ASP
ztjk ψ
t
jk − xtjk(1− ztjk) γ ψtjk.
(2.4)
Since A = AC ∪ ASP , the second inner sum in (2.4) can be split up into
two sums running over AC and ASP . Then indices can be set such that ` = i
in the resulting sum over AC , as it iterates over the same set of agents. In the
same way, let j = k and ` = j in the resulting sum over ASP . Finally, the cost
for providing services to agents are combined from AC and ASP respectively.
Thus,
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sw(St) =
∑
ai∈AC
∑
aj∈ASP
ztijvij − xtijcij
−
∑
aj∈ASP
∑
ak∈ASP
xtjkcjk
=
∑
aj∈ASP
( ∑
ai∈AC
ztijvij −
∑
a`∈A
xt`jc`j
)
.
(2.5)
In social welfare, payments and penalties sum up to zero. This result is
intuitive, since payments constitute redistribution of wealth between the agents,
but do not generate a surplus from a welfare perspective.
2.2 Problem analysis
In this section, the addressed problem is formally described and certain prop-
erties of solutions to the problem are analyzed. It is proven that overcommit-
ments cannot exist in optimal solutions and that finding optimal solutions is
NP-complete. Further, it is shown that the utilitarian social welfare optimal
allocation in multi-tier service networks is supported by a strategy profile of a
Nash equilibrium and that equilibria always exist in multi-tier service network
allocation games. The requirements for the allocation protocol to solve the
problem addressed are described by means of a structured informal document
with all features of the protocol (Huget & Koning 2003, pp. 180–182). Finally,
a definition of the requirements is provided.
2.2.1 Utilitarian social welfare maximization problem
Utilitarian social welfare (section 2.1.2.4) is most commonly used in the mul-
tiagent systems research area to assess the system performance in terms of
the maximal average profit of negotiating agents in electronic commerce trans-
actions (Chevaleyre et al. 2006, p. 16). Therefore, the allocation problem
addressed in this thesis can be formulated as a maximization problem of this
metric.
Let S∗ = ⋃t∈T St. Then the utilitarian social welfare maximization problem
consists of determining the optimal set of services:
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sw(S∗) = max
S∗∈S
∑
t∈T
∑
aj∈ASP
( ∑
ai∈AC
ztijvij −
∑
a`∈A
xt`jc`j
)
s.t. ∀aj ∈ ASP :
∑
ai∈AC
wijx
t
ij ≤Wj .
(2.6)
The set of services S∗ = ⋃t∈T St maximizes the utilitarian social welfare,
i.e., the sum of customer agents’ valuations (vij) for services sij ∈ S that are
provided in t ∈ T (ztij = 1), less the SP agents’ costs for allocated resources
for the provision of sij (cij with x
t
ij = 1). The side condition ensures, that
resources from SP agents are not allocated beyond their resource capacities.
That is, the resources allocated for service provision (wij with x
t
ij = 1) must
not exceed the total resource capacities Wj ∀aj ∈ ASP .
Next, it is proven that optimal solutions to the social welfare maximization
problem do not contain overcommitments (section 2.1.3.2.3) in theorem 1 as
follows. If there is overcommitment in an utilitarian social welfare optimal al-
location, there would be a service sij ∈ S for which zt(sij) = 0 and xt(sij) = 1.
It yields cj(sij) > 0 for all SP agents and services. Therefore, the overcommit-
ment would cause negative welfare, due to the cost of the allocated resources; it
would not lead to positive welfare by the valuation for sij , since sij is not pro-
vided (zt(sij) = 0). Hence, overcommitments cannot exist in utilitarian social
welfare optimal solutions.
Theorem 1. If S∗ = ⋃t∈T St is the set of contracted services of an utilitarian
social welfare optimal allocation, then zt(sij) = x
t(sij) ∀sij ∈ St, ∀t ∈ T .
Proof. By contradiction. Let S∗ be the set of contracted services of an util-
itarian social welfare optimal allocation such that ∃t ∈ T , sij ∈ St ⊆ S∗ :
zt(sij) 6= xt(sij). As zt(sij) ≤ xt(sij) ∀sij ∈ St, it yields zt(sij) = 0 and
xt(sij) = 1. Let S∗′ := S∗\{sij}. As S∗ is an optimal allocation, sw(S∗) ≥
sw(S∗′) ⇔ sw(S∗′) − xt(sij)cj(sij) ≥ sw(S∗′). As xt(sij) = 1 and cj(sij) > 0,
the contradiction follows.
2.2.1.1 Computational problem complexity
The computational complexity (section 2.1.2.5.6) of the utilitarian social wel-
fare optimization problem is analyzed in this section. To prove that the problem
addressed is NP-complete, it has to be shown that (i) the problem is in NP
and (ii) any instance of a problem that is known to be NP-complete can be
transformed to the problem addressed in polynomial time. For NP member-
ship, a given solution has to be verifiable in polynomial time (verifiability); i.e.,
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a non-deterministic algorithm which ‘guesses’ solutions can ‘solve’ the problem
in polynomial time (Garey & Johnson 1979).
A transformation (reduction) from the 0-1 knapsack problem to the problem
addressed in this thesis is provided. The 0-1 knapsack problem consists of the
determination of a subset of a given set of items, with defined valuation and
weight each, to be put in a knapsack with limited weight capacity, such that the
valuation of the items in the knapsack is maximized. The specificity of the 0-1
knapsack problem is that there is only one of each item. The transformation is
defined as follows:
(i) Overcommitments are excluded, (ii) only one time period is considered,
(iii) only one SP agent is considered, (iv) the function that determines which
items are put in the knapsack is transformed to the allocation function x1ij , (v)
the valuations of the items are transformed to cost less valuation of services,
(vi) the weights of the items are transformed to the capacity requirements of
the services, and (vii) the knapsack capacity is transformed to the resource
capacity of the single SP agent.
Since this reduction can be done in polynomial time, the problem is shown
to be NP-hard. Together with NP membership, this proves that the problem
addressed is NP-complete.
Theorem 2. The computation problem for the socially optimal allocation is
NP-complete.
Proof. NP membership is trivial, since for any given solution to the allocation
problem, the calculation of the resulting social welfare (2.5) and the verifica-
tion of the constraints that the sum of the capacity requirements wijxij does
not exceed the given capacity Wj for each SP (2.6) can obviously be done in
polynomial time. For hardness, this research defines a reduction from the 0-1
knapsack problem which is known to be NP-complete (Karp 1972). The 0-1
knapsack problem is defined as follows. Let U be a finite set and let u ∈ U .
Further, g(u) denotes the weight and b(u) the valuation of element u, and K
is a positive integer. Now maximize
∑
u∈U a(u)b(u) s.t.
∑
u∈U a(u)g(u) ≤ K,
where a(u) denotes a 0-1 assignment to each u ∈ U (Garey & Johnson 1979).
Any instance of the 0-1 knapsack problem can be reduced to our optimization
problem as follows. By theorem 1, ztij = x
t
ij can be assumed. In addition, let
|T | = 1, |ASP | = 1, AC = U , x1ij = a(u), vij − cij = b(u), wij = g(u)∀u ∈ U ,
and Wj = K with aj ∈ ASP . Obviously, this reduction can be done in poly-
nomial time. Hence, each SP agent’s optimization problem and therewith the
utilitarian social welfare maximization problem is NP-hard.
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2.2.1.2 Equilibria
This section applies the concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) to analyze the net-
work allocation game (section 2.1.2.3.4). Informally, a strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium if no player has incentive to deviate from his strategy given that
the other participating players do not deviate (Nash 1950, Rasmusen 1989).
It is shown that the empty allocation constitutes a NE if all bids exceed all
customer valuations and the costomers’ offers are 0 in proposition 1. If a SP
agent deviates, it cannot gain positive utility, since the willingness to pay for
all customers is 0. Thus, there is no incentive for SP agents to deviate from
their strategy. For customer agents, deviating is not beneficial, since the bids
of all SP agents exceed the valuations of all customer agents. Therefore, a NE
always exists in multi-tier service network allocation games.
Proposition 1. A Nash equilibrium always exists in multi-tier service network
allocation games.
Proof. Let otij = 0 and b
t
ij = N ∀ai, aj ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T where N > vij is a
large number. As N exceeds the customer agents’ valuation for all services
without loss of generality, this results in an empty allocation, i.e., no service
is contracted. Further, SP agents have cost (cij > 0) for the provision of
contracted services. Thus, no agent can gain a positive utility by deviating from
the characterized strategy profile. That is, the empty allocation constitutes a
NE.
In proposition 2, it is proven that utilitarian social welfare optimal alloca-
tions are supported by a strategy profile of a NE in multi-tier service networks
as follows. If a service is not in the optimal set of services, customers’ offers
are 0 and all bids exceed all customer valuations for these services. If a service
is part of the optimal set of services, bids are equal to offers and the valua-
tions exceed the payments for these services, and SP agents bid their marginal
cost. If a SP agent deviates, it cannot gain positive utility, since the willing-
ness to pay for all customers equals the marginal cost for service production.
Therefore, there is no incentive for SP agents to deviate from their strategy.
For customer agents, deviating is not beneficial, since the bids of all SP agents
exceed the valuations of all customer agents for services that are not in the set
of optimal services. For services that are part of the optimal set of services, it
is not beneficial for the customer agent to deviate, since for lower offers, it will
not receive the allocation and cannot gain utility, due to the valuation for these
services. Higher offers are useless, since customer agents would pay more than
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necessary for the services requested. Therefore, the utilitarian social welfare
optimal allocation in multi-tier service networks is a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2. The utilitarian social welfare optimal allocation in multi-tier
service networks is supported by a strategy profile of a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let S∗ be an utilitarian social welfare optimal allocation. The agents’
strategy profiles are constructed as follow. If sij /∈ S∗ ⇒ otij = 0 and btij = N ,
where N is a large number; sij ∈ S∗ ⇒ ∃t ∈ T : otij = btij , vij ≥ ψtij , and
ψtij = cij +
∑
sjk∈ϕ(sij) ψ
t
jk ∀ai, aj ∈ A. Thus, each SP agent has 0 utility
and cannot gain a positive utility by deviating from this strategy, as their bids
correspond to the marginal cost for service provision. The customer agents
cannot increase their utility by choosing a different strategy, as N exceeds the
customer agents’ valuation for sij /∈ S∗ or vij ≥ ψtij otherwise. This strategy
profile can always be constructed and constitutes a NE.
2.2.2 Requirements description
For the production of the requested services in SNs it is possible for SPs to (i)
utilize resources from the own inventory or (ii) buy services from a third party
(subcontracting). The latter is done if (i) the own capacity is not sufficient,
(ii) the own resources do not have the required functionality, or (iii) if the
utilization of the own capacity is economically not favorable because of the cost
function (e.g., step cost). The subcontracting can also comprise parts of the
service. This means, that a service provided to the customer can be an arbitrary
composition of own and procured services.
SPs have to consider economically relevant values to determine the concrete
resources for service provision. For services in SNs, this implies that the indi-
vidual requirements of the customer determine the requirements of SLAs that
have to be established in upstream SN tiers. Therefore, the protocol must allow
for subcontracting activities by SPs and for establishing all (sub-)agreements
for a concrete customer request in a coordinated manner: the protocol has to
avoid overcommitments. That is, it must prevent agreements with customers
without establishing necessary sub-agreements with other agents.
For example, the service requested by the customer can be a data mining
service which is provided in tier λ = 0. The customer request includes a defini-
tion of the service along with respective parameters (e.g., throughput). The SPs
can subcontract parts of the service to, respectively procure appropriate sub-
services from, their suppliers (e.g., storage and analysis services) in tier λ = 1.
The protocol has to ensure that agreements will either be established with the
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customers and with respective suppliers or no agreements will be established
at all.
As a next step towards a protocol specification, this research performs the
analysis stage in accordance to the interaction protocol engineering approach.
On the basis of the discussion and SN model, a structured informal document
with all features of the protocol can be provided (Huget & Koning 2003, pp.
180–182). This informal description is shown in table 2.4 for the proposed
protocol.
The formal problem analysis and informal description of the protocol are
utilized to derive requirements for the protocol to be specified. Next, these
requirements are discussed in detail. They comprise (i) distributed allocation,
(ii) service dependencies, and allocation mechanism properties: (iii) allocative
efficiency, (iv) incentive compatibility, (v) individual rationality, (vi) budget
balance, and (vii) allocation complexity.
Distributed allocation refers to centralized vs. distributed allocation. There
are, however, existing approaches which distribute parts of the allocation prob-
lem, but still require a central coordinating entity. Service dependencies are
twofold – they can be allowed by an approach without guaranteeing their con-
sideration in every allocation outcome. In contrast, the stronger interpretation
of this criterion requires every valid allocation outcome to guarantee the con-
sideration of service dependencies.
The mechanism properties of an allocation procedure are analyzed with
regard to the properties defined in section 2.1.2.5.
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Table 2.4: Informal protocol description.
Name Multi-tier contract net protocol
Keywords multi-tier resource allocation, service networks, swaps
Agents’
role
customer, service provider (SP)
Initiator customer
Prerequisite The agents must know how to send messages to other agents.
Function A customer requests to buy a service which has to be provided at
a certain service level (quality of service). A SP offers a bid on
the request. The SP may procure (sub-)services from other SPs
(subcontracting, outsourcing) in multi-tier request processing if
(i) the SP’s capacity is insufficient, (ii) the SP’s resources do not
provide the required functionality, or (iii) if the utilization of the
SP’s capacities is not economically favorable. This can also com-
prise parts of the service; i.e., a composition of own and procured
services. The protocol enables to establish all agreements along
the SN in a coordinated manner.
Behavior The protocol can be decomposed into three phases:
(i) In the collect proposal phase, the customer’s request is trans-
ferred to potential SPs in service network tier λ. The SPs process
the request and may decide to establish sub-agreements for parts
of the request in tier λ+ 1 of the service network; i.e., they trans-
fer own requests to other SPs in tier λ + 1. SPs’ subcontracting
activities can be recursively extended to an arbitrary number of
tiers. Before a SP in tier λ answers the final customer’s request
with a binding bid, it evaluates the bids received from SPs in tier
λ+ 1. Thus, the SP can make a bid to the customer based on the
results of multi-tier bids.
(ii) In the acceptance notification phase, the SPs are informed
about the acceptance of the bids they have provided. The SPs
in tier λ subsequently inform the SPs in tier λ + 1 about the
acceptance of dependent bids. The recursion is executed to the
number of tiers on which bids were submitted.
(iii) The execution phase comprises the actual service delivery.
The result of the execution (e.g., service level) is reported to the
customer. SPs in tier λ report the state of the provision of the
services to their customers which may constitute SPs in tier λ −
1. The recursion is executed to the number of tiers on which
agreements have been established.
Constraints All agents must be authenticated.
Termination (i) All SPs have provided the services as contracted, (ii) the actual
delivery of one or more services has failed, (iii) no agreement has
been established, or (iv) a timeout has occurred during resource
allocation or execution.
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2.2.2.1 Distributed allocation
It is required that the distributed nature of SNs is considered. Therefore, the
protocol must not assume that central coordinating entities (such as central
auctioneers) exist to select and enforce allocation outcomes.
Requirement 1 (distributed allocation). The protocol must allow for dis-
tributed resource allocation, i.e., it must not require central coordinating en-
tities.
The distribution of the allocation comprises the existence of a central agent
that selects and enforces allocation outcomes. In a completely centralized
auction-based setting, there is a single auctioneer that computes the alloca-
tion outcomes. This requires the existence of an appropriate agent that can
assume this role. In addition, this agent has to be able to communicate with
every agent relevant for the allocation.
In distributed winner determination scenarios, the central agent does not
calculate the allocation outcomes itself, but distributes the computational task
to other agents. This type of distribution is concerned with distribution of the
allocation computational load only. Thus, it neither reduces the complexity
of winner determination, nor does it make a central auctioneer agent obsolete.
In this thesis, an allocation procedure is denoted as distributed if and only if
there is no single agent that selects and enforces allocation outcomes along the
complete SN, since the assumption of a central entity contradicts the distributed
nature of SNs.
2.2.2.2 Service dependencies
As a central focus of this research, the protocol must consider service depen-
dencies over multiple tiers of SNs. It has been shown that overcommitments
cannot occur in socially optimal allocations. Therefore, this research formulates
a respective requirement for the protocol proposed.
Requirement 2 (service dependencies). The protocol must avoid overcommit-
ments.
An allocation procedure can guarantee consideration of service dependencies
in SNs if and only if it addresses supply and demand side of service producing
agents. This means that it is required to respect both input and output ser-
vices of every SP agent before any binding allocation is made. That is, during
the execution of the allocation procedure. If the service dependencies are not
considered, the provision of services (i.e., fulfillment of agreements) may be
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unaccomplishable due to missing services which are required for the provision
(overcommitment).
Respecting service dependencies in the allocation procedure is not a binary
criterion. For example, an approach can minimize the expected probability
of overcommitments (i.e., existence of unconsidered service dependencies in
the allocation outcome) by SP agents while it does not guarantee to avoid
overcommitments. Thus, the service dependency requirement is divided into
two sub-criteria to assess how pertinent allocation approaches deal with service
dependencies.
The weaker form of this requirement is denoted as consideration of service
dependencies. The stronger form, which guarantees to respect all service depen-
dencies in the allocation outcome, is denoted as avoidance of overcommitments.
2.2.2.3 Allocative efficiency
Next, properties of the allocation mechanism are considered: allocative ef-
ficiency, incentive compatibility, individual rationality, budget balance, and
allocation complexity. Since the allocation complexity in SNs is generally
NP-complete, the utilitarian social welfare optimization problem cannot be
solved in polynomial time for any problem instance. In addition, it is im-
possible to design a mechanism that is allocatively efficient, budget balanced,
and incentive compatible, at least in settings with quasi-linear preferences
(Green & Laffont 1977, Walker 1980, Myerson & Satterthwaite 1983, Hurwicz
& Walker 1990). Therefore, the proposed solution must approximate the utili-
tarian socially optimal allocation.
Requirement 3 (allocative efficiency). The allocation protocol must constitute
a heuristic for the utilitarian social welfare maximization problem.
The allocative efficiency of a mechanism refers to the mechanism’s property
of maximizing a preference aggregation (e.g. social welfare) of the agents. In
this thesis, the notion of utilitarian social welfare is utilized. Thus, a mechanism
is allocatively efficient if and only if it maximizes the utilitarian social welfare,
i.e., the sum of utilities of the agents (sections 2.1.2.4 and 2.1.2.5.2).
2.2.2.4 Incentive compatibility
A mechanism is incentive compatible if it is rational for the agents to report
their true preferences (types); the agents cannot gain utility by reporting untrue
preferences (e.g., manipulating bids) (section 2.1.2.5.3).
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Requirement 4 (incentive compatibility). The allocation protocol must be in-
centive compatible.
2.2.2.5 Individual rationality
If no agent is worse-off by participating in the allocation, a mechanism is indi-
vidually rational. That is, no agent can gain utility by not participating in the
allocation game (section 2.1.2.5.4).
Requirement 5 (individual rationality). The allocation protocol must be indi-
vidually rational.
2.2.2.6 Budget balance
An allocation mechanism is budget balanced if there are no net payments by the
mechanism to the participating agents, i.e., the single payments of the agents
sum up to zero (section 2.1.2.5.5).
Requirement 6 (budget balance). The allocation protocol must be budget bal-
anced.
2.2.2.7 Allocation complexity
The complexity of an allocation procedure comprises computational and com-
munication complexity (section 2.1.2.5.6). The allocation complexity in SNs
is generally NP-complete. The utilitarian social welfare optimization problem
cannot be solved in polynomial time for any problem instance. Therefore, the
proposed solution must approximate the utilitarian socially optimal allocation
and must guarantee to terminate in polynomial time.
Computational complexity theory is concerned with the question of how
many computational resources are required to solve a given problem. It provides
a classification of problems of different complexity (Garey & Johnson 1979,
Papadimitriou 1994). This thesis assigns a complexity class (e.g., NP) of the
problem to be solved, following the allocation procedures proposed in related
research.
Requirement 7 (allocation complexity). The allocation protocol must guar-
antee to terminate in polynomial time for any problem instance.
Communication complexity has four elements: (i) the number of required
agreements (or deals) to arrive at an optimal allocation outcome, (ii) the number
of dialogue moves required to establish an agreement, (iii) the expressiveness
of the communication language required, and (iv) the complexity of individual
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agents’ reasoning tasks, deciding on dialogue moves (Endriss & Maudet 2005,
p. 122).
In the following review of current solutions to the allocation problem, the
latter two elements of communication complexity are neglected, due to the fol-
lowing reasons. First, the required communication language is widely applica-
tion domain-dependent. This aspect of communication complexity is concerned
with requirements of concrete solution instances, rather than with the com-
munication complexity of conceptual solutions. Second, the individual agents’
reasoning complexity is essentially a question of computational complexity.
2.3 Allocation approaches for multi-tier service net-
works
Resource allocation has been subject of comprehensive research in multiagent
systems (see (Chevaleyre et al. 2006) for a survey); relevant approaches can be
divided into two different groups.
The first group, which mostly does not deal with concrete negotiation mech-
anisms, focuses on principles of specific sub-topics. This includes approaches
for distributed allocation, leveled commitments, and socially optimal allocation
outcomes.
The second group consists of more concrete approaches which are found
in the areas of interdependent negotiations, supply chain formation, and ser-
vice network formation. Interdependencies of multiple negotiations for supply
and demand constitute a class of relevant research. These approaches con-
sider dependencies between inputs and outputs. In contrast, another class of
related work is concerned with multiple supply (procurement) negotiations. It
addresses the problem of procuring a desired product in the right amount and
at the right price. That is, decision problems are addressed to avoid agreements
for more products than intended (e.g., winning two auctions for one unit of a
product each if just one unit is required). Among the approaches for supply
chain formation, most consider coordination via a central entity, though there
are also approaches which consider decentralized coordination. The most rele-
vant class of service network formation research considers auctions as allocation
mechanisms.
The requirements defined in section 2.2.2 must be fulfilled by any allocation
approach to solve the research problem. Therefore, the following literature
review assesses if and how pertinent allocation approaches meet one or more of
these requirements.
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2.3.1 Distributed allocation
Parkes & Shneidman (2004) present guidelines for the development of dis-
tributed allocation mechanism implementations based on the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (Vickrey 1961) mechanism. The aim of the approach is to distribute
as much computational load as possible onto network nodes and thus help to
determine a suitable allocation result. However, the proposed allocation proce-
dure requires a ‘center’ entity which communicates with network nodes through
a trusted channel and hence selects and enforces allocation outcomes. Thus,
this approach cannot be applied to SNs without the existence of central coor-
dinating entities, i.e., it does not allow for distributed allocation in terms of
the requirement. Since Parkes & Shneidman (2004) do not propose a concrete
algorithm or negotiation framework, neither the service dependency nor the
allocation mechanism properties requirements are applicable.
In the field of multiagent resource allocation, Bo and Lesser (Bo & Lesser
2010) investigate contract-based resource allocation across computational net-
works – a set of selfish agents route traffic for individual users. Before user
agents can route traffic through node entities, contracts between user agents
and the participating nodes need to be established. The negotiation approach
proposed by Bo and Lesser is of distributed nature, i.e., agents act on behalf of
themselves, and the corresponding resource allocation emerges from sequences
of distributed negotiations.
In addition to mutual contracting, nodes are allowed to decommit from
existing contracts at a penalty cost. The authors investigate the relationship
between stability and optimality of the network resource allocation game and
consider system dynamics during agent contracting. However, user agents are
required to establish a separate contract with each node on the path. Thus,
service dependencies, in which each node only negotiates contracts with nodes
in adjacent tiers, are not considered. That is, the approach does not consider
service dependencies.
The allocation problem addressed by Bo & Lesser (2010) is NP-complete.
However, the proposed distributed approach constitutes a polynomial time
heuristic of the social welfare maximization problem. The agents exchange
a finite set of messages, and network node agents decide if they are willing
to accept user agents’ bids. As network node agents act rational, they accept
user agents’ bids if and only if they do not exceed the network node agents’
costs for routing the user agents’ traffic. Thus, the network node agents’ de-
cision problem can be solved in polynomial time. Further, routing paths and
node agents’ marginal cost for routing traffic are known to the user agents, as
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complete information is assumed. The user agents’ decision processes consist
of price comparisons for alternative paths and potential decommitments from
obsolete node contracts. This reasoning can be done in polynomial time.
The proposed mechanism is not individually rational, since costs can occur
without valuation for user agents. In addition, the approach does not incentivize
truthful bidding, but is budget balanced. Regarding the communication cost,
three messages are required to conclude a contract between a user and a node
agent.
2.3.2 Leveled commitments
Sandholm & Lesser (2001) propose leveled commitment contracts which are
not binding, but can be canceled by an agent by paying a pre-defined penalty
to the other party (Sandholm & Lesser 1995, Sandholm & Lesser 2001). In
(Sandholm & Lesser 1995), leveled commitments and an extension of the Con-
tract net protocol (Smith 1980) are discussed. In (Sandholm & Lesser 2001),
further details of leveled commitments are given. The approach addresses the
traditional assumption of binding contracts between agents. In contrast, in lev-
eled commitment contracts, the level of commitment is defined by breach (i.e.,
decommitment) penalties. An agent can dissolve an agreement (or contract) by
paying a pre-defined penalty to the other agents involved in the agreement.
Sandholm & Lesser (2001) compare the proposed leveled commitment con-
tracts to full commitment contracts in a setting where agents have probabilistic
information about a contract’s value. Thus, the expected utilities are analyzed
for outside offers for contractor (the agent that pays the contract price) and
contractee (the agent that performs the contracted action). The agents decide
on decommitments when they know their outside offer, but the other agent
involved in the agreement does not know any outside offer of other agents.
Four distinct decommitment mechanisms are analytically compared; they
differ in the order of revealing the decommitment decision (sequentially or in
parallel) and whether the penalties have to be paid if both agents decommit. In
addition, games with future uncertainty for one and both agents are analyzed.
Leveled commitments can be applied to both centralized and distributed
winner determination. The approach cannot consider service dependencies,
but can mitigate the consequences of overcommitments, as the decommitment
penalty would normally be smaller than the penalty for not being able to fulfill a
binding agreement. However, leveled commitment contracts do not avoid over-
commitments. They may even increase the probability of overcommitments,
as upstream SPs can decommit from agreements which are required for the
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fulfillment of interdependent agreements to customers.
Since the approach performs a game-theoretic analysis of decommitment
games, but does not propose a concrete allocation protocol or mechanism,
mechanism properties cannot be assessed. For example, the communication
complexity greatly depends on concrete applications and cannot be assessed in
general.
2.3.3 Socially optimal allocations of resources
Endriss, Maudet, Sadri & Toni (2006) analyze multilateral deals (i.e., agree-
ments) to exchange bundles of indivisible resources between agents. Changes
in resource distribution are analyzed for different collective utility functions (i.e.,
social welfare orderings). The proposed negotiation framework is analyzed for
allocations with and without side payments with regard to guaranteed optimal
social welfare and pareto optimality. Subsequently, both settings are applied to
agent societies with different concepts of social welfare, i.e., interpretations of
the concept of social welfare which are different from utilitarian social welfare
– the concepts most commonly used in the multiagent systems research area.
This work constitutes a distributed allocation approach and focuses on the
convergence to optimal allocations for different notions of social welfare. Since
the negotiation framework considers multilateral agreements, a single agreement
can comprise any number of agents and resources. The particular notion of
dependency of agreements is introduced, though this notion of ‘independently
decomposable deals’ refers to the agents involved, rather than to dependencies
between allocations. That is, while it would be generally possible to consider
service dependencies in multilateral deals, the proposed negotiation framework
does not consider service dependencies in multi-tier SN.
The reason is that the framework would consider these dependencies in mul-
tilateral deals of all agents along the SN, since overcommitments would result in
irrational agreements, though the framework assumes that any agent involved
in the production of a service would participate in a single agreement. This
assumption contradicts the multi-tier characteristic of the SN. The approach is
individually rational and budget balanced by definition and guarantees alloca-
tive efficiency when side payments are possible, though it is not strategy-proof.
The communication complexity of the multilateral negotiation framework
is analyzed for one of its four aspects in (Endriss & Maudet 2005), namely the
required number of deals to arrive at an optimal allocation outcome. However,
the presented upper and lower bounds for the needed number of deals refer to
the abstract negotiation framework, rather than to a concrete negotiation pro-
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tocol, i.e., these results are valid for any negotiation protocol enabling allocation
under the provided assumptions.
2.3.4 Interdependent Supply Negotiations
In the area of interdependent procurements across multiple negotiations, An-
thony & Jennings (2003) investigate the problem of bidding across multiple
auctions to procure the best deal for the desired good. The approach addresses
the decision process of agents bidding across auctions with different start and
end times and with different auction protocols (English, Dutch, and Vickrey),
i.e., agents’ bidding decisions among concurrent heterogeneous auctions.
A genetic algorithm is applied to search for strategies in different environ-
mental settings. These are experimentally evaluated in an electronic market-
place scenario with a group of random bidders; they simulate other bidders
and bid on one single auction only. These random bidders’ private valuations,
starting bids, and bid increments are generated from a normal probability dis-
tribution.
Different bidding policies for the agent bidding on multiple auctions are
analyzed. Here, the bidding agent does not submit further bids if it holds the
highest bid in an English auction or has submitted a bid to a Dutch or Vickrey
auction, to avoid purchasing of more than one product. The policy is defined
by an aggregation function over different bidding functions for the remaining
time left, the remaining number of auctions left, the desire to get a bargain,
and the level of desperateness of a bidding agent. These four attributes are
taken into consideration in distinct parametrized bidding functions, referred to
as tactics. The functions’ values are combined by the aggregation function with
varying weights. In the experimental evaluation, different parameters for the
tactics and different weights for the aggregation function are simulated.
Next, as the solution space for parameter values and weights is infinite,
a genetic algorithm is applied to determine most successful bidding policies in
predefined environments (e.g., short time, many auctions). The most successful
bidding policies in terms of concrete parameter values and weights are then
selected for different environments. Finally, these policies are experimentally
evaluated against control bidding policies.
The approach does not propose an allocation protocol, but bidding policies
in multiple procurement negotiations; it is addressing a single agent’s decision
problem when participating in multiple auctions. Thus, the requirements de-
fined cannot be assessed. However, similar decision problems also exist in SNs
and the approach can in principle be applied to service procurement in SNs.
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The agents utilizing this bidding policy need to determine the environment type
quickly and accurately. Further, probability distributions of the auctions are
assumed to be static and known to the agents. With different strategies for the
other auctions’ participants, the bidding policy has to be evolved again, and
more accurate probability predictions are necessary to select suitable target
auctions.
Nguyen & Jennings (2005) analyze procurement activities for services in
multiple bilateral negotiations, i.e., a customer agent is looking for a single SP
agent from a number of multiple SP agents in its environment. Therefore, the
customer agent concurrently negotiates bilaterally with the SP agents. The
proposed negotiation framework is based on the concept of leveled commitment
contracts (Sandholm & Lesser 2001).
The customer agents are assumed to know the probability distributions of
successful negotiations for a set of strategies and the expected utility of suc-
cessful negotiations. With this information, the customer agent calculates the
probability that a SP agent is of a specific type. Then, it calculates the expected
utility of applying different strategies to its proposal for this specific SP agent
and selects the strategy which maximizes the expected utility. This is done
until the customer agent has allocated strategies to all concurrent negotiations.
The negotiation framework considers ‘intermediate deals’ which can be de-
commited from at a dynamic penalty, starting at a percentage of the contract
value and increasing towards the end of the negotiation. In an earlier version
of the negotiation framework, customer agents were allowed to decommit at no
penalty (Nguyen & Jennings 2004). Therefore, this version is heavily biased in
favor of the customer agents. In (Nguyen & Jennings 2005), a customer agent
decommits from a contract (and pays the penalty fee) if the expected utility of
a new offer exceeds the utility of an established contract along with the penalty
to be paid for the decommitment by a given threshold. The customer agent
keeps bargaining this way until its private negotiation deadline is reached.
The authors also consider that a customer agent accepts more than one inter-
mediate agreement to decommit from all, but the utility maximizing agreement
at the private negotiation deadline. This avoids the risk of a single agreement
that is revoked by the SP agent close to the negotiation deadline. However, if
the SP agent does not decommit, the customer agent has to pay penalties for
any additional intermediate agreement. The negotiation framework is empiri-
cally evaluated for three different types of SP agents.
Since the approach proposes bargaining between customer and SP agents,
it constitutes a distributed allocation approach. It does not consider services
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to be re-sold or to be utilized as input factors for value added services. Thus,
the approach cannot consider service dependencies. However, the framework
and findings can in principle be applied to negotiations on distinct tiers of SNs.
The approach is budget balanced, but not individually rational or incentive
compatible, and does not guarantee allocative efficiency. The computational
complexity of the allocation is in P, since the customer agent has to simply
compare different offers by SPs. The communication complexity (in terms of
messages to be sent) is potentially high, as multiple offers and counter-offers
are sent and received by customer agents to every potential SP agent. In addi-
tion, decommitment messages are required to resolve unnecessary intermediate
agreements.
Schillo, Kray & Fischer (2002) analyze resource allocation with the Contract
net protocol (Smith 1980) and propose three strategies for the eager bidder
problem. This problem results from a SP agent which submits bids to multiple
reverse auctions for the utilization of its resources. On the one hand, the SP
agents can submit single bids, potentially losing the auction without agreements
for its resources. On the other hand, if SP agents submit bids for more than one
auction, they may conclude more agreements than their resources can fulfill.
SP agents need to decide in which auctions they participate and how their
commitments should be handled, with regard to limited resources. The authors
compare three methods to address the eager bidder problem and compare them
to the utilization of the conservative ad hoc solution, in which SP agents allo-
cate resources just before sending a bid. The latter solution ensures resource
availability. However, if the service provision requires only one SP agent and
multiple customer and SP agents exist, this solution will lead to underutiliza-
tion of SP agents’ resources and not every customer agent will be provided with
the service requested.
The first proposed solution to the problem addressed is based on the concept
of leveled commitment contracts (Sandholm & Lesser 2001). This solution
is only applicable for a limited number of concurrent customer agents, since
penalty payments for decommitments must be taken into account. That is,
no rational SP agent would establish contracts for which the decommitment
penalties would exceed the expected utility of an outside offer.
The second solution approach is based on a protocol redesign. The authors
propose the Contract net with confirmation protocol (CNCP) to postpone the
commitment time as far as possible. Using the CNCP, the original bids of SP
agents are non-binding. After selecting a potential SP agent from the bidders,
the customer agents have to send an additional request to the bidder to con-
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clude an agreement in accordance to the initial bid. SP agents make binding
commitments only after the customer agents have explicitly requested them to
do so. Since customer agents are expected to send these requests to the utility
maximizing bidders only, this can significantly reduce the number of commit-
ments made by SP agents.
As a third alternative to the conservative ad hoc solution, the authors pro-
pose a statistical risk analysis approach. Here, SP agents risk to enter commit-
ments which they cannot fulfill as long as the estimated number of overcommit-
ments is below a certain threshold. Therefore, the bidding agent needs to be
able to determine the probability of getting a single bid accepted by a customer
agent.
Schillo et al. (2002) characterize suitable environments for the different ap-
proaches proposed, since there is no generally superior solution to the eager
bidder problem. The approach considers distributed auctioneers in terms of
customer agents; it constitutes a distributed allocation approach. Although the
addressed problem is relevant for the decision making of SP agents in SNs, the
proposed solution does not include linking supply and demand side in inter-
leaved interactions. Thus, it cannot consider service dependencies.
The approach does not propose a concrete mechanism. Therefore, the re-
quirements for mechanism properties cannot be applied, e.g., the allocation
complexity depends on the chosen solution alternative. While the computa-
tional complexity for winner determination is not altered using the proposed
solution, the risk analysis requires additional computational resources. In con-
trast, leveled commitment contracts and the CNCP can increase the number of
messages required to arrive at a final allocation.
2.3.5 Interdependent Supply and Demand Negotiations
Zhang, Lesser & Abdallah (2005) propose an approach using temporal order-
ing of negotiations, addressing supply chain formation problems. The authors
investigate the problem of multi-linked negotiations, i.e., interconnected nego-
tiations which influence each other. The relationships of related negotiations
are classified into two categories. Two negotiations are directly linked if the
characteristics of the subject of one negotiation (e.g., properties of resources,
subtasks to be performed) directly affect the subject of the other negotiation.
In directly linked negotiations, the failure of one negotiation implies the
infeasibility or unnecessity of the second. Indirectly linked negotiations compete
for the utilization of common resources. That is, multi-linked negotiations
denote multiple negotiations in which the negotiation over one issue influences
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the negotiations over other issues.
The approach proposes a temporal ordering of multi-linked negotiations to
be carried out either sequentially or in parallel. Thus, the first issue addressed
is if these negotiations should be performed in parallel or in a sequence. If
they are to be performed in sequence, the concrete order is to be determined
to minimize conflicts.
Zhang et al. (2005) present a formal model for the problem of multi-linked
negotiations along with a heuristic search algorithm to determine near-optimal
solutions for the ordering and interdependencies. The relationships of directly-
linked negotiations are described as a forest of rooted trees. A function defines
for every non-leaf negotiation if the children are alternatives (OR) or comple-
mentary (AND).
The authors present a set of negotiation attributes which are domain depen-
dent for the supply chain formation problem, such as start time and deadline.
In addition, they identify a set of four attributes which are domain independent
(duration, start time, deadline, and success probability). Zhang et al. (2005)
argue that the problem cannot be reduced to project management or schedul-
ing, as not only the negotiations are interdependent, but also the subjects and
therewith attributes. Thus, two levels of interdependent entities exist in the
problem of multi-linked negotiations.
The approach represent orderings in a directed acyclic graph that defines
which negotiations can only start after others have been completed. Given a
start time of the first negotiation, this graph constitutes the negotiation sched-
ule. Finally, the authors evaluate the algorithm that constitute a heuristic for
the ordering and attribute mapping problems in a set of multiagent simulation
experiments.
The approach proposed by Zhang et al. (2005) is of distributed nature. It
has a strong focus on the problem of directly-linked negotiations, which is essen-
tial for service dependencies. However, it does not avoid the establishment of
unaccomplishable agreements and therewith penalty payments, as negotiations
are considered as atomic blocks, and thus the interleaving of directly linked
negotiations is not considered. That is, interdependencies in parallel negotia-
tions are not considered – if they exist, the negotiations are to be performed in
sequence; overcommitments cannot be avoided.
Since the approach does not present a concrete mechanism for allocation,
but an ordering of interdependent allocations, the mechanism properties of an
allocation utilizing this approach cannot be assessed.
Si, Edmond, ter Hofstede, Dumas & Chong (2005) propose a probabilis-
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tic approach for composing interrelated negotiations, allowing compositions of
alternative (one-or-the-other) and complementary (all-or-nothing) trading ac-
tivities. The authors analyze a supply chain setting, where alternative trad-
ing activities denote alternatives for input procurements, while complementary
trading activities can also comprise negotiations for inputs and respective out-
puts, i.e., dependencies over supply chain tiers.
However, the approach does not consider to interweave the complementary
trading activities. The producer agents either acquire inputs first and produce
outputs independently of customer agents’ orders (buy-to-build), or they first
negotiate with customers and subsequently acquire the inputs required to ful-
fill agreements with customer agents (build-to-order). The authors describe
an agent using the buy-to-build high-level strategy. Before sending a bid to
customer agents, the agent considers the global bidding history and calculate
probabilities for closing prices. In addition, the average probability of an offer
accepted by a customer agent is calculated. These probability distributions
are then utilized to determine a producing agent’s prices offered to customers.
Thus, the approach allows the producing agents to maximize the expected util-
ity based on the global negotiation history.
In (Si, Edmond, Dumas & Hofstede 2007), the research is generalized to
any set of composite trading activities. The proposed model is capable of sup-
porting the decision process of a single agent that (i) buys products in different
auctions (i.e., English, Dutch, first-price sealed bid, and Vickrey auctions), (ii)
sells products in reverse auctions, or (iii) buys and sells products by means of
an alternating offers bargaining protocol. A special focus of this research are
interdependencies, heterogeneous protocols, and temporal constraints of nego-
tiations. Similar to their previous work, the authors calculate the expected
utility of a set of trading activities based on the history of past negotiations.
Since the approach is applicable to various protocols, it can neither be con-
sidered centralized nor distributed. Similarly, the allocation mechanism cannot
be assessed. Regarding service dependencies, the authors avoid invalid out-
comes by assuming that the negotiations for the minimum number of required
agreements minus one constitute ‘secure’ trading activities, i.e., that have re-
ceived a binding offer by another agent, and are guaranteed to result in deals
if executed. Any combination of successful and failed negotiations prior to the
secure trading activity results in a set of agreements honoring the given con-
straints. However, it remains unclear how complementary trading activities can
be combined such that the required number of ‘secure’ deals exists.
The nodes in the presented execution model represent composite or elemen-
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tary negotiations. The authors present an analysis of trading activity states for
different protocols, though the model is not capable of describing these single
states, but a negotiation as a whole. As can be seen from the examples pre-
sented, the authors rely on information which is not represented in the model
explicitly (i.e., the processing is done on negotiation state level while the model
captures them as a whole only). This approach considers service dependencies
with certain constraints on the dependencies, but cannot avoid overcommit-
ments with the details provided.
2.3.6 Supply chain formation with auctions
Research on supply chain formation with combinatorial auctions assumes cen-
tralized winner determination along all tiers of the supply chain. A central
entity, collecting all bids on input and output products in all tiers of the supply
chain at a single point, is required.
Walsh, Wellman & Ygge (2000) propose a one-shot combinatorial auction
protocol, and analyze bidding strategies for self-interested agents, i.e., the ef-
ficiency and producers’ surplus are experimentally evaluated in five different
networks of producer and consumer agents. The protocol’s performance in
terms of allocative efficiency is compared to a distributed, progressive auction
protocol with non-strategic bidding.
The assumption of a central entity contradicts the distributed nature of
supply chains and in particular SNs. Walsh et al. (2000) argue that, while
acknowledging that it is infeasible to coordinate complete supply chains using a
centralized approach in a single market, centralized coordination can be applied
to sub-markets with strong dependencies between producer agents, since these
sub-markets are only weakly dependent on the broader market of the complete
network of producer and consumer agents (Walsh et al. 2000, p. 262).
The approach clearly utilizes centralized allocation. It explicitly considers
interdependencies among inputs and outputs, i.e., it is suitable to avoid over-
commitments. The allocation complexity of combinatorial auctions is generally
NP-complete, though there is a number of computationally manageable cases
(i.e., solvable in polynomial time) (Rothkopf, Pekecˇ & Harstad 1998). The au-
thors state, while not computationally manageable in general, many allocation
problems can be solved using commercial mixed-integer-linear programming op-
timizers (Andersson, Tenhunen & Ygge 2000). The proposed protocol is budget
balanced, though it is neither individually rational (producers can obtain inputs
without the possibility to use it), nor incentive compatible.
Regarding communication complexity, one-shot combinatorial auctions es-
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tablish optimal allocations with the minimal set of agreements. One dialogue
move (message) is required by each agent to submit its combinatorial bid. The
central auctioneer then sends a message to each agent, to inform it about the
allocation outcome.
Walsh & Wellman (2003) present a decentralized protocol for supply chain
formation based on auctions – SAMP-SB. Although this approach suggests dif-
ferent, decentralized auctions for every traded product, it requires mediators
(auctioneers) that determine allocation outcomes. That is, a coordinating en-
tity is required for each traded product, though the authors do not give details
about this entity. Interdependencies between different auctions are not coordi-
nated – producer agents place bids on output goods before they have received
commitments on input goods (Walsh & Wellman 2003, p. 527). Thus, the
SAMP-SB protocol cannot consider service dependencies.
To address this issue, and therewith individual rationality of the mecha-
nism, the authors propose an extension to the SAMP-SB with decommitments –
SAMP-SB-D. This protocol allows producer agents to decommit (at no penalty
or fee) from agreements, for which production dependencies are not met. These
decommitments are applied recursively to producer agents affected by other
producer agents along the supply chain. Therefore, the SAMP-SB-D protocol
makes auction bids non-binding; it avoids negative surplus for agents where
production dependencies are not met, and is individually rational. There is the
possibility for agents to manipulate bids and thus SAMP-SB-D is not incentive
compatible. The protocol cannot enforce that only producer agents with unmet
dependencies decommit from agreements (Walsh & Wellman 2003, p. 531).
The allocation complexity of the SAMP-SB(-D) protocols’ auctions is in
P, since bids comprise non-combined (i.e., ‘additive-OR’) quantity-value pairs.
These can be processed as if they where separate bids from different agents. Re-
garding communication complexity, the SAMP-SB protocol may need a number
of bids that is exponential in network size (i.e., number of agents plus number of
products) before it terminates. In addition to that, the SAMP-SB-D protocol
requires additional messages for decommitments.
2.3.7 Service network formation with auctions
Vulkan & Jennings (2000) consider an allocation approach for the supply of
services, i.e., service network formation. They present an English auction pro-
tocol, modified for the provision of services. A protocol for auctions arranged
by the service providing agents, if the service seeking agents fail to do so, is
proposed. Similar to this thesis, Vulkan & Jennings (2000) focus on two types
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of agents, representing different organizations: Service-seeking agents (i.e., cus-
tomer agents) and service-providing agents (i.e., SP agents). However, the au-
thors neither assume that services can be re-sold, nor that services are utilized
to produce value-added services to customers along service network tiers.
The proposed protocol constitutes an extension of the standard English
auction to a multi-attribute auction (Bichler 2000). That is, besides the price,
multiple additional service parameters are considered. The service-seeking cus-
tomer agents weight valuations for service parameters (including the service
price) differently. The service customer acts as an auctioneer and announces
auction details to SP agents.
If the customer agent fails to initiate an auction, or if further details need to
be negotiated after the auction, another protocol is initiated by the SP agents.
Here, the SP agent that is approached by the customer agent and is not satisfied
with a one-to-one negotiation (e.g., if communication is costly), initiates a ‘pre-
auction’ protocol, in which SP agents compete for negotiation with the customer
agents. The winning SP agent sends a take-it-or-leave-it offer for the service
to the customer agent. The other SP agents do not interact with the customer
agent, and receive payments from the winning agent for their cooperation.
The approach suggested by Vulkan & Jennings (2000) constitutes distributed
allocation. Service dependencies are not considered, as a re-sale of services is
not taken into account. The computational complexity of winner determina-
tion is in P, since the auctioneer agent just has to calculate the utility of every
offer received. The mechanism is budget balanced and individually rational,
but not incentive compatible. The communication complexity depends on the
increments of the English auctions, but is expected to be significantly lower as
compared to multiple one-to-one negotiations.
Preist, Bartolini & Byde (2003) present an algorithm for decision making
service composition agents. These agents buy component services in a set of
English auctions, and sell composite services in reverse English auctions. The
agents maintain a probabilistic model of the closing prices, based on past auc-
tions. The authors present an algorithm to calculate the expected utility of
bundled bids for any subset of auctions. To reduce the computational com-
plexity, a simplified algorithm that does not assess any subset of auctions, is
proposed.
Since they assume English auctions, the algorithms can be applied to agents
participating in centralized, as well as distributed allocations. Service depen-
dencies are considered and the probability of overcommitments can be mini-
mized, though probabilistic approaches cannot guarantee the avoidance of over-
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commitments. The approach does not include any alterations to a negotiation
protocol; the allocation mechanism properties are those of standard English
auctions.
2.3.8 Summary and research gap
Table 2.5: Requirement fulfillment of related approaches.
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Bo & Lesser (2010)  # # #   P
Endriss et al. (2006) G# G#  #   NP
Nguyen & Jennings (2005)  # # # #  P
Walsh et al. (2000) #   # #  NP
Walsh & Wellman (2003), SAMP-SB G# # #  #  P
Walsh & Wellman (2003), SAMP-SB-D G#  # #   P
Vulkan & Jennings (2000)  # # #   P
Preist et al. (2003)  G# # #   P
This work   #    P
Existing approaches for distributed allocation exist, but do not fulfill the
identified requirements. The generic allocation approaches do not provide con-
crete mechanism details, and thus cannot be assessed regarding the require-
ments (e.g., (Sandholm & Lesser 2001, Parkes & Shneidman 2004)).
Table 2.5 shows the requirement fulfillment of related research that propose
concrete mechanisms for resource allocation. All approaches are budget bal-
anced, but only Walsh et al. (2000) and Walsh & Wellman (2003) can avoid
overcommitments. However, the former approach is not distributed, and the
latter is not individually rational. SAMP-SB-D (Walsh & Wellman 2003) can
be applied to avoid the consequences of overcommitments, though the proto-
col makes auction bids non-binding, is not incentive compatible, and requires
intermediaries for the allocation for each product.
The distributed approaches Bo & Lesser (2010), Nguyen & Jennings (2005),
and Vulkan & Jennings (2000) cannot consider service dependencies. Endriss
et al. (2006) assume that any agent involved in the production of a service would
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participate in a single agreement, which contradicts the multi-tier characteristic
of the SN. The approach of Preist et al. (2003) can minimize the probability
of overcommitments, but cannot avoid them. In addition, these approaches are
not incentive compatible.
The review shows that a research gap exists in the area of multiagent re-
source allocation which considers the distributed nature of SNs and avoids over-
commitments. There is no approach that provides an appropriate allocation
mechanism which constitutes an individually rational, budget balanced, incen-
tive compatible polynomial time heuristic. This thesis proposes a multi-tier
resource allocation protocol that avoids overcommitments by SPs, does not re-
quire central entities for coordination, is individually rational, budget balanced,
incentive compatible for SPs, and has polynomial complexity.
Chapter 3
Design
This chapter provides the proposed protocol. First, the protocol is described,
based on the game-theoretic model that was introduced in chapter 2. Second,
the protocol is formally specified by using two techniques for protocol specifica-
tion, UML sequence diagram (OMG 2011b) and Promela (Holzmann 1991).
Third, an implementation of the protocol in a MAS is presented, which will be
used for the simulation study in the succeeding chapter.
3.1 Game-theoretic protocol model
The protocol model is based on the formal framework presented in section
2.1.3.2.3. Supply and demand in SNs are allocated in sealed-bid second-price
reverse service auctions in each tier: The bidding agents privately transfer their
bids to the auctioneer, the lowest bidder wins and receives the payment of
the second lowest bid (Vickrey 1961). This research analyzes three different
bidding policies for SPs. Further, it assumes that the number of bidding agents
is unknown to the bidders, and there is no collusion among bidding agents
(Robinson 1985, Smith 1989).
The proposed protocol is defined as follows:
• Customer agents’ offers otij are announced to SP agents which can recur-
sively transfer own offers ot`m to SP agents in the next tier.
• SP agents submit binding bids bt`m to their customers, considering bids
btmn received from SP agents in the next tier.
• SP agents are informed about the acceptance of the bids they have pro-
83
CHAPTER 3. DESIGN 84
vided and receive second-price payments (cf. Vickrey 1961), i.e.,
ψt`m =
minm 6=n bt`n if bt`m < minm 6=n bt`n,0 otherwise.
where minm6=n bt`n denotes the second highest bid.
For the composition of the SP agents’ bids – which can be based on the
utilization of either internal (own) or external (from other SPs) resources – this
research investigates three different bidding policies: internal resources first
(IRF ), external resources first (ERF ), and best price resources only (BPRO).
Customer agents accept bids if and only if the provided service is produced
to the full extend requested; i.e., customer agents do not accept the partial
fulfillment of their requests.
Using the IRF bidding policy, SP agents try to establish contracts for their
own resources first. Consequently, they request sub-services from providers in
the next tiers only if the unallocated own resource capacity is insufficient to ful-
fill a customer agent’s request. Thus, SP agents request sub-services exceeding
the own resource capacity. If both own and external capacity are insufficient to
fulfill a customer agent’s request, SP agents submit bids on a partial fulfillment
of the request, utilizing as many resources as possible. Therefore, downstream
SP agents are able to combine partial bids to fulfill a customer agent’s request
even if none of the SP agents is able to fulfill the request using the own resources
only. Formally, the SP agents’ bidding function for the IRF bidding policy is
defined as
bIRF (sij)
t =
cj(sij) if wij +
∑t
t′=0
∑
ah∈AC whjx
t′
hj ≤Wj ,
cj(s
′
ij) + b
t
jk otherwise,
with s′ij such that w
′
ij = Wj −
∑t
t′=0
∑
ah∈AC whjx
t′
hj and wjk = wij −w′ij .
In contrast, using the ERF bidding policy, SP agents try to outsource as
much of a customer agent’s request as possible. Similarly to the IRF bidding
policy, these SP agents combine partial bids and supplement received bids with
utilization of own resources to arrive at the capacity required to fulfill the
customer agent’s request if possible. If both received bids and the SP agent’s
own capacity are insufficient to fulfill the customer agent’s request, the SP
agents submit partial proposals as for the IRF bidding policy. Formally, the
SP agents’ bidding function for the ERF bidding policy is defined as
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bERF (sij)
t =
btjk if wjk = wij ,cj(s′ij) + btjk otherwise,
with s′ij such that w
′
ij = min(Wj −
∑t
t′=0
∑
ah∈AC whjx
t′
hj , wij − wjk).
The BPRO bidding policy avoids the utilization of non-best price (lowest
marginal cost) resources. Thus, the SP agents compare the marginal cost which
they have to pay to SP agents in the next tier (i.e., second prices) with the
internal marginal cost of utilizing their own resources. Consequently, the SP
agents using the BPRO bidding policy combine first-price bids to submit bids
themselves if and only if the second price is below their internal cost. Obviously,
the SP agents are more likely to submit partial bids using the BPRO bidding
policy, as compared to the IRF and ERF bidding policies. However, the BPRO
bidding policy allows to submit bids with the lowest possible prices. Formally,
the SP agents’ bidding function for the BPRO bidding policy is defined as
bBPRO(sij)
t =
btjk if
bjk
wjk
<
cij
wij
,
cj(s
′
ij) otherwise,
with s′ij such that w
′
ij = min(Wj −
∑t
t′=0
∑
ah∈AC whjx
t′
hj , wij).
3.2 Protocol specification
The game-theoretic protocol model defines the behavior of agents and their
bidding policies. Implementing the protocol in a MAS requires a formal spec-
ification that defines message types and message sequences. For this purpose,
interaction protocol specification techniques are available. The FIPA Contract
net interaction protocol (CNP) (FIPA 2002b) – the FIPA interpretation of the
original Contract net protocol proposed by Smith (1980) – provides a baseline
protocol for resource allocation that can be enriched by recursion, distributed
winner determination, and a specific allocation mechanism.
The proposed protocol allows subcontracting activities by the participants;
i.e., a participant can evaluate if subcontracting is possible and feasible in ad-
vance to making binding proposals. The proposed interaction protocol is de-
noted as Multi-tier contract net protocol (MTCNP), since the protocol enables
coordinated interactions over multiple service network tiers. This means that
the protocol allows consideration of agreement dependencies over multiple tiers
for subcontracting.
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Adopting the existing CNP requires to extend its communicative acts (per-
formatives) (FIPA 2002a). The cfp (call for proposals) can include customer
requests which (i) explicitly require multiple services (e.g., storage and analy-
sis services) or (ii) can be realized with a composite service (e.g., data mining
service), potentially composed at run time. To calculate the service level of a
composite service, service parameter aggregation definitions have to be defined
for each pair of service parameter and composition pattern (section 2.1.3.2.2).
The inform-result message type in the CNP does not relate to separate FIPA
communicative acts but to the general inform act. Once an agent has com-
pleted one or more tasks, it sends a message to the initiator in the form of
an inform-done; more information about the execution can be provided by an
inform-result. In case of an inform-result message, the agent has to aggregate
the results of the single services according to the parameter aggregation def-
initions. For example, the price of the data mining service can be calculated
by summing up the prices of the single services (e.g., storage and analysis ser-
vices) and the service provider’s profit margin. In contrast, the throughput
of the data mining service is calculated by the maximum throughput of the
constituent services, since these are executed in sequence.
3.2.1 UML specification
Figure 3.1 shows the sequence diagram of the protocol’s interactions. It consists
of three encapsulated interaction sequences:
1. The MTCNP-collect-proposals interaction sequence includes collecting the
proposals (bids) by the initiator (customer) from the participants (SPs).
Collecting the proposals can also include subcontracting.
2. If and only if the participant has made a proposal, it is notified in the
MTCNP-acceptance-notification interaction sequence about the allocation
result.
3. If and only if the participant’s proposal is accepted, the MTCNP-execution
interaction sequence is performed. It includes the provision of information
by the participants about the outcome of the execution of all allocated
actions, which can also involve multiple tiers as for the allocation.
Details on the referenced interactions are given in the following.
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participant :initiator :
sd: Multi−tier contract net protocol
ref
MTCNP−collect−proposals
opt
opt
ref
MTCNP−execution
[proposal accepted ]
ref
MTCNP−acceptance−notification
[proposal made ]
Figure 3.1: Multi-tier contract net protocol sequence diagram.
The MTCNP-collect-proposals interaction sequence is shown in figure 3.2.
The initiator in tier λ sends a cfp message to the participants on the same
tier. Optionally, if (i) participants exist in tier λ + 1 which are potentially
capable of executing actions or sub-actions described in the cfp in tier λ and
(ii) (one or more of) the tier λ participants prefer to subcontract actions or
sub-actions in tier λ + 1 (acting as tier λ + 1 initiators), the MTCNP-collect-
proposals interactions are recursively executed in tier λ+1. The recursion can be
extended to an arbitrary number of tiers. Similarly to the CNP (FIPA 2002b),
participants receiving the cfp generate n responses. The tier λ participants may
decide that they refuse to propose, resulting in i = n− j refuse act responses.
Alternatively, j participants propose to perform the task, specified as propose
acts.
@t is a time observation which defines t as the point in time when the cfp
message is sent. d refers to the deadline duration which is also communicated
in the cfp message. Thus, the constraints {t . . . t+ d} specify that the refuse or
propose messages should be received by the initiator in that interval (Haugen
& Runde 2009).
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tier λ+1 participant :tier λ participant / tier λ+1 initiator :tier λ initiator :
sd: MTCNP−collect−proposals
 .cfp
opt
[|Λ| > λ ]
ref
MTCNP−collect−proposals
m
i
j
alt
 .refuse
 .propose
@t
{t..t+d}
{t..t+d}
Figure 3.2: MTCNP-collect-proposals sequence diagram.
The initiator evaluates the j proposals received and selects participants to
perform the tasks within the notification deadline duration nd; i.e., in the time
interval {t . . . t+nd}. nd is communicated to the participants in the cfp message.
The MTCNP-acceptance-notification interaction sequence, shown in figure 3.3,
covers informing the participants of the allocation result. The l participants of
the selected proposals are notified with an accept-proposal message, defining the
notification time nt in observation @nt. The remaining k participants receive
a reject-proposal message. The recursion is executed to the number of tiers in
which proposals were made (propose messages were sent).
The MTCNP-execution interaction sequence is shown in figure 3.4. Once
the subcontracted participants in tier λ + 1 have completed the tasks, they
send completion messages to the tier λ + 1 initiator in the form of an inform-
done message or a more explanatory version in the form of an inform-result
message. If a participant fails to complete one or more tasks, a failure message
is sent. Similarly, the tier λ participants (λ + 1 initiators) report the state of
the execution of tasks to the tier λ initiator. The result messages should be
received by the initiators within the execution deadline duration ed; i.e., in
the time interval {nt . . . nt+ ed}. The definition of ed is part of the agreement
between the initiator and the participant. This definition can either be included
in the cfp message or in the participants’ proposals.
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tier λ+1 participant :tier λ participant / tier λ+1 initiator :tier λ initiator :
sd: MTCNP−acceptance−notification
 .reject−proposal
 .accept−proposal
k
l
alt
opt
[|Λ| > λ ]
ref
MTCNP−acceptance−notification
{t..t+nd}
{t..t+nd} @nt
Figure 3.3: MTCNP-acceptance-notification sequence diagram.
tier λ+1 participant :tier λ participant / tier λ+1 initiator :tier λ initiator :
sd: MTCNP−execution
loop (1,|actions| )
opt
[|Λ| > λ ]
ref
MTCNP−execution
alt
[task execution results reported ]
 .failure
 .inform−done
 .inform−result
{nt..nt+ed}
{nt..nt+ed}
{nt..nt+ed}
Figure 3.4: MTCNP-execution sequence diagram.
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3.2.2 PROMELA model
Promela is a language for the specification and verification of protocol valida-
tion models – the complete and consistent sets of rules to govern interactions in
distributed systems (Holzmann 1991). A protocol validation model can then be
verified by a model checker (Clarke et al. 1999) such as Spin (Holzmann 1997);
Spin accepts protocol specifications in Promela and correctness claims in lin-
ear temporal logic (LTL). Promela and Spin have been successfully used in
prior research on specifying and verifying interaction protocols (e.g., (Giordano
et al. 2007)). To use these techniques, the behavior of the participants must be
described in states for every (alternative) interaction. Therefore, this research
constructs finite state machines (FSMs) for the participants, based on the UML
sequence diagrams. This section first presents these FSMs, and then formulates
the Promela model.
Figure 3.5 shows the FSM for the initiator, starting in state s1. On the
initiator’s side, state s2 is reached after the cfp message has been sent. If the
participant refuses to propose before the corresponding deadline, the end state
is reached by the initiator. If a proposal is received by the initiator before
the deadline, the initiator reaches state s3. If neither a refuse nor a propose
message is received by the initiator during the deadline duration d, the protocol
terminates with a timeout.
 cfp 
 propose 
 refuse 
 proposal-timeout 
 accept-proposal 
 reject-proposal 
 notification-timeout 
 failure 
 inform-done 
 inform-result 
 execution-timeout 
Start s1
s2 s3 s4
end
timeout
Figure 3.5: Initiator FSM.
If the proposal is accepted by the initiator within the notification deadline,
state s4 is reached. Similarly, the end state is reached if the proposal is rejected
by the initiator within the notification deadline. Otherwise, a timeout occurs if
neither a accept-proposal nor a refuse-proposal message is sent by the initiator
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during the notification deadline duration nd.
From state s4, either the end state is reached by receiving the execution
result or failure from the participant within the execution deadline duration ed
or an execution timeout occurs.
Figure 3.6 shows the FSM for the participant. On the participant’s side,
receiving a cfp message leads to state s2, in which subcontracting with partici-
pants in the next tier is possible. Therefore, a participant in tier λ can act as
initiator in tier λ+ 1 and send a cfp message to tier λ+ 1 participants, leading
to state s3 for the participant in tier λ. In state s3, the participant processes
the response of the tier λ + 1 participants to the cfp message and proceeds to
state s4 if the response to the cfp is received before the deadline duration d.
Otherwise, a proposal timeout occurs. If the participant in tier λ does not send
a cfp message in tier λ+ 1, state s4 is reached.
 cfp  subcfp 
 !subcfp 
 subpropose, subrefuse 
 proposal-timeout 
 propose  refuse  proposal-timeout 
 reject-proposal 
 accept-subproposal  accept-proposal 
 notification-timeout 
 subfailure, subinform-done, subinform-result 
 execution-timeout  failure, inform-done, inform-result  execution-timeout 
Start s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
s6s7
end timeout
Figure 3.6: Participant FSM.
If the participant in tier λ refuses to propose – potentially after processing
the result of subcontracting activities – to the initiator, the end state is reached.
If the participants sends a proposal, state s5 is entered. If the participant
neither sends a refuse nor a propose message during the deadline duration d,
the protocol terminates with a timeout.
Rejection of the proposal by the initiator leads to the end state for the
participant. If the participant in tier λ did not collect proposals from tier λ+ 1
participants, the acceptance of the proposal by the initiator leads to state s7.
Otherwise, the acceptance of the subproposal from tier λ+1 by the participant
in tier λ leads to state s6. If the allocation notification is not communicated
during the notification deadline duration nd, the protocol terminates with a
timeout.
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In state s6, the result of the execution in tier λ + 1 is processed. Either
state s7 is reached by receiving the execution result or failure by the initiator
in tier λ + 1 (participant in tier λ) within the execution deadline duration ed,
or an execution timeout occurs.
The result of the execution in tier λ is processed in state s7. In state s7,
an execution timeout can also occur, leading to a protocol termination with a
timeout. If the execution result or failure is reported on both tiers λ and λ+ 1,
the end state is reached.
The interaction states of the protocol’s participants – defined in the FSMs
– are translated to Promela to be verified by model checking. In contrast to
FSMs, Promela allows concurrency and recursion. In addition, incoming and
outgoing messages can be differentiated. The Promela model of the MTCNP
is shown in listing 3.1. An arbitrary recursion depth cannot be checked by
Spin. Thus, the model has been limited to seven tiers (listing 3.1, line 1) due
to memory requirements for checking the proposed model.
Listing 3.1: MTCNP Promela model.
1 #define MAXDEPTH 7
2 mtype = { cfp , r e fu s e , propose , r e j e c t p r o p o s a l ,
a ccept proposa l , f a i l u r e , inform done , i n f o r m r e s u l t }
3 int currentDepth = 0 ;
4 int nes tedProposa l s = 0 ;
5 int s l a s [MAXDEPTH] = 0 ;
6 bool terminated =0;
7 in i t {
8 atomic{
9 chan t o P i n i t = [ 1 ] of {mtype} ;
10 chan t o I i n i t = [ 1 ] of {mtype} ;
11 chan toSubPinit = [ 1 ] of {mtype} ;
12 chan t o S u b I i n i t = [ 1 ] of {mtype} ;
13 run i n i t i a t o r ( toPin i t , t o I i n i t ) ; run p a r t i c i p a n t ( toPin i t ,
t o I i n i t , toSubPinit , t oSubI in i t , 0) ;
14 }
15 }
16 proctype i n i t i a t o r (chan toP , t o I ) {
17 mtype ca ;
18 s1 : toP ! c fp ; goto s2 ;
19 s2 : t o I ? ca ;
20 i f
21 : : ( ca == r e f u s e ) −> goto end ;
22 : : ( ca == propose ) −> goto s3 ;
23 f i ;
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24 s3 :
25 i f
26 : : 1 −> toP ! r e j e c t p r o p o s a l ; goto end ;
27 : : 2 −> toP ! a c c ep t p ropo sa l ; goto s4 ;
28 f i ;
29 s4 : t o I ? ca ;
30 i f
31 : : ( ca == f a i l u r e ) −> goto end ;
32 : : ( ca == inform done ) −> goto end ;
33 : : ( ca == i n f o r m r e s u l t ) −> goto end ;
34 f i ;
35 end : terminated =1; skip ;
36 }
37 proctype p a r t i c i p a n t (chan toP , toI , toSubP , toSubI ; int t i e r ) {
38 mtype ca ;
39 bool nestedProp =0;
40 s1 : toP? ca ;
41 i f
42 : : ( ca == cfp ) −> goto s2 ;
43 : : else goto end ;
44 f i ;
45 s2 : assert ( nestedProp==0) ;
46 i f
47 : : 1 −> goto s4 ;
48 : : ( 2 && currentDepth < MAXDEPTH−1) −>
49 prog r e s s : atomic { chan toSubI i = [ 1 ] of {mtype} ;
50 chan toSubPi = [ 1 ] of {mtype} ;
51 run p a r t i c i p a n t ( toSubP , toSubI , toSubPi , toSubI i , t i e r +1) ;
52 toSubP ! c fp ; currentDepth++;
53 assert ( currentDepth < MAXDEPTH) ;
54 } goto s3 ;
55 f i ;
56 s3 : toSubI ? ca ;
57 i f
58 : : ( ca == r e f u s e ) −> goto s4 ;
59 : : ( ca == propose ) −> nestedProp =1; nes tedProposa l s++; goto
s4 ;
60 f i ;
61 s4 :
62 i f
63 : : 1 −> t o I ! r e f u s e ;
64 i f
65 : : ( nestedProp == 1) −> toSubP ! r e j e c t p r o p o s a l ; goto end ;
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66 : : else goto end ;
67 f i ;
68 : : 2 −> i f
69 : : ( ( nestedProp == 1) | | ( t i e r==MAXDEPTH−1) ) −> t o I ! propose ;
goto s5 ;
70 : : else t o I ! r e f u s e ; goto end ;
71 f i ;
72 f i ;
73 s5 : toP? ca ;
74 i f
75 : : ( ca == r e j e c t p r o p o s a l ) −>
76 i f
77 : : ( nestedProp == 1) −> toSubP ! r e j e c t p r o p o s a l ; goto end ;
78 : : else goto end ;
79 f i ;
80 : : ( ca == accep t p ropo sa l ) −> s l a s [ t i e r ]++;
81 i f
82 : : ( nestedProp == 1) −> toSubP ! ac c ep t p ropo sa l ; goto s6 ;
83 : : else goto s7 ;
84 f i ;
85 f i ;
86 s6 : assert ( nestedProp==1) ; toSubI ? ca ;
87 i f
88 : : ( ca == f a i l u r e ) −> goto s7 ;
89 : : ( ca == inform done ) −> goto s7 ;
90 : : ( ca == i n f o r m r e s u l t ) −> goto s7 ;
91 f i ;
92 s7 :
93 i f
94 : : 1 −> t o I ! f a i l u r e ; goto end ;
95 : : 2 −> t o I ! inform done ; goto end ;
96 : : 3 −> t o I ! i n f o r m r e s u l t ; goto end ;
97 f i ;
98 end : skip ;
99 }
3.3 Implementation
This section presents the implementation of the proposed protocol and the
simulation system. It elaborates on the used agent framework Jadex and the
implementation of the protocol as a reusable library. Implementation details
are given about the abstract types of the participating agents and the different
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concrete agent types, i.e., customer agents and SP agents. Finally, the agent-
based simulation system that will be used for the experimental evaluation, is
described.
3.3.1 BDI agent system
This research adopts the belief-desire-intention (BDI) approach (Bratman, Is-
rael & Pollack 1988) for implementing the agents using the protocol. First, the
architectural foundations of BDI are described. Second, the Jadex BDI agent
system is selected as the underlying framework of the implementation.
3.3.1.1 Belief-desire-intention architectures
The BDI model is the most common approach for deliberative (or hybrid)
agents. These agents can deliberate over symbolic knowledge to reach given
goals (Wooldridge 2000). The BDI architecture facilitates goal-driven system
behavior. The model consists of the following concepts: beliefs capture infor-
mational attitudes realized as a data structure containing current facts about
the world. Desires capture the motivational attitudes that form concrete goals
if an agent has potentially the chance to fulfill the desire. Intentions capture
the deliberative attitudes realized by reasoning to select appropriate actions to
achieve given goals or to react to particular situations.
A BDI agent is equipped with sensors to assist it on its environmental
awareness, and effectors to impact the environment by actions. A reasoning
mechanism between the sensor input and the effector output deduces the nec-
essary actions for achieving the agent’s goals. The agent acquires new beliefs
in response to changes in the environment and through the actions that it per-
forms as it carries out its intentions (Bratman et al. 1988). Thus, the BDI
agents allow reasoning regarding decisions to determine which – possibly con-
flicting – goals can be achieved and how the agent is going to achieve these
goals.
Concrete architectures which follow the BDI approach include hybrid (e.g.,
procedural reasoning system, PRS (Ingrand, Georgeff & Rao 1992)) and delib-
erative agent architectures (e.g., intelligent resource-bounded machine architec-
ture, IRMA (Bratman et al. 1988)) (Wooldridge & Jennings 1995).
3.3.1.2 Jadex BDI agent system
The Jadex BDI agent system (Pokahr et al. 2005) is based on the BDI ap-
proach. The computational reasoning model of Jadex follows the PRS archi-
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tecture (Ingrand et al. 1992), a specific architecture for BDI systems. Jadex is
implemented in the Java programming language.
All incoming messages and goal events constitute input to the reaction and
deliberation mechanism in Jadex, which is common for PRS systems. This
mechanism dispatches the events received to plans selected from the plan li-
brary. For the representation of beliefs, Jadex employs an object-oriented rep-
resentation; arbitrary Java objects and sets of objects can be stored in named
beliefs or belief sets. Jadex provides a set-oriented query language for operations
on the beliefbase. Further, beliefs can be actively and conditionally monitored
to trigger events or create and terminate goals.
As Jadex implements the BDI model, goals play a central role. In contrast
to other BDI systems, goals in Jadex are explicitly represented in a goalbase.
Thus, goals are accessible by the reasoning engine, as well as by plans which
can actively monitor and alter goals. Goals are either adopted as top-level goals
or sub-goals. If a goal is created from a plan, it is adopted as a sub-goal of the
plan’s root goal. The validity of goals can be expressed in terms of conditions
on beliefs, i.e., goals can be specified to be valid only when certain conditions
hold.
Jadex provides four different types of goals. Perform goals are directly
associated with the execution of actions. These goals are considered to be
reached if the specified actions are performed, independent of their outcomes.
Achieve goals specify desired external effects to be reached; alternative plans
can be provided how these goals can be reached. Query goals are similar to
achieve goals, though the desired effects to be reached refer to internal effects
in terms of availability of information. Maintain goals are utilized to sustain
a desired state. That is, corresponding plans are executed to reestablish the
desired state whenever the state has been changed to an undesired condition.
Jadex separates plans into a head and a body part. A plan’s head specifies
the conditions when a plan may be selected for execution. This includes events
and goals handled by the plan, preconditions of its execution, as well as context
conditions which must hold during plan execution. A plan’s body provides a
pre-defined sequence of actions, written in the Java programming language,
which is executed when the plan is selected for execution.
Capabilities define a grouping of beliefs, goals, plans, and events which
are required for a certain functionality (e.g., for interactions in accordance to
a specific protocol): Jadex capabilities encapsulate functionalities in reusable
modules which can be linked by import and export mechanisms (Pokahr et al.
2005).
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3.3.2 Protocol implementation
The MTCNP has been implemented as a reusable capability for the Jadex BDI
agent system version 0.96 on basis of the protocol capability included in the
Jadex release. The MTCNP capability contains beliefs for the message and
execution timeouts, a message filter to decide which messages are handled by
the capability, as well as a data structure to store the relationships of proposals
received and sent, i.e., the proposal compositions belief is used to determine the
proposals which have been used to create a proposal sent to a customer in a
downstream tier.
3.3.2.1 Initiator
On the initiator’s side without downstream customers, the mtcnp initiate a-
chieve goal constitutes the top-level goal of a MTCNP interaction. This goal is
dispatched primary by the customer agents to initiate the interaction with SPs.
Goal parameters include the cfp object as an input parameter, specifying the
service requested, and a result object as an output parameter, giving details
about the result of the service provision (e.g., service level). The mtcnp initiate
goal can be dispatched from an arbitrary plan providing the cfp object, as well
as receiving SPs.
Once the customer has received proposals, the mtcnp evaluate proposals
query goal – which determines the acceptable proposals – is instantiated. Thus,
it takes proposals as an input parameter and provides the acceptables as an out-
put parameter. This is realized by an evaluator plan implementation which is
mapped to the mtcnp evaluate proposals query goal. The result of the service
provision is not handled by a separate goal but by the mtcnp initiate achieve
goal as an output parameter.
3.3.2.2 Participant
On the participant’s side, the mtcnp make proposal query goal constitutes the
top-level goal of a MTCNP interaction. It is adopted as soon as a participating
agent receives a cfp message. Hence, it includes the cfp as an input parameter
and the proposal as an output parameter. Since proposals can be constructed
utilizing received proposals from the next tier, the mtcnp make proposal query
goal also includes a parameter to store the nested proposals received (i.e., the
parameter nested proposal messages). For creating the actual proposal object,
a concrete, domain-dependent implementation of at least one corresponding
plan is required which is mapped to the mtcnp make proposal query goal. This
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plan is also responsible for initiating the MTCNP interactions to the next tier.
The MTCNP capability provides the mtcnp collect proposals achieve goal
for this purpose. This goal is similar to the mtcnp initiate achieve goal, though
it (i) constitutes a sub-goal of the mtcnp make proposal query goal and (ii) does
not automatically result in the adoption of a mtcnp evaluate proposals query
goal, as the final decision of acceptance is performed by the customer of the
agent adopting the mtcnp collect proposals achieve goal. The plan implemen-
tations corresponding to this goal are thus not only responsible to initiate the
collection of proposals from the next tier, but also to construct concrete propos-
als sent to customers from the proposals received. The proposal compositions
belief is used to store the relationship of proposals sent and received.
Once the customer has evaluated the (composed) proposals, the partici-
pating agents are informed about the allocation’s result. This leads to adop-
tion of the mtcnp execute task achieve goal on proposal acceptance or the
mtcnp handle rejected proposal achieve goal on proposal rejection. For both
goals, the corresponding plan implementations have to handle the nested pro-
posals received if existent. Handling nested proposals is trivial in case of pro-
posal rejection: The implementation of the MTCNP capability includes func-
tionality to reject all nested proposals.
In case of proposal acceptance, the nested proposals that have been utilized
to construct the accepted proposal, have to be determined. The capability
defines the proposal compositions belief and the nested proposal messages goal
parameter for this task. The latter is mapped from the mtcnp make proposal
query goal to the mtcnp execute task achieve goal internally by the MTCNP
capability without requiring any additional, domain-dependent implementa-
tion for specific use cases. First, the nested proposals corresponding to the
accepted composed proposal are looked up, using the proposal compositions
belief data structure. Then, these proposals are used to determine the corre-
sponding proposal messages from the nested proposal messages goal parameter.
When the participating agent has determined the nested acceptables, it can
dispatch the mtcnp acceptance notification achieve goal as a sub-goal of the
mtcnp execute task achieve goal. The mtcnp acceptance notification achieve
goal uses the nested proposal messages, as well as the nested proposals as input
parameters.
The mtcnp acceptance notification achieve goal includes the results of the
provision of the sub-services as output parameters. Finally, the (composed)
result of all (nested) service provisions is forwarded to the mtcnp execute task
achieve goal via the mapped plan implementation and sent to the initiating
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agent by the capability.
3.3.3 Agent implementation
The agents have been implemented as Jadex agents that are independent of
domain-specific particularities. Thus, this implementation can be specialized
for domain-specific resource allocation in multi-tier SNs. A generic agent is
provided for both customer and SP agents.
3.3.3.1 Customer agent
The customer agent in Jadex has beliefs about its demand for services, the
valuation for these services, and the potential SPs. In addition, the customer
agent has beliefsets of established agreements with SPs. Since the customer
agent only interacts with SPs and does not offer services itself, this agent is not
aware of the multi-tier nature of the SN.
Once a customer agent is started, it tries to establish contracts with SPs
until its demand for services is fulfilled. Therefore, it adopts the mtcnp initiate
achieve goal, giving the service specifications in the cfp message.
The mtcnp evaluate proposals query goal evaluates the proposal messages
received and determines the acceptable proposals received via one of its associ-
ated plan implementations, i.e., via evaluation plan instances. As the proposals
received are binding for SP agents, the customer agent adds corresponding
agreements to its beliefset upon determination of acceptables.
Since the costs for the service provisions are also determined via the estab-
lished agreements, the customer agent is directly able to compute the resulting
utility of established agreements. The capability then informs the SPs about
the outcome of the allocation and includes the results of the service provisions
in an output parameter of the mtcnp initiate achieve goal.
3.3.3.2 Service provider agent
The SP Jadex agent has beliefs regarding its available capacity, the cost of
capacity utilization, and the potential SPs in the next tier. The SP agent
has a beliefset of established agreements with customers and other SP agents.
Further, the SP agent’s current bidding policy is represented in a belief. The
allocation interaction on SP side is initiated by cfp messages received from
customer agents.
The receipt of a cfp message – which includes the requested services’ spec-
ifications – leads to an adoption of the mtcnp make proposal query goal by
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the SP agent. Depending on a SP agent’s bidding policy, it requests different
sub-services from SP agents in the next tier.
Using the IRF bidding policy, the SP agent tries to provide the requested
services, using as many of its own resources as possible. If it is able to fulfill the
customer requests without external resources, the SP agent does not request
additional sub-services from SPs in the next tier. In contrast, if the SP agent’s
own resources are either insufficient or incapable to provide the requested ser-
vices, the SP agent submits cfp messages to the SPs in the next tier by adopting
the mtcnp collect proposals achieve goal, requesting the sub-services which are
essentially required to fulfill the customer’s demand.
The ERF bidding policy differs from the IRF bidding policy in the priority
of external and internal resources. Thus, a SP agent using the ERF bidding
policy tries to fulfill the customer requests, using as many procured sub-services
as possible by adopting the mtcnp collect proposals achieve goal. If it is able
to provide the requested services using external resources from SPs in the next
tier, the SP agent does not utilize its own resources. However, if the sub-
services offered by SP agents in the next tier are insufficient or incapable to
fulfill a customer agent’s request to the full extend, the SP agent using the
ERF bidding policy uses its own resources to create a proposal which fulfills
the customer agent’s request to the largest extend possible.
The BPRO bidding policy is different from the IRF and ERF bidding poli-
cies in terms of a combination of internal and external resources, as it avoids
this combination. A SP agent using this bidding policy submits cfp messages
to the SPs in the next tier, using the same service specification it receives from
customers by adopting the mtcnp collect proposals achieve goal. It first requests
the whole service as a sub-service, though this service can also be provided by
multiple SPs in the next tier by a combination of sub-services. Second, the
procurement costs are compared to the cost of utilizing the SP agent’s own re-
sources. Finally, the SP agent using the BPRO bidding policy submits proposal
messages to its customer agents, which include the alternative with the lowest
cost. On the one hand, this bidding policy ensures that only the cost-optimal
resources are utilized. On the other hand, this can lead to partial proposals in
terms of sub-services, which do not fulfill the customer agent’s request to the
full extend.
Independent of the bidding policy, once a proposal has been created, the
SP agent provides this proposal to the mtcnp make proposal query goal as an
output parameter. The proposal compositions belief is used to store the rela-
tionship of proposals sent and received. The MTCNP capability then handles
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the submission of the proposal to the customer agents.
The receipt of the acceptance notification by a SP agent leads to adop-
tion of the mtcnp execute task achieve goal on proposal acceptance or the
mtcnp handle rejected proposal achieve goal on proposal rejection. If the pro-
posal is rejected, all nested proposals are rejected by the MTCNP capability.
The proposal compositions belief and the nested proposal messages goal pa-
rameter are utilized to determine the nested proposals that have been used to
construct the accepted proposal. The SP agent determines nested acceptables
and dispatches the mtcnp acceptance notification achieve goal to inform the SPs
in the next tier about the allocation outcome.
The composed result of all direct and nested service provisions is forwarded
to the mtcnp execute task achieve goal via the mapped plan implementation
and send to the SP’s customer agents by the capability.
3.3.4 Simulation system architecture
The simulation system consists of a simulation manager agent, customer agents,
and SP agents based on the Jadex agent framework. The overall architecture of
the simulation system is shown in figure 3.7. The simulation manager is capable
of instantiating experiments with different parameters, reading the configura-
tion from simulation setup files.
Customer and SP agents are created and destroyed by the simulation man-
ager agent with help of the Jadex agent management system (AMS) agent,
which is responsible for creating and destroying agents in the Jadex agent sys-
tem. The simulation manager agent sends corresponding messages to the AMS
agent. These messages include details of the agent creation in terms of, e.g.,
the number of customer and SP agents, valuation functions, and cost functions.
The details can be passed to agents on creation as arguments to the agent
configuration.
Once all agents have been started, the resource allocation is conducted in
accordance to the MTCNP. The agents subsequently report the allocation out-
come, as well as their utility to the simulation manager agent. Finally, the sim-
ulation manager produces output files which include details about the agents’
utility, the utilitarian social welfare, established contracts, and allocation de-
tails for debugging purposes. To calculate the utility ratio of the distributed
allocation in comparison to the socially optimal allocations’ welfare, reference
values are computed using the CPLEX optimization engine (IBM 2011). The
socially optimal allocations’ welfare values are output in the simulation result
files.
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Figure 3.7: Simulation system architecture.
Chapter 4
Evaluation
This chapter states the evaluation of the proposed protocol. First, it validates
the protocol specification based on the formal, game-theoretic model. Second,
it verifies safety and liveness properties of the Promela model by means of
the model checker Spin. Third, it presents and discusses the results of the
simulation study that evaluates the protocol implementation.
4.1 Formal protocol analysis
This section evaluates the formal protocol specification, based on the game-
theoretic model, by means of proofs for (i) distributed allocation, (ii) service
dependencies (avoidance of overcommitments), and the proposed mechanism’s
properties: (iii) allocative efficiency, (iv) incentive compatibility, (v) individual
rationality, (vi) budget balance, and (vii) allocation complexity, in accordance
to the requirements (section 2.2.2).
4.1.1 Distributed allocation
Theorem 3. The proposed protocol allows for distributed resource allocation.
Proof. Customer agents ai ∈ AC send their offers to |ASP ,1| SP agents, which
respond with corresponding bids; i.e., in tier 1, there are at least |AC | auctions,
guided by the customer agents. In tier λ, |ASP ,λ| SP agents send their offers to
|ASP ,λ+1| SP agents in the next tier, which respond with corresponding bids;
i.e., in tier λ, there are at least |ASP ,λ| auctions, guided by the SP agents aj ∈
ASP ,λ. Therefore, the protocol allows for distributed resource allocation.
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4.1.2 Service dependencies
In theorem 4, it is shown that the protocol avoids overcommitments (i.e., no
service is procured which cannot be used to produce another service for a cus-
tomer) as follows. Assume that service sij is included in the allocation (x
t
ij = 1).
Then there has been a binding bid for this service by agent aj and the costs for
providing sij – including lower tier bids for services utilized to produce sij – are
less or equal to aj ’s bid. However, according to the protocol, aj submits a bid
if it has received bids for all required services on lower SN tiers. By recursion,
it can be concluded that there cannot be overcommitments in this case.
In the opposite case, sij is not included in the allocation (x
t
ij = 0), there
is either no bid from agent aj to ai, or the bid is rejected. In the latter case,
aj can reject any corresponding bid on lower tiers, and thus no corresponding
service is allocated.
Theorem 4. The proposed protocol avoids overcommitments.
Proof. Let ai ∈ A, aj ∈ ASP . A necessary condition for xtij = 1 is that a
binding bid btij has been submitted. In addition, aj expects a positive utility
by submitting a binding bid btij if and only if it has received b
t
jk∀sjk ∈ ϕ(sij),
such that btij ≥ cij +
∑
sjk∈ϕ(sij) b
t
jk with b
t
jk < mink 6=` b
t
j`. That is, aj has
received binding bids for all services required for the provision of sij and the
total costs do not exceed the minimal payment from ai. If b
t
ij is accepted by
ai (x
t
ij = 1), aj accepts b
t
jk (x
t
jk = 1) with b
t
jk < mink 6=` b
t
j`. By recursion, it
yields xt`m = 1∀s`m ∈ ϕ(sij) and by (2.1) it follows that zt(sij) = xt(sij) = 1.
If aj has either (i) not received b
t
jk∀sjk ∈ ϕ(sij) such that btij ≥ cij +∑
sjk∈ϕ(sij) b
t
jk with b
t
jk < mink 6=` b
t
j`, or (ii) b
t
ij is rejected by ai (x
t
ij = 0), aj
rejects all btjk (x
t
jk = 0). By (2.1) it follows that z
t(sij) = x
t(sij) = 0.
4.1.3 Allocative efficiency
In theorem 5, it is proven that for a single customer the proposed protocol re-
sults in a utilitarian socially optimal allocation for non-substitutable resources.
Theorem 4 is used to eliminate overcommitments in this proof. Due to the
second-price payments, it is individually rational for SP agents to bid their true
marginal cost. Therefore, in each tier, the SP agent with the lowest bid, and
therewith the lowest marginal cost, is allocated. Since the valuation is given
and the costs for service provision are minimized, allocations are utilitarian
socially optimal for single user agents and non-substitutable resources.
Theorem 5. For a single customer request, the proposed protocol results in a
utilitarian socially optimal allocation for non-substitutable resources.
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Proof. By theorem 4 it yields ztij = x
t
ij . By assumption, collusion between SP
agents is excluded (section 2.1.3.2). As SPs receive the second-price payment, it
is individually rational for SPs to submit bids such that btij = cij+
∑
sjk∈ϕ(sij) b
t
jk
with btjk < mink 6=` b
t
j`. It follows b
t
ij =
∑
s`m∈ϕ(sij) c`m with c`m < minm 6=n c`n.
That is, the SPs with minimal costs are contracted along all service network
paths. As vij is given and costs are minimized, the allocation is utilitarian
socially optimal.
4.1.4 Incentive compatibility
It is shown in theorem 6 that the proposed protocol is incentive compatible for
SP agents; it is always rational for SP agents to bid their true marginal cost.
Theorem 6. The proposed protocol is incentive compatible for SP agents.
Proof. Let aj ∈ ASP be a service provider bidding on an offer from agent ai ∈ A
for service sij ∈ S and let cij be the total marginal cost for agent aj for the
provision of service sij . If ∃btik ∈ Bt : btik < cij , agent aj cannot gain positive
utility by submitting a bid btij , such that b
t
ij < b
t
ik∀ak ∈ ASP , since it would
win the reverse auction, but cost would exceed monetary compensation. If
@btik ∈ Bt : btik < cij , there is also no incentive for agent aj to submit a bid
btij < cij , since it would win the auction and receive the second-price payment
mink 6=j btik.
4.1.5 Individual rationality
In theorem 7, it is shown that participation in the protocol is individually
rational, i.e., no agent can obtain negative utility by participating. This results
from the avoidance of overcommitments, proven in theorem 4, which results in
zero penalty payments. Since SP agents bid their true marginal cost (theorem
6), and payments for service provision are never below the submitted bids, the
protocol is individually rational for SP agents. Customer agents never accept
bids higher than their valuation for the requested service and thus cannot receive
negative utility from participating.
Theorem 7. The proposed protocol is individually rational.
Proof. No SP agent can receive negative utility, since by theorem 4, it yields
ztij = x
t
ij ∀ai, aj ∈ A, t ∈ T and therewith no penalty payments, since xtijρtj(sij) =
0∀ai, aj ∈ A, t ∈ T . No SP agent aj ∈ ASP overbids its marginal cost, as shown
in theorem 6. Therefore, SP agents’ bids are equal to the marginal cost for
utilization of own resources and the procurement of lower tier services. Since
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ψtij ≥ btij∀ai, aj ∈ A, t ∈ T , SP agents cannot receive negative utility from
participating. Customer agents do not have costs besides payments and do not
accept bids which exceed their valuation for a service. Thus, customer agents
also cannot receive negative utility from participating.
4.1.6 Budget balance
Theorem 8. The proposed protocol is budget balanced.
Proof. Since both ordinary payments ψtij , as well as penalty payments ρ
t
j(sij),
distribute wealth between the participating agents only, the proposed protocol
is budget balanced.
4.1.7 Allocation complexity
Theorem 9. The proposed protocol complexity is in P.
Proof. For winner and price determination in the single auctions, customer
agents have to determine the lowest and second-lowest bids, i.e., sort the bids
received. This can be done in polynomial time for each customer agent, and
scales linearly with the number of customer agents. SP agents calculate their
bids, respectively marginal cost for service provision, based on the bids received
in higher tiers of the SN. They have to sort the bids received, and perform a
simple comparison and/or addition to calculate the concrete bids. Hence, the
proposed protocol is in P.
4.2 Model checking
Model checking is used to verify the logical consistency of a formal protocol
specification, independent of the implementation, by an automated validation
system. In addition to consistency, further correctness properties can be vali-
dated (Holzmann 1991).
To facilitate the verification of the protocol, this research assumes a de-
terministic disaggregation of customer requests to upstream SN tiers; i.e., the
number of SLAs required in upstream SN tiers is known a priori. Thus, the
required number of agreements in tier λ can be determined by multiplying the
corresponding number of agreements in tier λ+1 with the disaggregation factor.
If the number of required SLAs on each tier would be determined at run time,
depending on the offers made on lower tiers (i.e., randomly), different experi-
ments would not be comparable. Further, this work assumes that agreements
are required in all tiers of the SN, since the decision whether subcontracting is
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required or feasible is beyond the scope of the protocol specification. These as-
sumptions do not mitigate the applicability of the protocol in non-deterministic
environments with varying numbers of tiers – any resulting parameter setting
can be verified ex post, though the set of possible parameter values has to
be defined. As a result, the protocol enables multi-tier resource allocation if
and only if the number of agreements – adjusted by the disaggregation factor
from tier λ = 0 along the whole SN – is equal in all tiers after the protocol
interactions for a single given customer requests have terminated; i.e.,
z(sij) = x(sij) ∀sij ∈ S ⇒ |S0| = |Sn|∀Sn ⊂ S, n > 0, (4.1)
where Sλ denotes the set of contracted services in tier λ. For a single
customer request, establishing a SLA can either fail or a SLA is established in
tier λ = 0 once the execution of the protocol terminates; i.e.,
z(sij) = x(sij) ∀sij ∈ S ⇒ |S0| = 0 ∨ |S0| = 1. (4.2)
The model checker Spin can verify basic safety properties such as absence
of deadlock, unreachable code, unspecified receptions, and invalid end states
on the basis of basic Promela models (Holzmann 1997, pp. 287–288). In
addition, Spin checks the validity of user defined assertions. Therefore, Spin
can generate C-code for a model checking system specific for the given protocol
model (spin -a MTCNP.pmla). The code is compiled for pure safety properties
only (gcc -o pan -DSAFETY pan.c). The execution of the generated program
shows that the model satisfies the safety properties mentioned above, consider-
ing about 1500 states/transitions, which underlines the need for an automated
verification. Since zero unreachable states are reported and no assertion errors
are raised, safety properties are proven for the Promela model.
The liveness properties formulae have been limited to seven tiers due to
memory requirements for checking the proposed model (section 3.2.2). There
is no evidence that a verification would not be possible for a larger number of
tiers. However, due to the recursive model, the memory requirements for model
checking increase exponentially with the number of tiers.
To assess the fulfillment of the requirements, this research needs to verify
that the protocol enables multi-tier resource allocation (4.1) and proper termi-
nation of the protocol for a customer request (4.2). As the maximum number of
tiers has been limited to seven tiers, (4.1) can be proven for n ≤ 6 only. These
properties have to be provided in LTL to be proven by Spin:
CHAPTER 4. EVALUATION 108
♦(
6∧
n=1
|S0| = |Sn| (4.3)
∧(|S0| = 0 ∨ |S0| = 1)).
Therefore, the LTL formula has to be translated to Promela. First, symbol
definitions have to be defined as shown in listing 4.1.
Listing 4.1: Symbol definitions.
1 #define t terminated
2 #define c01 s l a s [ 0 ] == s l a s [ 1 ]
3 #define c12 s l a s [ 0 ] == s l a s [ 2 ]
4 #define c23 s l a s [ 0 ] == s l a s [ 3 ]
5 #define c34 s l a s [ 0 ] == s l a s [ 4 ]
6 #define c45 s l a s [ 0 ] == s l a s [ 5 ]
7 #define c56 s l a s [ 0 ] == s l a s [ 6 ]
8 #define c0 0 s l a s [ 0 ] == 0
9 #define c0 1 s l a s [ 0 ] == 1
Second, a LTL formula equivalent to (4.3) can be passed in command-line
arguments to Spin for translation into never claims. Never claims formalize
behavior that should never happen – potential violations of correctness require-
ments. Thus, they are corresponding to the negated formulae, formalizing vio-
lations of the original:
spin -f ’!(<> (t && s01 && s12 && s23 && s34
&& s45 && s56 && (s0_0 || s0_1)))’
The resulting never claims can then be passed to Spin in a separate file
(MTCNP.pmla.ltl) in order to include them in the generated program (spin -N
MTCNP.pmla.ltl -a MTCNP.pmla). Here, the code has to be compiled without
the optimizations possible for pure safety properties, i.e., state compression,
partial order reduction, and a transition coarsening strategy (Holzmann 1997,
p. 288). The verifier shows that the resulting state space is three to four times
larger than with safety properties optimizations; it reports unreachable states
for the model for the generated never claims, which proves the absence of the
negated formulae; i.e., (4.3) is proven for the Promela model.
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4.3 Simulation
In the simulation study, the resource allocative efficiency of the protocol is
compared to the centralized socially optimal allocation. This study considers
different settings with regard to, e.g., network topology, number of customer
and SP agents. Further, the experiments are executed with and without substi-
tutable resources, i.e., SP agents can decide if they use own resources or procure
sub-services from SP agents in the next tier in case of substitutable resources.
4.3.1 Experimental design
In the experiments, different scenarios from Cloud computing are considered.
In Cloud computing, the assumption of substitutable resources holds in case
of generic service requests (e.g., physical resource near IaaS services such as
CPU or storage resources), while non-substitutable resources exist for specific
services (e.g., SaaS services like specific format conversions or optimizations)
(Armbrust et al. 2010). The experiments are conducted for different network
topologies, as well as different agent parameters (e.g., cost). Details about the
experimental design are given in the following.
Table 4.1 and 4.2 show the deterministic and random simulation experiment
parameters. A set of experiment instances is generated for every deterministic
parameter permutation; i.e., each of the deterministic parameter value vectors
is supplemented by a set of vectors of the random parameters. The required ca-
pacity, SP cost, SP capacities, and SP agent progression intervals, are randomly
determined, based on equal distributions for each experiment instance. The val-
uation function for customer agents is defined as vij = 10wij to guarantee that
at least one non-trivial solution exists for each allocation problem.
Table 4.1: Deterministic experiment parameters.
parameter range
number of customer agents (|AC |) {5, 10, 15, . . . , 100}
number of SP agents in tier 1 (|ASP ,1|) {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}
number of SP agent tiers (|Λ|) {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
Table 4.2: Random experiment parameters.
parameter range (⊂ N)
required capacity (wij) [1, 5]
SP agents’ cost (cij) [5, 10]
SP agents’ capacities (Wj) [5, 10]
SP agent progression interval (δSP ) [2, 10]
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Let ASP ,λ denote the SP agents in tier λ ∈ Λ. The SN topologies are created
as follows. For concurrent customer agents, SP agents in tier 1, aj ∈ ASP ,1 are
generated randomly from an equal distribution in the progression interval δSP .
Then, each SP agent is connected with at least one customer agent ai ∈ AC .
Further, additional connections are created relative to all possible additional
connections (|ASP ,1| − 1) · |AC |. They are generated randomly from a normal
distribution with a mean of 0.1 · (|ASP ,1| − 1) · |AC | and a standard deviation
of 0.1 · (|ASP ,1| − 1) · |AC |.
The number of SP agents in the next tier is again generated randomly from
an equal distribution in the progression interval δSP . Next, each SP agent in
tier λ+ 1 is randomly connected to a SP agent in tier λ. Figure 4.1 illustrates
an example of the SN creation process for this minimal set of edges.
Figure 4.1: SN creation process example for minimal edges.
Additional direct connections are established, relative to all possible addi-
tional direct connections (|ASP ,λ| − 1) · |ASP ,λ−1|. They are randomly taken
from a normal distribution with a mean of 0.1 · (|ASP ,λ| − 1) · |ASP ,λ−1| and a
standard deviation of 0.1 · (|ASP ,λ| − 1) · |ASP ,λ−1|.
Next, multi-tier connections (in this example, from tier λ = 2 to the cus-
tomer agents) are generated, relative to all possible additional multi-tier con-
nections (|ASP ,2| − 1) · |AC |. They are created randomly from a normal distri-
bution with a mean of 0.01 · (|ASP ,2| − 1) · |AC | and a standard deviation of
0.05 · (|ASP ,2|−1) · |AC |. In general, mean and standard deviation for multi-tier
connection probabilities decrease with distance of the tiers involved as follows.
Let λ, λ′ ∈ Λ be the tiers for which multi-tier connections are to be generated
with λ > λ′ ⇒ λ ≥ λ′ + 2, since these are concerning multi-tier connections.
Then, the probability of multi-tier connections from λ to λ′ is a normal distri-
bution with a mean of 0.01 · (|ASP ,λ| − 1) · |ASP ,λ′ |/2(λ−λ′−2) and a standard
deviation of 0.05 · (|ASP ,λ| − 1) · |ASP ,λ′ |/(λ− λ′− 1). Figure 4.2 illustrates the
example of the SN creation process for additional direct and multi-tier edges. If
a SN is instantiated in which one or more customer agents are not connected to
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any SP agent, an additional edge is randomly generated to connect the customer
agent to the SN.
Figure 4.2: SN creation process example for additional and multi-tier edges.
This study includes fifty experiment setups with different random param-
eter values for each permutation of the deterministic parameter values, along
with a corresponding SN topology. That is, fifty experiment setups are gener-
ated with these parameter values and SN topology with distinct random values
for wij , cij , and Wj∀i, j for each experiment instance. The resulting 100 000
experiment instances are executed with fifty time periods (rounds) each, i.e.,
T = {0, . . . , 49}. Thus, customer agents are able to re-request the provision
of services from SP agents if the demand is not fulfilled. SP agents can con-
clude contracts with the largest expected utility first, while they can propose
to provide services to other customer agents in a subsequent time period of the
experiment instance if sufficient capacity remains unallocated. The SP agents
do not bid concurrently to several customer agents in one time period of an
experiment instance to avoid unaccomplishable contracts. Instead, SP agents
propose to provide the requested services with the highest required resource
utilization, i.e., the highest expected SP utility. This research has conducted
all experiments with the three different SP agent bidding policies described.
After each experiment, the social welfare of the simulation’s final allocation is
calculated.
4.3.2 Results
4.3.2.1 Over all experiments
Table 4.3 shows mean, median, and standard deviation (sd) as a function of
the number of customer agents over all experiments. In addition, it shows
the difference (∆) from the previous experiment (line) for median, mean, and
standard deviation.
In general, the utility ratio decreases with an increasing number of customer
agents. However, the decrease flattens for an increased number of customer
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agents and the median is still above 0.82 for the experiments with 100 cus-
tomers. This means that more than 50% of the experiments arrive at or above
an efficiency of 0.82. The standard deviation lies between 0.117 and 0.148 over
all experiments.
Table 4.3: Utility ratio as function of number of customer agents.
|AC | median mean sd ∆median ∆mean ∆sd
5 0.8947 0.8550 0.1471 - - -
10 0.8505 0.8261 0.1349 0.0443 0.0289 0.0122
15 0.8377 0.8183 0.1256 0.0128 0.0078 0.0093
20 0.8308 0.8130 0.1207 0.0069 0.0054 0.0049
25 0.8235 0.8035 0.1202 0.0073 0.0094 0.0005
30 0.8271 0.8064 0.1201 0.0036 0.0029 0.0001
35 0.8276 0.8071 0.1176 0.0005 0.0007 0.0026
40 0.8225 0.8015 0.1199 0.0051 0.0056 0.0023
45 0.8242 0.8021 0.1244 0.0017 0.0007 0.0045
50 0.8307 0.8052 0.1232 0.0065 0.0031 0.0012
55 0.8232 0.8025 0.1234 0.0076 0.0027 0.0002
60 0.8271 0.8007 0.1314 0.0039 0.0018 0.0080
65 0.8291 0.8038 0.1280 0.0021 0.0031 0.0034
70 0.8276 0.8065 0.1249 0.0015 0.0027 0.0031
75 0.8361 0.8095 0.1280 0.0085 0.0030 0.0031
80 0.8333 0.8109 0.1270 0.0028 0.0014 0.0010
85 0.8323 0.8115 0.1242 0.0010 0.0006 0.0028
90 0.8313 0.8088 0.1289 0.0010 0.0027 0.0047
95 0.8333 0.8121 0.1234 0.0020 0.0033 0.0055
100 0.8274 0.8087 0.1231 0.0059 0.0034 0.0003
[5, 100] 0.8326 0.8107 0.1265 - - -
Figure 4.3 shows the utility ratio as a function of the number of customer
agents over all experiments. In the box plots, the box includes 50% of the data
points, i.e., it limits the upper and lower quartiles. This means that 25% of the
data points lie above the box, and 25% lie below it, where the line inside the
box represents the median. For figure 4.3, this means that over all experiments
and all number of customers, more than 75% of the experiments arrive at an
efficiency above 0.7. In all experiments with more than five customers, more
than 75% of the experiments arrive at an efficiency below 0.95.
The ‘whiskers’ (vertical lines) above and below the box are at most 1.5
times the inter-quartile range (distance between the first and third quartiles).
Outliers are marked as single dots below the whiskers. Although the extreme
outliers arrive at an efficiency below 0.2, their number is too small to have a
distinct impact on the mean values.
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Figure 4.3: Utility ratio as function of number of customer agents.
For SNs with more than ten customers, the protocol implementation’s ef-
ficiency is quasi-constant. Therefore, it can be concluded that the protocol
implementation is scalable regarding the number of customers.
Table 4.4 shows mean, median, and standard deviation as a function of the
number of SP agent tiers over all experiments. Additionally, it shows the differ-
ence (∆) from the previous experiment (line) for median, mean, and standard
deviation. The median efficiency of the protocol is decreasing for an increased
number of tiers. The median utility ratio values lie in the interval [0.8, 0.851]
over all experiments. In contrast to the number of customers, the number of
SP agent tiers has a quasi-linear effect on the protocol implementation’s effi-
ciency, i.e., efficiency is decreasing with an increasing number of SP agent tiers.
However, the median of the protocol implementation’s efficiency is still 0.8 for
the experiments with five SP agent tiers. That is, more than 50% of the experi-
ments with five SP agent tiers yield an efficiency at or above 0.8. The standard
deviation lies between 0.108 and 0.138 over all experiments.
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Table 4.4: Utility ratio as function of number of SP agent tiers.
|Λ| median mean sd ∆median ∆mean ∆sd
1 0.8471 0.8379 0.1088 - - -
2 0.8506 0.8298 0.1150 0.0036 0.0081 0.0062
3 0.8351 0.8119 0.1259 0.0155 0.0179 0.0109
4 0.8186 0.7950 0.1335 0.0165 0.0169 0.0076
5 0.8012 0.7787 0.1374 0.0174 0.0163 0.0039
[1, 5] 0.8326 0.8107 0.1265 - - -
Figure 4.4 shows the utility ratio as a function of the number of SP agent
tiers over all experiments. Over all experiments and one to four SP agent tiers,
more than 75% of the experiments arrive at an efficiency above 0.7, while for
five SP agent tiers, the third quartile ends slightly below 0.7. In all experiments,
more than 75% of the experiments arrive at an efficiency below 0.95.
In the experiments with one SP agent tier, there are very few outliers beyond
the whisker, but the worst efficiency lies around 0.5 for these experiments. Since
in this case there is only competition between SPs on one single tier, inefficient
allocations cannot get worse by additional inefficient allocation in the next tier.
The median is decreasing with the number of SP agent tiers and also, the third
quartile (lower part of the box) is wider for an increased number of tiers, i.e., the
standard deviation, especially with regard to lower efficiency values, increases
with the number of SP agent tiers.
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Figure 4.4: Utility ratio as function of number of SP agent tiers.
Table 4.5 shows mean, median, and standard deviation as a function of
the number of SPs in tier 1. In addition, it shows the difference (∆) from
the previous experiment (line) for median, mean, and standard deviation. The
median efficiency of the protocol is increasing for an increased number of SP
agents in tier 1. The median utility ratio values lie in the interval [0.795, 0.849]
over all experiments. Inverse to the number of SP agent tiers, the number of SP
agent in tier 1 has a quasi-linear positive effect on the protocol implementation’s
efficiency, i.e., efficiency is monotonically increasing with an increasing number
of SP agents in tier 1. The median of the protocol implementation’s efficiency
is above 0.82 for the experiments with more than two SP agents in the first tier.
That is, more than 50% of the experiments with more than two SP agents on
the first tier yield an efficiency above 0.82.
The standard deviation lies between 0.097 and 0.164 over all experiments,
and is considerably higher for two SP agents in the first tier. This results from
a low SP-customer-ratio for these experiments and therefore a worse utilization
CHAPTER 4. EVALUATION 116
of the resources, due to the myoptic allocation strategy of the SP agents to
allocate resources for agents with higher demand first.
Table 4.5: Utility ratio as function of the number of SPs in tier 1.
|ASP ,1| median mean sd ∆median ∆mean ∆sd
2 0.7959 0.7724 0.1636 - - -
4 0.8217 0.8007 0.1309 0.0258 0.0283 0.0327
6 0.8333 0.8169 0.1144 0.0117 0.0162 0.0165
8 0.8426 0.8278 0.1048 0.0093 0.0108 0.0096
10 0.8483 0.8354 0.0976 0.0057 0.0077 0.0072
[2, 10] 0.8326 0.8107 0.1265 - - -
Figure 4.5 shows the utility ratio as a function of the number of SPs in tier
1. Over all experiments and four to ten SP agents in tier 1, more than 75%
of the experiments arrive at an efficiency above 0.7, while for two SP agents in
the first tier, the third quartile ends above 0.65. In all experiments, 25% of the
experiments arrive at an efficiency above 0.9.
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Figure 4.5: Utility ratio as function of number of SP agents in tier 1.
Table 4.6 shows the results on a linear regression analysis over all experi-
ments. It contains the utility ratio as the dependent variable, and shows the
influence of the number of customer agents (|AC |), the number of SP agent
tiers (|Λ|), the number of SP agents in tier 1 (|ASP ,1|), the number of SP agents
(|ASP |), the number of total edges of the SN, and the demand-supply-ratio of
the SN on the utility ratio.
All mentioned variables have a significant influence on the utility ratio. The
number of customers has a negative effect on the utility ratio, and therewith
the protocol implementation’s efficiency; since the search space is increased, the
probability of allocating resources suboptimally is also increased. Similarly, the
number of SP agent tiers and the total number of SP agents have negative effects
on the efficiency. In contrast, the number of SP agents in the first tier positively
influences the utility ratio. The number of total edges also has a positive effect
on the utility ratio, while the demand-supply-ratio has a negative effect.
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Table 4.6: Linear regression analysis results.
Dependent variable:
UTILITY RATIO
|AC | −0.001∗∗∗
(0.00003)
|Λ| −0.011∗∗∗
(0.001)
|ASP,1| 0.006∗∗∗
(0.0002)
|ASP | −0.003∗∗∗
(0.0001)
TOTAL EDGES 0.001∗∗∗
(0.00002)
DEMAND SUPPLY RATIO −0.003∗∗∗
(0.0002)
Constant 0.852∗∗∗
(0.002)
Observations 100, 000
R2 0.079
Adjusted R2 0.079
Residual Std. Error 0.121(df = 99993)
F statistic 1, 432.620∗∗∗(df = 6; 99993)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
4.3.2.2 Non-substitutable resources
Table 4.7 shows the mean, median, and standard deviation values for the ex-
periments with non-substitutable resources (NSR) as a function of the number
of customer agents. It also shows the differences between the single experi-
mental settings for these values. More than 50% of the experiments achieve an
efficiency of above 0.81; the median is still above 0.81 for 100 customers. The
standard deviation is 0.094 to 0.145. For an increasing number of customer
agents, the utility ratio decreases for NSR until approximately 50 customer
agents. With more customer agents, the utility ratio is quasi-constant.
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Table 4.7: Utility ratio as function of number of customer agents for non-
substitutable resources.
|AC | median mean sd ∆median ∆mean ∆sd
5 0.9347 0.9096 0.0944 - - -
10 0.9039 0.8843 0.0974 0.0308 0.0253 0.0029
15 0.8916 0.8705 0.1066 0.0123 0.0138 0.0093
20 0.8778 0.8554 0.1112 0.0138 0.0152 0.0046
25 0.8644 0.8388 0.1243 0.0134 0.0166 0.0131
30 0.8671 0.8294 0.1299 0.0027 0.0093 0.0056
35 0.8571 0.8287 0.1215 0.0100 0.0007 0.0084
40 0.8492 0.8193 0.1229 0.0079 0.0094 0.0014
45 0.8419 0.8082 0.1373 0.0073 0.0111 0.0144
50 0.8290 0.7986 0.1380 0.0129 0.0096 0.0007
55 0.8276 0.7984 0.1316 0.0014 0.0002 0.0064
60 0.8218 0.7900 0.1448 0.0057 0.0084 0.0132
65 0.8215 0.7891 0.1416 0.0004 0.0009 0.0033
70 0.8128 0.7880 0.1350 0.0087 0.0011 0.0066
75 0.8187 0.7889 0.1418 0.0060 0.0009 0.0068
80 0.8158 0.7881 0.1367 0.0029 0.0008 0.0051
85 0.8114 0.7872 0.1356 0.0044 0.0009 0.0011
90 0.8141 0.7883 0.1397 0.0027 0.0011 0.0041
95 0.8143 0.7859 0.1360 0.0002 0.0024 0.0037
100 0.8120 0.7911 0.1309 0.0023 0.0051 0.0051
[5, 100] 0.8464 0.8169 0.1336 - - -
Figure 4.6 shows the utility ratio as a function of the number of customer
agents over all experiments with NSR. In all experiments with more than ten
customers, more than 75% of the experiments yield an efficiency below 0.95.
For five and ten customer agents, the efficiency is considerably higher: For five
customers, almost 25% of the experiments yield the optimal result, while for
ten customers, more than 25% still arrive at an efficiency above 0.95.
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Figure 4.6: Utility ratio as function of number of customer agents for non-
substitutable resources.
Table 4.8 shows the numerical results over all experiments with NSR as a
function of the number of SP agent tiers. It shows mean, median, and standard
deviation, as well as the differences from the previous experiment for these
values. The median efficiency of the protocol is quasi-constant for an increased
number of tiers and NSR; it lies in the interval [0.838, 0.858], the standard
deviation values are between 0.108 and 0.151. Since the resources are non-
substitutable across tiers, the number of tiers does not have a considerable
influence on the utility ratio.
The results for the number of SP agent tiers over all experiments with NSR
are shown in figure 4.7. The protocol’s efficiency in these experiments is quasi-
constant, independent of the number of SP agent tiers. The experiments yield
a median utility ratio between 0.83 and 0.86. The standard deviation increases
with the number of SP agent tiers.
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Table 4.8: Utility ratio as function of number of SP agent tiers for non-
substitutable resources.
|Λ| median mean sd ∆median ∆mean ∆sd
1 0.8482 0.8380 0.1088 - - -
2 0.8574 0.8312 0.1224 0.0092 0.0068 0.0136
3 0.8440 0.8132 0.1346 0.0134 0.0180 0.0122
4 0.8426 0.8056 0.1426 0.0014 0.0076 0.0080
5 0.8381 0.7964 0.1510 0.0045 0.0092 0.0084
[1, 5] 0.8464 0.8169 0.1336 - - -
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Figure 4.7: Utility ratio as function of number of SP agent tiers for non-
substitutable resources.
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Table 4.9 shows mean, median, and standard deviation as a function of
the number of SPs in tier 1 for NSR. It also shows the differences from the
previous experiment for these values. The median utility ratio values lie in the
interval [0.761, 0.873] for the experiments with NSR; they are increasing with
the number of SP agents in tier 1. The protocol implementation’s efficiency is
monotonically increasing with an increasing number of SP agents in tier 1: The
number of SP agents in tier 1 has a quasi-linear effect. More than 50% of the
experiments with more than two SP agent tiers yield an efficiency above 0.82,
i.e., the median of the protocol implementation’s efficiency is above 0.82 for the
experiments with more than two SP agents in the first tier.
The standard deviation is considerably higher for two SP agents in the first
tier; it lies between 0.094 and 0.173 over all experiments with NSR. Due to the
myoptic allocation strategy of the SP agents to allocate resources for agents
with higher demand first and, in addition, a low SP-customer-ratio for two SP
agents in the first tier, this results in a worse utilization of the resources.
Table 4.9: Utility ratio as function of the number of SPs in tier 1 for non-
substitutable resources.
|ASP ,1| median mean sd ∆median ∆mean ∆sd
2 0.7610 0.7468 0.1724 - - -
4 0.8289 0.8037 0.1370 0.0679 0.0569 0.0354
6 0.8519 0.8295 0.1176 0.0230 0.0258 0.0194
8 0.8667 0.8482 0.1015 0.0148 0.0187 0.0161
10 0.8726 0.8563 0.0943 0.0059 0.0081 0.0072
[2, 10] 0.8464 0.8169 0.1336 - - -
The utility ratio is shown as a function of the number of SPs in tier 1 for NSR
in figure 4.8. Over all experiments with NSR and four to ten SP agents in tier
1, more than 75% of the experiments arrive at an efficiency above 0.7, while for
two SP agents in the first tier, the third quartile ends in the interval [0.6, 0.65].
In all experiments, almost 25% of the experiments arrive at an efficiency above
0.9.
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Figure 4.8: Utility ratio as function of number of SP agents in tier 1 for non-
substitutable resources.
Table 4.10 shows the results on a linear regression analysis over all ex-
periments for non-substitutable resources. In contains the utility ratio as the
dependent variable, and shows the influence of the number of customer agents
(|AC |), the number of SP agent tiers (|Λ|), the number of SP agents in tier 1
(|ASP ,1|), the number of SP agents (|ASP |), the number of total edges of the
SN, and the demand-supply-ratio of the SN on the utility ratio.
The number of SP agent tiers does not have a significant influence on the
utility ratio, since resources are non-substitutable between SN tiers. All other
variables have a significant influence on the utility ratio. The number of cus-
tomers has a negative effect on the utility ratio, and therewith the protocol
implementation’s efficiency, since the search space is increased and the proba-
bility of allocating resources suboptimally is also increased. Similarly, the total
number of SP agents has a negative effect on the efficiency. In contrast, the
number of SP agents in the first tier positively influences the utility ratio. The
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number of total edges and the demand-supply-ratio also have a positive effect
on the utility ratio.
Table 4.10: Linear regression analysis results for non-substitutable resources.
Dependent variable:
UTILITY RATIO
|AC | −0.002∗∗∗
(0.0001)
|Λ| −0.002
(0.001)
|ASP,1| 0.013∗∗∗
(0.0004)
|ASP | −0.002∗∗∗
(0.0002)
TOTAL EDGES 0.001∗∗∗
(0.00003)
DEMAND SUPPLY RATIO 0.004∗∗∗
(0.0004)
Constant 0.829∗∗∗
(0.004)
Observations 25, 000
R2 0.164
Adjusted R2 0.164
Residual Std. Error 0.122(df = 24993)
F statistic 818.715∗∗∗(df = 6; 24993)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
4.3.2.3 Substitutable resources
In Cloud computing, equivalent generic services (e.g., IaaS) can be produced by
different SPs. That is, the resources to provide these services to customers are
substitutable between SPs. For the composition of the SP agents’ bids for these
services, this research investigates three different bidding policies: best price
resources only (BPRO), external resources first (ERF ), and internal resources
first (IRF ). The results of the simulation study for substitutable resources are
presented in this section.
4.3.2.3.1 BPRO bidding policy Table 4.11 shows mean, median, and
standard deviation as a function of the number of customer agents over all ex-
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periments for substitutable resources for the BPRO bidding policy. Addition-
ally, it shows the differences from the previous experiment for median, mean,
and standard deviation.
In general, the utility ratio decreases with an increasing number of customer
agents. However, the decrease flattens for an increased number of customer
agents and the median is still above 0.75 for the experiments with 100 customers.
That is, more than 50% of the experiments arrive at or above an efficiency of
0.75. The standard deviation lies between 0.105 and 0.138 over all experiments
for substitutable resources and the BPRO bidding policy.
Table 4.11: Utility ratio as function of number of customer agents for substi-
tutable resources and BPRO bidding policy.
|AC | median mean sd ∆median ∆mean ∆sd
5 0.9254 0.9013 0.1055 - - -
10 0.8710 0.8508 0.1173 0.0544 0.0505 0.0118
15 0.8452 0.8275 0.1203 0.0258 0.0233 0.0031
20 0.8324 0.8155 0.1187 0.0128 0.0120 0.0017
25 0.8065 0.7865 0.1243 0.0259 0.0289 0.0056
30 0.8060 0.7857 0.1244 0.0005 0.0008 0.0001
35 0.7975 0.7778 0.1241 0.0084 0.0079 0.0003
40 0.7823 0.7632 0.1319 0.0152 0.0146 0.0078
45 0.7767 0.7578 0.1354 0.0056 0.0054 0.0035
50 0.7861 0.7624 0.1320 0.0094 0.0047 0.0034
55 0.7691 0.7517 0.1323 0.0170 0.0107 0.0004
60 0.7659 0.7476 0.1378 0.0032 0.0041 0.0054
65 0.7735 0.7558 0.1300 0.0076 0.0083 0.0078
70 0.7696 0.7557 0.1281 0.0039 0.0001 0.0019
75 0.7738 0.7566 0.1340 0.0042 0.0008 0.0059
80 0.7818 0.7645 0.1323 0.0080 0.0079 0.0018
85 0.7792 0.7646 0.1267 0.0026 0.0001 0.0056
90 0.7694 0.7566 0.1321 0.0098 0.0080 0.0055
95 0.7783 0.7675 0.1244 0.0089 0.0109 0.0077
100 0.7815 0.7667 0.1250 0.0033 0.0008 0.0005
[5, 100] 0.7983 0.7808 0.1326 - - -
The utility ratio is shown as a function of the number of customer agents
over all experiments for substitutable resources for the BPRO bidding policy
in figure 4.9. More than 75% of the experiments arrive at an efficiency above
0.65. In all experiments with more than five customers, more than 75% of the
experiments arrive at an efficiency below 0.95. For five customers, 25% of the
experiments yield the optimal utility.
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Figure 4.9: Utility ratio as function of number of customer agents for substi-
tutable resources and BPRO bidding policy.
Table 4.12 shows mean, median, and standard deviation as a function of the
number of SP agent tiers over all experiments for substitutable resources and the
BPRO bidding policy, as well as the differences from the previous experiment
for the mentioned values. The standard deviation is in the interval [0.109, 0.137].
The median efficiency of the protocol lies in the interval [0.766, 0.847] and is
decreasing for an increased number of tiers.
The utility ratio as a function of the number of SP agent tiers over all
experiments for substitutable resources and the BPRO bidding policy is shown
in figure 4.10. For one and two SP agent tiers, more than 75% of the experiments
arrive at an efficiency above 0.7, while for four and five SP agent tiers, the third
quartile ends slightly above 0.65. In all experiments, more than 75% of the
experiments arrive at an efficiency below 0.95.
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Table 4.12: Utility ratio as function of number of SP agent tiers for substitutable
resources and BPRO bidding policy.
|Λ| median mean sd ∆median ∆mean ∆sd
1 0.8466 0.8378 0.1090 - - -
2 0.8108 0.7946 0.1266 0.0358 0.0432 0.0176
3 0.7876 0.7702 0.1323 0.0232 0.0245 0.0058
4 0.7716 0.7541 0.1358 0.0160 0.0161 0.0035
5 0.7661 0.7473 0.1369 0.0055 0.0069 0.0010
[1, 5] 0.7983 0.7808 0.1326 - - -
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Figure 4.10: Utility ratio as function of number of SP agent tiers for substi-
tutable resources and BPRO bidding policy.
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Table 4.13 shows the results of the experiments for substitutable resources
and the BPRO bidding policy. It shows mean, median, and standard deviation
as a function of the number of SPs in tier 1, along with the differences from
the previous experiment. The median efficiency of the protocol is increasing
with the number of SP agents in tier 1 and lies in the interval [0.743, 0.826].
The median of the protocol implementation’s efficiency is above 0.779 for the
experiments with more than two SP agents in the first tier. That is, more than
half of the experiments with more than two SP agent tiers yield an efficiency
above 0.779. The number of SP agents in tier 1 has a quasi-linear positive effect
on the protocol implementation’s efficiency; it is monotonically increasing with
an increasing number of SP agents in tier 1, inverse to the number of SP agent
tiers.
The standard deviation is considerably higher for two SP agents in the first
tier. It lies between 0.096 and 0.172 for these experiments. This results from a
low ratio of SP to customer agents for these experiments, and therefore a worse
utilization of the resources, due to the allocation strategy of the SP agents to
allocate resources to agents with higher demand first.
Table 4.13: Utility ratio as function of the number of SPs in tier 1 for substi-
tutable resources and BPRO bidding policy.
|ASP ,1| median mean sd ∆median ∆mean ∆sd
2 0.7437 0.7347 0.1715 - - -
4 0.7790 0.7636 0.1385 0.0353 0.0289 0.0330
6 0.7985 0.7882 0.1195 0.0195 0.0246 0.0189
8 0.8119 0.8015 0.1078 0.0134 0.0133 0.0117
10 0.8256 0.8160 0.0968 0.0137 0.0145 0.0110
[2, 10] 0.7983 0.7808 0.1326 - - -
Figure 4.11 shows the utility ratio as a function of the number of SPs in tier
1 for substitutable resources for the BPRO bidding policy. Over all experiments
and six to ten SP agents in tier 1, more than 75% of the experiments arrive at
an efficiency above 0.7, while for two to four SP agents in the first tier, the third
quartile ends below 0.7. In all experiments, more than 25% of the experiments
arrive at an efficiency above 0.85.
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Figure 4.11: Utility ratio as function of the number of SPs in tier 1 for substi-
tutable resources and BPRO bidding policy.
The results of a linear regression analysis for substitutable resources and the
BPRO bidding policy are shown in table 4.14. In contains the utility ratio as
the dependent variable. The influence of the number of customer agents (|AC |),
the number of SP agent tiers (|Λ|), the number of SP agents in tier 1 (|ASP ,1|),
the number of SP agents (|ASP |), the number of total edges of the SN, and the
demand-supply-ratio of the SN on the utility ratio is analyzed.
All mentioned variables significantly influence the efficiency. The number
of customers has a negative effect on the utility ratio. This results from the
increased search space and the increased probability of suboptimal allocation
of resources. The number of SP agent tiers and the total number of SP agents
also have negative effects on the efficiency. Contrarily, the number of SP agents
in the first tier positively influences the utility ratio. The number of total edges
and the demand-supply-ratio also have a positive effect on the utility ratio.
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Table 4.14: Linear regression analysis results for for substitutable resources and
BPRO bidding policy.
Dependent variable:
UTILITY RATIO
|AC | −0.002∗∗∗
(0.0001)
|Λ| −0.019∗∗∗
(0.001)
|ASP,1| 0.009∗∗∗
(0.0004)
|ASP | −0.002∗∗∗
(0.0002)
TOTAL EDGES 0.001∗∗∗
(0.00003)
DEMAND SUPPLY RATIO 0.004∗∗∗
(0.0004)
Constant 0.847∗∗∗
(0.004)
Observations 25, 000
R2 0.164
Adjusted R2 0.164
Residual Std. Error 0.121(df = 24993)
F statistic 818.559∗∗∗(df = 6; 24993)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
4.3.2.3.2 ERF bidding policy Table 4.15 shows the experiment results
as a function of the number of customer agents for substitutable resources and
the ERF bidding policy. These numerical results include mean, median, and
standard deviation, along with the differences from the previous experiment.
For more than five customer agents, the utility ratio increases with the
number of customer agents. The median is still above 0.83 for the experiments
with 10 customers; i.e., more than 50% of the results are at or above an efficiency
of 0.83 for these experiments. The increase flattens for more than 50 customer
agents and is quasi-constant for more than 75 customer agents. The standard
deviation is in the interval [0.083, 0.132].
Figure 4.12 shows the utility ratio as a function of the number of customer
agents over all experiments for substitutable resources and the ERF bidding
policy. More than 75% of the experiments achieve an efficiency above 0.7.
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Table 4.15: Utility ratio as function of number of customer agents for substi-
tutable resources and ERF bidding policy.
|AC | median mean sd ∆median ∆mean ∆sd
5 0.8704 0.8441 0.1316 - - -
10 0.8309 0.8233 0.1152 0.0394 0.0208 0.0163
15 0.8316 0.8248 0.1004 0.0007 0.0015 0.0148
20 0.8305 0.8244 0.0953 0.0011 0.0003 0.0051
25 0.8348 0.8304 0.0878 0.0043 0.0060 0.0075
30 0.8445 0.8408 0.0850 0.0097 0.0104 0.0028
35 0.8502 0.8425 0.0876 0.0057 0.0017 0.0026
40 0.8546 0.8446 0.0856 0.0044 0.0021 0.0020
45 0.8614 0.8553 0.0831 0.0068 0.0107 0.0026
50 0.8738 0.8623 0.0832 0.0124 0.0070 0.0001
55 0.8705 0.8592 0.0903 0.0033 0.0031 0.0072
60 0.8780 0.8635 0.0944 0.0075 0.0044 0.0040
65 0.8858 0.8685 0.0944 0.0078 0.0050 0.0000
70 0.8915 0.8722 0.0929 0.0058 0.0037 0.0015
75 0.8931 0.8760 0.0928 0.0015 0.0038 0.0002
80 0.8971 0.8753 0.1001 0.0040 0.0007 0.0073
85 0.8992 0.8784 0.0959 0.0022 0.0032 0.0041
90 0.8983 0.8769 0.0997 0.0010 0.0016 0.0037
95 0.8989 0.8759 0.0994 0.0007 0.0010 0.0003
100 0.8969 0.8694 0.1029 0.0020 0.0065 0.0036
[5, 100] 0.8697 0.8554 0.0983 - - -
Except for the experiments with ten customer agents, which show the worst
efficiency for the ERF bidding policy, the third quartile ends above 0.75. The
median increases up to 75 customers and is quasi-constant for more costumer
agents. For these experiments, almost 25% yield an efficiency at or above 0.95.
In contrast, for 15–30 customers, more than 75% of the experiments arrive at
a utility ratio below 0.9.
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Figure 4.12: Utility ratio as function of number of customer agents for substi-
tutable resources and ERF bidding policy.
The numerical results of the experiments for substitutable resources and the
ERF bidding policy are shown in table 4.16 as a function of the number of SP
agent tiers. The table shows mean, median, and standard deviation, as well as
the differences between the experiment settings. The standard deviation lies
between 0.091 and 0.109. The median efficiency of the protocol is decreasing for
an increased number of tiers and the values arrive in the interval [0.846, 0.886]
over all experiments.
Figure 4.13 shows the utility ratio as a function of the number of SP agent
tiers. In these experiments, more than 75% of the experiments arrive at an
efficiency above 0.75, but below 0.95. It is notably higher for two and three SP
agent tiers. There is a trade-off between more SP agents in total, due to more
tiers, and forwarded requests along the complete SN to the last tier, due to the
ERF bidding policy.
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Table 4.16: Utility ratio as function of number of SP agent tiers for substitutable
resources and ERF bidding policy.
|Λ| median mean sd ∆median ∆mean ∆sd
1 0.8462 0.8375 0.1085 - - -
2 0.8857 0.8690 0.0912 0.0396 0.0315 0.0173
3 0.8851 0.8681 0.0933 0.0006 0.0009 0.0021
4 0.8707 0.8579 0.0969 0.0143 0.0102 0.0036
5 0.8556 0.8446 0.0968 0.0152 0.0133 0.0001
[1, 5] 0.8697 0.8554 0.0983 - - -
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Figure 4.13: Utility ratio as function of number of SP agent tiers for substi-
tutable resources and ERF bidding policy.
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Table 4.17 shows mean, median, and standard deviation as a function of the
number of SPs in tier 1 for substitutable resources for the ERF bidding policy.
In addition, it shows the difference (∆) from the previous experiment (line) for
median, mean, and standard deviation. The median efficiency of the protocol
is quasi-constant for six to ten SP agents in tier 1; the values lie in the interval
[0.861, 0.892] over all experiments and in [0.861, 0.866] for six to ten SP agents
in the first tier. The standard deviation lies between 0.085 and 0.124 and is
considerably higher for two SP agents in the first tier. This results from a worse
utilization of the resources, due to SP agents allocating resources for customer
agents with higher demand first. In addition, the SP-customer-ratio is higher
for an increased number of SP agents in tier 1.
Table 4.17: Utility ratio as function of the number of SPs in tier 1 for substi-
tutable resources and ERF bidding policy.
|ASP ,1| median mean sd ∆median ∆mean ∆sd
2 0.8916 0.8590 0.1239 - - -
4 0.8720 0.8548 0.1003 0.0197 0.0042 0.0236
6 0.8652 0.8552 0.0895 0.0068 0.0005 0.0108
8 0.8649 0.8541 0.0877 0.0003 0.0012 0.0018
10 0.8615 0.8539 0.0850 0.0034 0.0002 0.0027
[2, 10] 0.8697 0.8554 0.0983 - - -
The utility ratio is shown as a function of the number of SPs in tier 1 for
substitutable resources and the ERF bidding policy in figure 4.14. Almost 75%
of the experiments arrive at an efficiency above 0.8, and more than 25% of the
experiments even arrive at an efficiency above 0.9. The standard deviation is
considerably smaller for an increased number of SP agents in tier 1.
CHAPTER 4. EVALUATION 135
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
2 4 6 8 10
number of SP agents in tier 1
u
til
ity
 ra
tio
Figure 4.14: Utility ratio as function of the number of SPs in tier 1 for substi-
tutable resources and ERF bidding policy.
Table 4.18 shows the results on a linear regression analysis over all exper-
iments for substitutable resources for the ERF bidding policy. It shows the
results of the analysis of the influence of the number of customer agents (|AC |),
the number of SP agent tiers (|Λ|), the number of SP agents in tier 1 (|ASP ,1|),
the number of SP agents (|ASP |), the number of total edges of the SN, and the
demand-supply-ratio of the SN on the utility ratio as the dependent variable.
All variables have a significant influence on the utility ratio. The number
of customer agents has a positive effect on the efficiency. This results from
the ERF bidding policy, since all intermediate SPs forward their requests to
the next tier and thus all customer demand is cumulated at the last SP tier.
Therefore, the search space for allocations is reduced to a single tier.
The number of total edges has a positive, the demand-supply-ratio a nega-
tive effect on the utility ratio. The number of SP agent tiers and the number
of SP agents in the first tier also negatively influence the utility ratio, since
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concurrency of forwarded requests occurs.
Table 4.18: Linear regression analysis results for for substitutable resources and
ERF bidding policy.
Dependent variable:
UTILITY RATIO
|AC | 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00004)
|Λ| −0.005∗∗∗
(0.001)
|ASP,1| −0.005∗∗∗
(0.0003)
|ASP | −0.002∗∗∗
(0.0002)
TOTAL EDGES 0.001∗∗∗
(0.00002)
DEMAND SUPPLY RATIO −0.012∗∗∗
(0.0003)
Constant 0.898∗∗∗
(0.003)
Observations 25, 000
R2 0.112
Adjusted R2 0.112
Residual Std. Error 0.093(df = 24993)
F statistic 526.290∗∗∗(df = 6; 24993)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
4.3.2.3.3 IRF bidding policy Table 4.19 shows the experiment results
for substitutable resources and the IRF bidding policy: mean, median, and
standard deviation as a function of the number of customer agents, as well as
the differences from the previous experiment for the mentioned values.
The standard deviation is in the interval [0.101, 0.19]. For more than five
up to approximately 75, the utility ratio increases with the number of customer
agents. For more customer agents, it is quasi-constant.
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Table 4.19: Utility ratio as function of number of customer agents for substi-
tutable resources and IRF bidding policy.
|AC | median mean sd ∆median ∆mean ∆sd
5 0.7936 0.7651 0.1894 - - -
10 0.7500 0.7460 0.1608 0.0436 0.0191 0.0286
15 0.7555 0.7505 0.1405 0.0055 0.0046 0.0203
20 0.7613 0.7566 0.1329 0.0058 0.0061 0.0076
25 0.7578 0.7585 0.1223 0.0035 0.0019 0.0106
30 0.7765 0.7697 0.1212 0.0187 0.0112 0.0011
35 0.7897 0.7794 0.1189 0.0132 0.0097 0.0024
40 0.7902 0.7787 0.1164 0.0005 0.0007 0.0025
45 0.7983 0.7872 0.1132 0.0081 0.0084 0.0032
50 0.8152 0.7975 0.1102 0.0169 0.0103 0.0030
55 0.8161 0.8008 0.1101 0.0008 0.0033 0.0001
60 0.8175 0.8017 0.1153 0.0015 0.0009 0.0052
65 0.8233 0.8016 0.1140 0.0058 0.0000 0.0013
70 0.8258 0.8100 0.1090 0.0025 0.0084 0.0050
75 0.8333 0.8164 0.1059 0.0075 0.0065 0.0031
80 0.8310 0.8157 0.1071 0.0023 0.0008 0.0012
85 0.8295 0.8157 0.1037 0.0015 0.0000 0.0034
90 0.8289 0.8133 0.1085 0.0006 0.0024 0.0048
95 0.8338 0.8190 0.1016 0.0049 0.0057 0.0070
100 0.8219 0.8077 0.1075 0.0119 0.0113 0.0059
[5, 100] 0.8072 0.7895 0.1245 - - -
Figure 4.15 shows the results as a function of the number of customer agents.
More than 75% of the experiments arrive at an efficiency above 0.65, except for
five and ten customer agents. For these experiments, the third quartile ends in
the interval [0.6, 0.65].
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Figure 4.15: Utility ratio as function of number of customer agents for substi-
tutable resources and IRF bidding policy.
In table 4.20, mean, median, and standard deviation are shown as a function
of the number of SP agent tiers over all experiments for substitutable resources
and the IRF bidding policy. It also includes the differences from the previous
experiment. The median efficiency of the protocol is decreasing for an increased
number of tiers. The median utility ratio values lie in the interval [0.736, 0.848]
over all experiments. The standard deviation lies between 0.103 and 0.128.
In figure 4.16, the utility ratio is shown as a function of the number of SP
agent tiers for substitutable resources and the IRF bidding policy. More than
75% of the experiments arrive at an efficiency at or above 0.65.
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Table 4.20: Utility ratio as function of number of SP agent tiers for substitutable
resources and IRF bidding policy.
|Λ| median mean sd ∆median ∆mean ∆sd
1 0.8475 0.8385 0.1087 - - -
2 0.8393 0.8244 0.1039 0.0082 0.0141 0.0049
3 0.8169 0.7960 0.1180 0.0223 0.0284 0.0141
4 0.7792 0.7624 0.1278 0.0377 0.0336 0.0098
5 0.7365 0.7265 0.1276 0.0427 0.0359 0.0002
[1, 5] 0.8072 0.7895 0.1245 - - -
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Figure 4.16: Utility ratio as function of number of SP agent tiers for substi-
tutable resources and IRF bidding policy.
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Table 4.21 shows mean, median, and standard deviation as a function of the
number of SPs in tier 1 for substitutable resources and the IRF bidding policy.
In addition, it shows the differences (∆) from the previous experiment (line) for
median, mean, and standard deviation. The median efficiency of the protocol
is increasing for an increased number of SP agents in tier 1. The median utility
ratio values lie in the interval [0.761, 0.829] over all experiments.
The standard deviation lies between 0.105 and 0.150 over all experiments,
and is considerably higher for two SP agents in the first tier. This results from
a low SP-customer-ratio for these experiments and therefore a worse utilization
of the resources, due to the myoptic allocation strategy of the SP agents to
allocate resources for agents with higher demand first.
Table 4.21: Utility ratio as function of the number of SPs in tier 1 for substi-
tutable resources and IRF bidding policy.
|ASP ,1| median mean sd ∆median ∆mean ∆sd
2 0.7619 0.7492 0.1500 - - -
4 0.7966 0.7809 0.1258 0.0347 0.0317 0.0242
6 0.8099 0.7948 0.1153 0.0133 0.0139 0.0105
8 0.8215 0.8073 0.1100 0.0116 0.0125 0.0053
10 0.8284 0.8156 0.1052 0.0069 0.0083 0.0048
[2, 10] 0.8072 0.7895 0.1245 - - -
Figure 4.17 shows the utility ratio as a function of the number of SPs in tier
1 for substitutable resources and the IRF bidding policy. Over all experiments
and more than two SP agents in tier 1, 75% of the experiments arrive at an
efficiency above 0.7. In all experiments, more than 25% of the experiments
arrive at an efficiency above 0.85.
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Figure 4.17: Utility ratio as function of the number of SPs in tier 1 for substi-
tutable resources and IRF bidding policy.
The results of a linear regression analysis over all experiments for substi-
tutable resources and the IRF bidding policy are shown in table 4.22. It con-
tains the utility ratio as the dependent variable, and shows the influence of
the number of customer agents (|AC |), the number of SP agent tiers (|Λ|), the
number of SP agents in tier 1 (|ASP ,1|), the number of SP agents (|ASP |), the
number of total edges of the SN, and the demand-supply-ratio of the SN on the
utility ratio.
All mentioned variables have a significant influence on the utility ratio. The
number of customers has a negative effect on the utility ratio, and therewith
the protocol implementation’s efficiency; since the search space is increased, the
probability of allocating resources suboptimally is also increased. The number
of SP agent tiers has a negative effect on the utility ratio, and therewith the
protocol implementation’s efficiency. This results from an increased probability
of allocating resources suboptimally in tiers closer to the customer agents first.
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In contrast, the number of SP agents in the first tier positively influences the
utility ratio. The number of total edges has a positive, the demand-supply-ratio
a negative effect on the utility ratio.
Table 4.22: Linear regression analysis results for for substitutable resources and
IRF bidding policy.
Dependent variable:
UTILITY RATIO
|AC | −0.0001∗∗
(0.0001)
|Λ| −0.019∗∗∗
(0.001)
|ASP,1| 0.006∗∗∗
(0.0003)
|ASP | −0.005∗∗∗
(0.0002)
TOTAL EDGES 0.001∗∗∗
(0.00003)
DEMAND SUPPLY RATIO −0.007∗∗∗
(0.0004)
Constant 0.835∗∗∗
(0.003)
Observations 25, 000
R2 0.211
Adjusted R2 0.210
Residual Std. Error 0.111(df = 24993)
F statistic 1, 111.687∗∗∗(df = 6; 24993)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
4.3.3 Discussion
The results of the simulation study provide evidence for the efficacy of the
proposed protocol in different settings and network topologies, for substitutable
and non-substitutable resources, and for the different SP agent bidding policies
(for substitutable resources).
The utility ratio decreases with an increasing number of customer agents
for non-substitutable resources. This result is intuitive, as the competition for
SP agents’ resources increases with the number of concurrent customer agents.
In addition, the difficulty to find a socially optimal allocation increases with
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the number of concurrent customer agents. The same applies for substitutable
resources for the BPRO bidding policy. For substitutable resources and the
IRF and ERF bidding policies, the utility ratio is increasing with an increasing
number of customer agents. Although the competition for SP agents’ resources
increases with the number of concurrent customer agents in these cases, the
negative effects of preferring lower tier (IRF ) or higher tier (ERF ) SP agents’
resources is counteracted by the higher number of requested resources over all
SP agents. That is, with an increasing number of customer agents, less effi-
cient single allocations are antagonized by the higher total number of resources
allocated to customer agents.
For substitutable resources, the IRF and BPRO bidding policies are domi-
nated by the ERF bidding policy for an increasing number of customer agents.
This results from the fact that SP agents using the BPRO bidding policy never
combine procured services from upstream SP agents with services they produce
using their own resources. Thus, SP agents are more likely to submit partial
bids to customer agents; those bids are refused, as they do not fulfill the cus-
tomer agents’ requirements. For the IRF bidding policy, SP agents do combine
procured services from upstream SP agents with services they produce using
their own resources. However, the IRF bidding policy limits the choice of re-
sources to the extend of which the required capacity for fulfilling a customer
agent’s request exceeds the available capacity of the SP agent. Since the effects
of choosing suboptimal allocations are counteracted by the effects of the larger
solution space, the ERF bidding policy converges to an efficiency of about 0.9.
Further, the SP agents using the ERF bidding policy can still choose from com-
peting SP in upstream SN tiers, potentially allocating the resources from the
most cost-efficient SP in the lowest tier.
For non-substitutable resources, the efficiency of the protocol is slightly
decreasing for an increased number of SP agent tiers, though it is not monoton-
ically decreasing. The allocation complexity increases with additional tiers, as
the solution space increases. This leads to decreased efficiency of the distributed
allocation.
For an increasing number of SP agent tiers and substitutable resources the
efficiency of the BPRO bidding policy decreases monotonically, since, in average
over all experiments, the number of SP agents – and therewith the solution
space – also increases with the number of tiers. Hence, it is more difficult to
approximate optimal allocations. The ERF bidding policy’s efficiency is quasi-
constant, regarding the number of tiers. Here, the converse effects of suboptimal
allocations and increased solution space lead to quasi-constant efficiency of the
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protocol, independent of the number of tiers. For the IRF bidding policy, the
efficiency of the allocations decreases with the number of tiers. The reason is
that with this bidding policy it is more likely that resources of a suboptimal SP
agent are allocated to the provision of a service, as the customer agents (i) do
not have access to upstream SP agents and (ii) the SP agents in tier 1 try to
sell their own resources, for which the cost can be higher than in upstream SN
tiers, first.
All bidding policies obviously show approximately the same efficiency for
one SP tier. For |Λ| > 1, i.e., more than one SP tier, the difference in bidding
policy efficiency is obvious. For the BPRO bidding policy, the efficiency of
the allocations monotonically decreases with the number of tiers in quasi-linear
form. The same applies for the IRF bidding policy. The ERF bidding policy’s
efficiency leads to quasi-constant efficiency of the protocol, independent of the
number of tiers.
For non-substitutable resources, the utility ratio increases for additional SP
agents in tier 1. Since the competition cannot be increased as the resources are
non-substitutable, the larger number of SP agents in tier 1 does not significantly
increase the probability that customer requests can be fulfilled to their full
extend after reaching a threshold.
The utility ratio increases for the BPRO and IRF bidding policies with
an increasing number of SP agents in tier 1. It is quasi-constant for the ERF
bidding policy. An increased utility ratio for additional SP agents in tier 1 for
substitutable resources for the IRF and BPRO bidding policies results from a
larger number of SP agents in this tier and therewith an increased competition
and probability, respectively, that a customer request can be fulfilled to its full
extend. The increased competition in tier 1 increases the probability of more
cost-efficient SP agents to be located on this tier. However, for the ERF bidding
policy, the increased competition is counteracted by prioritization of higher tier
SP agents’ resources. Thus the utility ratio for additional SP agents in tier 1
for substitutable resources is quasi-constant for the ERF bidding policy.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
Concluding the research, this chapter recapitulates the key contributions and
summarizes the utilized procedure and methods to develop them. It discusses
limitations of the proposed protocol for resource allocation and gives an outlook
on future research to complement the results of this thesis.
5.1 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are a multi-tier resource allocation protocol for
composite service provision over multiple SN tiers, along with a formal frame-
work which considers contractual dependencies. To solve the problem of multi-
tier dependencies in resource allocation in SNs, this research has applied an
interaction protocol engineering perspective. A game-theoretic problem anal-
ysis, based on the framework, has been performed. It has been shown that
computing socially optimal allocations in SNs is NP-complete and that Nash
equilibria exist for these allocations.
A game-theoretic model of the protocol has been presented. It has been
proven that the proposed protocol prevents overcommitments. In addition,
the protocol is incentive compatible for SP agents, individually rational, and
budget balanced; it also constitutes a polynomial time heuristic for the social
welfare maximization problem. Under the assumption that resources are non-
substitutable between SPs, it guarantees socially optimal allocations for single
customer requests.
The protocol specification has been provided in UML sequence diagrams,
finite state machines, and a Promela model. To formally verify safety as well
as liveness properties, the model checker Spin has been applied.
The proposed protocol has been implemented as a reusable capability for
the Jadex BDI agent system. Simulation experiments have been executed, using
145
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 146
this implementation along with Jadex BDI agents for different Cloud comput-
ing scenarios. In these experiments, the allocative efficiency of the protocol
has been compared to the optimal allocation as a centralized benchmark in dif-
ferent settings (e.g., number of customer and SP agents) for three SP bidding
policies. Further, the simulation study has been conducted with and without
substitutable resources, i.e., SP agents can decide if they use own resources or
procure sub-services from SP agents in the next tier in case of substitutable re-
sources. The simulation-based evaluation has demonstrated the efficacy, utility,
and quality of the protocol. This thesis has shown that the protocol provides
means for multi-tier resource allocation without centralized control; therefore,
the required ad hoc contracting of the needed services is facilitated, honoring
the dependencies of agreements over multiple SN tiers.
5.2 Future research
Future research might be conducted in four directions. First, probabilistic the-
ory can be used to decrease response time and communication complexity if
the requesting customer requires an immediate response. If the response time
is non-critical, SPs can apply the proposed protocol and can store responses
from other SP agents. If it is critical, SP agents can use this stored knowl-
edge to respond to customers quickly. As a matter of principle, SP agents
cannot avoid overcommitments if they rely on historical data and respond to
their customers based on probabilistic data. Second, more work needs to be
done on developing (probabilistic) decision models for SPs. Service produc-
tion functions with different types and combinations of substitutable as well as
non-substitutable resources have to be considered.
Third, below-penalty decommitments, respectively leveled commitments,
can be combined with the proposed protocol. Together with advanced schedul-
ing for SP agents’ resource utilization, these approaches have shown to have
merits for the allocative efficiency in settings with uncertainty. Fourth, the
protocol can be used with different pricing schemata. In this research, resource
utilization is assumed to be certain once an agreement with a customer agent is
established. However, resource utilization may be fuzzy to a certain degree, and
the application of revenue management methods like overbooking can provide
benefits for SP agents. In contrast, an aggressive application of these methods
can have a negative effect on the providers’ reputation.
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